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The Hope of a New World

WILLIAM TEMPLE

Archbishop of York

IF we are to hope and work for a new world with any confidence, we must have as clear a notion as possible about the faults of the old world. Of course it is quite clear that a great deal was wrong with it. Otherwise it could not have plunged again into the catastrophe of general war. But it is not very useful to see or to say this, unless we see where the wrong actually lies. About one part of the answer to this question, I have no doubt whatever. About the other part I have an equally strong personal assurance, though I find that some who agree with the first part of my jeremiad, disagree with me about the second.

WE HAVE NEGLECTED GOD

The summary of the first part is this: we have neglected God and His laws. Historians of the future will admire much about the nineteenth century and its products in the early decades of this century. But they will, I am sure, express a bewildered astonishment at the attitude to God and faith in God which increasingly prevailed in that period—I mean the attitude which regards God and faith in God as an optional extra, so to speak; to be added according to taste when the requirements of a decent human life have been met—the attitude often expressed in the astonishingly silly saying that a man's religion is a private affair between him and his Maker. The prevalence of this childishly superficial attitude has been possible only because we have inherited a civilization largely permeated by principles which derive all their validity from faith in God, and indeed in God as Christians have learned to understand Him, and have not troubled to know on what those principles rest. These principles were so firmly rooted in the minds of our fathers and grandfathers that they took them for granted, even when they ceased to attend to their source. It has taken the shock of this war, and the perception of what is at stake in it, to call the attention of multitudes once more to the real foundation of the way of life which we are fight-

ing to preserve. And there are multitudes more for whom that has not yet happened even now.

The prevalent feeling of our countrymen when they contemplate the Nazi tyranny, is a sense of outrage. It seems incredible that men should really believe what they have proclaimed as their convictions. It is not what they do that horrifies us so much as what they preach. People often say to a preacher: "Practise what you preach." That is a very wholesome prod for the preacher's conscience; but if the preacher in fact preaches nothing more than he can practise, he is preaching very badly. The trouble with the Nazis is not that they do not practise what they preach. It is that they do preach what they practise. Their standards are perverted. Their right is our wrong.

The realization of it is horrifying. For a long time we could not believe it. They told us very plainly what they believed and what, accordingly, they meant to do. But we went on hoping that if only we gave them a little relief here and a small concession there, they would turn out to be decent human beings after all. Of course we know that when Hitler sent his troops into the Rhineland we ought to have driven them out again at once. I do not mean that we ought to have fought for every clause of the Treaty of Versailles. In fact, we ought to have modified parts of it a great deal earlier than that, and then perhaps Hitler would never have won his power at all. But though we are partly responsible for the opportunity which the evil genius of Germany has seized, we ought as we see now, to have resisted that evil genius from the outset. Our failure to do this and our failure to recognize the evil thing, had one chief cause. We had settled down into a comfortable enjoyment of a life which sprang from, and could only be safeguarded by, a living Christian faith. We thought what we had learned to value must be prized by all sane men. When we find these things so precious to us despised by others, and look for the ground of our confidence in them, we can in fact, find this nowhere except in God as Christ has made Him known.

So we come back to the paradox of modern English culture, which is Christian in quality yet regards faith in God as a dispensable indulgence. This reaches its climax in our educational system. We have supposed that it is possible to provide education which is religiously neutral, to which religion can then be added in greater or less measure. But, in fact, an education

which is not religious is atheistic. There is no middle way. If you give to children an account of the world from which God is left out, you are teaching them to understand the world without reference to God. If He is then introduced, He is an excrescence. He becomes an appendix to His own creation.

If God exists at all, it is obvious that He is the most important of all existing things. We can understand nothing properly until we see it in its relation to God and His purpose. If we are to save those precious things which we are fighting to preserve from obliteration in the overflowing flood of Nazi barbarism, our first need is to return to God and see ourselves as His creatures, dependent in all things upon Him.

It was natural that neglect of God should lead to violation of His law, I am not now thinking of the Ten Commandments but of that general law or order of things, which is the framework of our lives and found particular expression, adapted to the circumstances of another age, in the economic legislation of the Old Testament. We need to appreciate again not only the profound wisdom of that legislation for its own time, but the abiding importance of its underlying principle. For that principle is precisely the allowing of free play to individual initiative in such a way that no man requires the right to possess, to exploit or to hold down his neighbor.

WHEN LIFE HAS A MEANING

To a great many people the traditional language of Christians has become meaningless. It does not fit in with their way of looking at life. They scarcely know what we mean by the word "sin," supposing it to consist in consciously doing what is known or believed to be wrong. But this is only one part of the whole great fact of sin—the visible part, so to speak. It is the symptom, not the disease; the inflammation, not the poison. All is sin that falls short of God's will for it, and the essence of man's sin is his self-centeredness. But this is forgotten, and because people have so scanty an understanding of sin they attach no meaning whatever to redemption. The result is that when we preach the Gospel, we are shooting over their heads. It makes no impact on them.

But there is something of which many people are acutely aware, and of which a great many more quite easily become aware; this is futility and that baffled irritation which we have learned to call "frustration." It became

manifest in the last war and is now manifest again, and what gives meaning and value to life is a cause to which life can be devoted. Life finds its value in a cause for which it is worth while to die. No man who is actually serving such a cause, however small his own contribution to it, ever feels frustrated. At present we have all found such a cause. It is worth while to die at the hands of the barbarous Nazi tyranny, if we may thus do something to secure justice and freedom for the generations to come.

It is a characteristic of war that it provides sharp alternatives. We may have to choose between loyalty with death on one side and life with shame on the other. The right choice is glorious and therefore comparatively easy. It is easier to die for a cause than to live for it. Living for it means the setting aside of pleasure and self-interest in a host of little choices, where there is no glory, at least in men's eyes, on the one side and no open shame on the other. Yet if life is to keep for us its dignity and value, we must find something to live and die for in peace as in war.

Some find this in the pursuit of knowledge or of beauty; but we cannot all be scientists or artists; and even for them, their chosen ideals never cover the whole of life. Nothing does that except the purpose of God. The one sovereign cure for a sense of futility and frustration is faith in God. If anyone's faith in God were complete, so that he trusted God with his whole being, that would give direction and meaning to every moment of his time and every jot of his activity; and a man has this sense of direction and meaning in life just so far as he really does believe and trust in God.

We had let that slip into the background. Is it not true that a great number of us had come to think of comfort, pleasure and amusement as the real object of life? We had to do a job of work so as to earn the means of enjoying ourselves when it was done; but that enjoyment was what we really lived for—not for the service to the common good that we gave through our work. And why did we shirk, as undoubtedly we did, our share of the burden of maintaining international order? Was it not once more our unwillingness for the discipline and discomfort of military training? Of course this was not the only reason; but I am sure it played its part. A rather sentimentalized faith combined with a rather aimless love of comfort, to make us hope for the blessings of peace without shouldering our share of its burden. Especially have we been unwilling to ask our neighbors or our children for hard or difficult service. Even when we have accepted high

standards for ourselves, we have hesitated to call others to live by them. But this is sheer arrogance masquerading as kindness. You cannot insult a man more atrociously than by offering him a lower standard than your own. We must recover faith—virile faith—in God, and dedication—costly dedication—to His service, if we are not to slip back into the rather listless and complacent state from which the challenge of the war has roused us.

"All very well," perhaps you say, "but how am I to follow God's purpose in my life? Am I to believe that His purpose for me is the monotonous drudgery which is demanded of so many folk today?" Here we come to the second group of considerations: Because we have neglected God, we have also neglected His Law. We have forgotten that we are His creatures equally with the other animals and with the earth itself. Leaving God out of account, we have found ourselves able to utilize all natural resources for our purposes and have regarded ourselves as lords of creation. So we have turned the bounty of nature to the satisfaction of our greed, with the result that the whole economic system is now upside down. It is clear that, in the natural order of things, God's order, the object of all industry is the supply of men's wants. In the language of the economist, the consumer is the person whose interest should be supreme in determining the whole process. For his sake goods are produced. Finance comes in as the servant of production. But in our world, goods are produced, not primarily to satisfy the consumer but to enrich the producer. The profit-motive predominates over the service-motive; and this inversion of all that is right has gone so far that now finance controls production instead of production controlling finance. And the consumer, for whose benefit alone production really goes on at all, becomes no more than an indispensable condition of successful business enterprise.

The predominance of the profit-motive is itself a source of war. The industrial system familiar to us before the war broke out was itself a predisposing cause of war. Also it stood condemned as ineffective in its function, by the fact of widespread unemployment. It must be remodelled. But if that is done under pressure of competing class-interests, the remedy may be worse than the disease. We must try to find God's way of ordering our life and follow that "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things"—food, clothing, economic good as a whole—"shall be added unto you."

We constantly remind ourselves that this is a war between freedom and tyranny. That is absolutely true, and cannot be too prominent in our minds. If the Nazis win there will be no freedom left in Europe for many a year to come—no freedom of conscience, for the young people will be trained to believe that the leader is always right; no freedom of speech, for criticism of the leader and his subordinates is forbidden; no freedom of thought, for if men may not express their thoughts their minds will atrophy; no freedom of spirit, for allegiance to the State will be inculcated as the only way of serving God.

SELF-INTEREST VERSUS COMMON SERVICE

Against this repudiation of freedom we are fighting. But let us remember that in the last twenty years we have seen nations deliberately reject freedom, believing it to be a source of disunion, a hindrance to fellowship, and a cause of degeneration. When great multitudes of people adopt an idea it may be more false than true, but it is unlikely to be simply and solely false. What have these people seen in free institutions which has led them to repudiate freedom for themselves and try to spread that repudiation through the world as a kind of new gospel? Let us try to draw the picture which they have had before their minds. It is a picture of society where everyone claims the right to do what seems good to him; where each individual, each family, above all each economic class, puts self-interest before all other considerations; where at times of political elections, candidates compete in offering to different sections of the constituency the satisfaction of their own desires; where those politicians gain power and determine policy who are most skillful in offering attractive baits for voters. In other words, it is a society where every man uses his freedom to advance his own interest. In contrast with this, is set the vision of a society where all are swept into the service of the common purpose by suppression of individual desires and the enlistment of each in the enterprise of all.

I am not now concerned with the methods by which, in fact, the intense unification of Germany has been carried out—the Gestapo, concentration camps and the like. I am concerned with the German picture of the democratic nations. Is there any real truth in it? Of course it is not wholly true.

The unity of our people in the war effort of this moment would be impossible if that picture were wholly true. But when we look back to the days of peace, do we not recall many features in our national life which bear a closer resemblance to this German caricature than we like? And if we have to admit this, must we not go on to ask how far freedom is necessarily accompanied by these bad results, and what we can do to avoid them?

THE NEED FOR A STEADY PURPOSE

Freedom is not a perfectly simple idea. At first, we mostly understand it as being allowed to do what we choose, and that is certainly part of it. But whether this will, in fact, lead to our happiness depends on our capacity—moral and intellectual—to choose wisely. If at any moment our desires are thwarted, that, so far as it goes, is agreeable and makes us to that extent less happy. But if the desire is for something unwholesome, the satisfaction of it may make us a great deal more unhappy. The fact is, that along with all our momentary desires we have some steady purpose in life, and fulfillment of this has much more to do with happiness than has the satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of desires. For example, we very quickly learn to make physical health, or keeping fit, a part of our steady purpose. It may involve refusing to eat some kinds of food which would give us a great deal of momentary pleasure. If that is so, our happiness depends on the self-control which enables us to refuse the unwholesome delicacy. In other words, the freedom that matters is not freedom to satisfy our momentary desires, but freedom to fulfil our steady and constant purpose. The main business of education is to strengthen our capacity to form and follow an adequate purpose throughout life.

How do we form that purpose? If we are left to ourselves, we build it up by putting together the things that matter most to us and so arranging life as to secure a reasonable amount of these. Each man's selection will vary according to his gifts, temperament and interests. But for every one they will include a home of sufficient comfort and congenial companionship. These objects will lead a man to develop his gregarious instincts—his impulses towards common feeling and generosity—to a considerable extent. Also he will readily accept so much regulation of his life by law as obtains for him security through the same regulation of other people's lives. Such a man may be a law-abiding, useful citizen and an agreeable member of his

own society. But in the end his own happiness, comfort and convenience are the decisive factors in directing his life and in moulding his estimate of social or national policy. His first, and probably last, question concerning any proposal, personal or public, will be: How does this affect me and my family or friends? Other questions may come in between; but that is likely to come both first and last and the answer to it almost alone decides his attitude.

If my freedom means chiefly my being left to do what I choose, it must chiefly express itself in this way. And a society based on that kind of freedom alone will be a welter of competing selfishness, held together in some kind of order because chaos means misery for all; but the order of that society may be broken up by any group which at any time has both desire and power to gain some advantage by an upheaval. This is the freedom which expresses itself in strikes and lock-outs and other features of a democratic system which have led the totalitarian countries to turn away from freedom as from a radically false principle of life.

THE WELL-SPRING OF ENGLISH LIBERTY

It cannot be denied that a great part of the inspiration of democracy has come from this self-assertive type of freedom. It has advanced by attack upon privilege and affirmation of rights. Mazzini constantly urged that it should be based, rather upon duties than upon rights; but it is at best doubtful whether, in this respect, he was able to exert any powerful influence. We have to recognize that democracy as we have known it, displays some of the characteristics for which the totalitarian States denounce it. We must also recognize that so long as men base their attachment to freedom on the opportunity which it brings to follow their own choice or purpose, so long will freedom and democracy deserve at least some measure of that denunciation.

But there is an older tradition of freedom than that which has been so prominent since the time of the French Revolution. Its authentic formulation is: "We must obey God rather than men." The real reason why the State must not presume to dictate to me my manner of life and thought is not that I am myself, but that I am a child of God. Historically, the first claim to liberty successfully asserted against the modern State was the claim to worship God according to conscience. It is this which makes the Dutch Protestants, who rose against Philip II of Spain, the true pioneers of Euro-

pean liberty; and the successful assertion of the same claim by groups attached to different beliefs in a series of political upheavals, was the well-spring of English liberty as we know it today. Often these pioneers had little understanding of what they were doing, and set no store at all by liberty as a principle. But they heard in their consciences what they believed to be the voice of God and by the constancy of their obedience to that voice, they won the right to freedom of conscience for themselves and for us.

Freedom of conscience that is the sacred thing. Not freedom to do what I choose or to fulfil my own purpose, but freedom to do what I ought, and to fulfil God's purpose for me. Of course the political forms which guarantee this freedom of conscience open the way also to the freedom of self-assertion; and this latter always follows the other like a dark shadow.

In the pressures of the modern world, a freedom of man in his human right alone cannot stand; nor does it deserve to stand. It is a sham and a usurpation. It is a sham because it poses as real freedom when, in fact, it is nothing of the kind. "Doing what I like" is what St. Paul accurately describes as "the body of this death." For my likes and dislikes are not free. They are fixed by my heredity, training and circumstance. As I pursue my self-chosen way, I come inevitably into collision with others pursuing theirs and in the conflict both lose all satisfaction. If you watch the characters in Shakespeare—most penetrating reader of the hearts of men—you will find that only his villains assert their power to control their own lives—men like Edmund in "King Lear" or Iago in "Othello." So far as I am not coerced by others, I have a formal kind of freedom for I, myself, am the origin of my conduct. But there is no substance in that freedom for from myself there is no escape.

This self-centered freedom—"I am the master of my fate"—is a snare to the individual and a menace to society. For the individual supposes himself free because he is "tied and bound by the chain of his sins" and the society is called free because its members are unhindered in destroying it if they will. Once again, the expression of this liberty is in strikes and lock-outs, which are the result of the free self-assertion of one group against another group to the detriment of society as a whole, and probably also of both the groups concerned.

But if I claim freedom over against the State because I am a child of

God and must obey Him rather than men, there is no risk (except so far as I delude myself) that I shall use this freedom to pursue my own advantage to the detriment of either my neighbors or society as a whole. For God loves all His children, and that divine purpose which I claim liberty to serve includes the welfare of them all. This freedom is indeed indestructible by the earthly State, except through the extermination of all who assert it; but it is no enemy to a State which aims at establishing justice between its members, for in pursuit of that aim the State will find its God-fearing citizens actively cooperating.

Every day it becomes clearer that the root of the main political problems of today is religious—the presence or absence of faith in God. If this world is the creation of God who is the Father of all men and has made Himself known in Jesus Christ, each man, because he is a child of God, has a dignity higher than any earthly title and a value independent of any State. That is his claim to freedom, and the claim carries with it the security against its own abuse. For it is freedom to serve God. Samuel Taylor Coleridge was profoundly right when he defined man's true freedom as "the power of the human being to maintain the obedience, which God through the conscience has commanded, against all the might of nature."

So our service of freedom in these days requires of us two things: first, that we should save it from the threat which hangs over it, by driving back and destroying the Nazi tyranny; but also that we should see to it that our freedom is rooted in that faith in God which alone can nurture it as a vigorous and healthy plant. We must return to God, and learn again, by experiment and experience, how true it is that His service is perfect freedom, and that the only true freedom is His service. However, our present duty is to secure the freedom we defend not only from external attack but from internal decay. If the aim of the last war was to make the world safe for democracy and freedom, our aim in this war must be to make freedom and democracy safe for the world. It is my conviction that only a freedom rooted in faith is able to survive or deserves to survive. Man must learn again that he is not the lord of creation but himself a creature, and acknowledge the gift of freedom, also confess "Our wills are ours to make them Thine." Thus our hope for a new world is in Him who declares from the throne of heaven, "Behold, I make all things new."

The Conscientious Objector in American Law

PAUL GIA RUSSO

THE structural status of the conscientious objector in American law was erected in the opening session of the first Congress of the United States in 1789. The basic issue—constitutional right or legislative privilege—was grappled with by the framers of the Bill of Rights. Their resolution remains rock-bottom throughout the legal history of the principle of religious pacifism.

James Madison considered the subject of conscientious objection important enough to give it constitutional status in his original list of proposed amendments which formed the basis for the Bill of Rights. One of his presentations read as follows: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; *but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.*" In the opinion of James Madison and others, the principle of religious pacifism was one which should be protected by the Constitution.

But some did not agree. Debate ran high. Representative Benson, who best expressed the opposing viewpoint, thought that "no man can claim this indulgence of right. It may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Government. If this stands a part of the Constitution it will be a question before the judiciary on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of the militia. . . . I have no reason to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but they ought to be left to their discretion."

"I can conceive it," said Congressman Scott, "to be a legislative right altogether. There are many sects, I know, who are religiously scrupulous in this respect; I do not mean to deprive them of any indulgence which the law affords; my design is to guard against those who are of no religion."

But proponent Boudinot fought for its passage: "I hope that in establishing this Government, we may show the world that proper care is taken

that the Government may not interfere with the religious sentiments of any person."

Later the subject was referred to committee for consideration and it reported in favor of Mr. Madison's original proposal. When put to a vote it was passed by a small majority. Then came consideration by the Senate which, debating the issue behind closed doors, did not approve the action of the representatives. When the conference committee reported on the whole list of proposed amendments recognition of the religious pacifist was not included. James Madison, the leading representative in the work of the committee, felt it necessary to compromise on this issue.

The report of this joint committee was adopted by both houses of Congress. Ten of these twelve amendments were ratified by enough state legislatures to make them a part of the national constitution. The second amendment, not including the Madison proposal, today reads: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."

Constitutional right or legislative privilege for the C. O.? The answer of the framers of the Bill of Rights is clear. The legislature shall have control over the religious pacifist—one aspect of its general power over military affairs. *Whatever status is given to the C. O. comes as a matter of privilege from Congress.* All later legal history is built upon this structural foundation.

The general consensus of opinion was clearly in favor of excusing the religious objector from military service; he was not to be prevented from following the dictates of his moral scruples. But the privilege of doing so had to come from the people, acting through their representatives in Congress; it could not be demanded as a matter of constitutional right.

Since the enactment of the Bill of Rights the argument has been flung forth frequently that the C. O. has a constitutional right to exemption under the first amendment whereby "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," but the framers of the Bill of Rights voted clearly to the contrary. There is no legal uncertainty here and the C. O. should accept this foundation; to have it otherwise would necessitate an amendment to the Constitution.¹

¹ *Annals of the Congress of the United States* (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), vol. I, pp. 433-34, 749-51, 767.

THE LAWS OF THE STATES

Religious pacifists were not pleased with the action of the federal government and a strong attempt was made to fortify themselves with protection from state constitutions and laws. They wanted all the legal security possible and not to be ever at the mercy of temperamental legislators. Would such legislators "always have humanity enough"? Would they always recognize and not become harsh and condemnatory? The risk was too great. So they sought constitutional rights within the states. Most of the military was still within the control and administration of state governments; constitutional rights under their laws might serve to obviate difficulties arising under federal law.

As early as 1777 the New York constitution provided "that all such of the inhabitants of this State being of the people called Quakers as, from scruples of conscience, may be averse to the bearing of arms, be therefrom excused by the legislature; and do pay the State such sums of money, as the same may, in the judgment of the legislature, be worth." The New Hampshire constitution of 1784 declared that "no person who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness of bearing arms shall be compelled to do thereto, provided he will pay an equivalent."

In view of such constitutional provisions already existing, and a past colonial policy of giving the C. O. some recognition, the trend toward solidification in state law began. Many states enacted constitutional provisions in favor of religious pacifists. Some excused only members of "specific sects"; others, "any person." Some called for "money payments" or "substitutes" or both. Some limited application during peacetime. The variables are many and can be found still within certain state constitutions. Where no such incorporation took place the power to deal with the C. O. remained completely within the hands of the legislatures.

In early days when military affairs were administered largely through state laws such provisions afforded the C. O. a substantial amount of legal security. But today most military authority for both state and national militia has been centralized in federal hands and for all practical purposes it is national law which determines the status of the religious objector. It is conceivable that state laws could come into effect if federal law provided that the C. O. should be handled by the states—but this is very unlikely.

State administrations are resorted to often in carrying out federal functions but they must operate according to certain national laws.

In times of war or crisis federal power tends to concentrate all the forces within the nation under blanket rules and regulations. State authorities are given some leeway in matters of administration, but basic legal rights and responsibilities are established by national law. When the C. O. is under conscriptive call he must look to the federal government for a clarification of his legal status.²

FEDERAL LAWS

The principle of religious pacifism appears often in American law but it becomes acute in human experience only in those instances where the C. O. is placed under conscriptive call to arms. Military conscription in this country has been rare, occurring only in times of war and during the present emergency period.

During the Civil War Congress enacted the first important law giving significant mention to the C. O.; only members of religious denominations whose "rules and articles of faith and practice" prohibited them from bearing arms were exempted. The Secretary of War was empowered to assign them to "duty in hospitals, or to the care of freedmen, or shall pay the sum of three hundred dollars to such person as the Secretary of War shall designate to receive it, to be applied to the benefit of sick and wounded soldiers." The C. O. was required to present evidence that his past behavior was consistent with his religious position; his inward conviction should be substantiated by outward evidence. Part of this evidence was membership in some pacifist sect; the government felt that the person who took his pacifism seriously should associate himself with a group that felt likewise as a whole.³

The law was harsh and unfair to those objectors who were members of non-pacifist denominations. But in earlier days most objectors were members of pacifist groups and Congress proposed to treat them as such. This policy was adhered to even in the 1917 Conscription Act although an attempt was made to have it otherwise. Yet it is well known that in many instances local boards awarded noncombatant status to objectors within other denominations though legally they were not required to do so.

² Paul Gia Russo, *History of Religious Pacifism in American Law* (Thesis: University of Chicago, 1939).

³ Act of Feb. 24, 1864, 13 U. S. Statutes 6, sec. 17; see also Act of Jan. 21, 1903, 32 U. S. Statutes 775, sec. 2; Act of June 3, 1916, 39 U. S. Statutes 166, sec. 59.

A feature of the 1917 law not in the 1864 act was the complete exemption of "regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, (and) students, who at the time of the approval of this act are preparing for the ministry in recognized theological or divinity schools."⁴ This provision is included in the present law.

The 1940 Conscription Act breaks the traditional policy of treating the C. O. as a member of some pacifist sect and recognizes him as an individual. This came about largely through pressure by organized groups; the tendency of the legislators was to remain within the groove of tradition. Also because a state of war did not exist and the fact that the British law granted individual recognition served as strong forces in making the change. Generally the 1940 law gives the C. O. more privileges than any other in federal history.

Local boards again are given the administrative function of determining the validity of the C. O.'s claim but their decisions are not final. Appeals may be taken to appropriate appeal boards which refer the claims to the "Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing." These legal tribunals may affirm or recommend reversals of local board decisions and though usually they will be accepted automatically they are not binding on appeal boards. The purpose of this is to retain full authority within the selective service administration and at the same time give the claimant a fair legal hearing.

The sphere of noncombatant activity was declared by presidential decree to be service in unarmed units, medical department, or "service in any unit or installation the primary function of which does not require the use of arms in combat, provided the individual's assignment within such unit or installation does not require him to bear arms or to be trained in their use." The president declared further that noncombatant training consists in training of all military subjects except "marksmanship, combat firing, target practices, and those subjects relating to the employment of weapons."

The 1940 law also provides that if the C. O. is opposed to participating in noncombatant activities because of his religious scruples and his claim is sustained he may be "assigned to work of national importance under civilian direction." The work camps which are being set up and operated through religious funds and supervision are a matter of common knowledge.

⁴ Act of May 18, 1917, 40 U.S. Statutes 76, sec. 4.

All in all, the 1940 law treats the C. O. with greater leniency than any other in history. His legal rights to a hearing are more secure; he is treated as an individual though on religious grounds, and noncombatant service may be far removed from active military duties.⁵

CONSTITUTIONALITY

An abstract review of law always seems cold and uninteresting. Only when considered in relation to human situations does it come to life with vigorous reality. Practical matters of administration and legal controversies come closer to the arena of actual operation. Administrative aspects of the law cannot be treated here but in those instances where legal controversies arise typical situations should be considered. Many controversies which arose in the past are coming up again under the 1940 law; the same questions, issues, and arguments. For the most part the Supreme Court has considered them and their past decisions almost predetermine the result of litigation in process today. One of these issues centers in the problem of constitutionality.

The Selective Draft Law cases of 1917, the R.O.T.C. cases, and the doctrine of "national emergency" will serve as strong bases for upholding the constitutional validity of the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act.

But many constitutional objections have been raised. It abrogates the right of free exercise of religious conviction; the power to raise armies originally was intended to operate upon voluntary services only; Congress never was given the power to conscript, even less can it do so in time of peace; and others.

In the Selective Draft Law cases the Supreme Court denied any infringement upon the free exercise of religion when the C. O. was placed under the responsibility to serve. The religious liberty guaranteed by the first amendment did not carry with it the right to refuse to bear arms. The specific exclusion of the principle of religious pacifism by the framers of the Bill of Rights substantiates this fact. The court dismissed the argument summarily: "We pass with anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses

⁵ Act of Sept. 16, 1940; and Presidential Decree of Dec. 6, 1940.

of this act . . . because we think its unsoundness too apparent to require us to do more."⁶ This position was affirmed in later cases.⁷

Congressional power to raise armies and declare war is a fundamental one awarded by the Constitution and all citizens may be required to render services. In an earlier case the court said that "a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense."⁸ The constitutional power to call men to arms irrespective of their personal convictions has been affirmed by the highest court. Present attempts to invalidate the law on this basis will fail.

The framers of the Bill of Rights were agreed that men could be compelled to bear arms; the issue on the floor was whether C. O.'s should be subject to such compulsion as well. In recent litigation the argument was presented that conscription was unknown until the time of the French Revolution and that it could not possibly have been incorporated within the federal Constitution which was formulated before that time. But if Congress had no constitutional power to compel men to bear arms the whole debate on the subject of religious pacifism was meaningless. Clearly the debate was conducted on the assumption that Congress did have the power to compel men to bear arms.

In pursuance to a legal agreement between land-grant colleges and the federal government, the action of academic officials in rendering military instruction compulsory upon the entire student body has been upheld as constitutional. This is peacetime conscription but with limited duties and sphere of operation. It is significant that such action is not unconstitutional. It tends to refute the argument that the 1940 law is unconstitutional because Congress has no power to conscript during peacetime. In the best known R.O.T.C. decision, Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "Instruction in military science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor indirectly is the government establishing a state religion when it insists upon such training. . . . Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were thus to be extended, might refuse to con-

⁶ *Selective Draft Law Cases* (1917), 245 U.S. 366.

⁷ See *United States v. Stephens* (1918), 247 U.S. 504.

⁸ *Jacobson v. Massachusetts* (1904), 197 U.S. 11.

tribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and compulsion of the agencies of government."⁹ A federal law requiring certain colleges to prescribe courses in military science during peacetime is constitutional and academic action rendering such instruction compulsory for all students is constitutional and does not violate any civil rights.

This case cannot serve as a precedent completely in point, to be sure, but it may be used as a strong support for finding the 1940 law constitutional. Basically, however, the constitutional power of Congress to raise armies and the doctrine of national emergency will serve as the chief forces for finding the 1940 law valid.

THE C.O. IN CITIZENSHIP CASES

The legal status of the C. O. has been considered often in cases where the objector sought American citizenship. The naturalization law requires an applicant to declare in open court that "he will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same."¹⁰ In fulfillment of this legislative mandate a form of oath has been drawn up by administrative officials which requires the applicant to bear arms in defense of the realm. Religious pacifists have found it difficult to take the oath.

One applicant wished to defend the Constitution and laws of the United States only "so far as they are in accord with the moral law of Jesus Christ." The court refused to sanction the addition saying: "It carries with it the conviction that some of our laws are not in accord with the moral law of Jesus Christ, and these he will not support or defend. The difficulty with the appellant's position is that he sets up his own conscience or will as the sole judge to determine what laws are not in accord with the moral laws of Jesus Christ. We might point to laws contested with much vigor on this point."¹¹ The personal viewpoint of a dissenter cannot be made the test to determine the morality of a national law as far as the courts are concerned. The dictates of Congress, acting as the representatives of

⁹ *Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California* (1934), 293 U.S. 245.

¹⁰ Act of June 29, 1906, 34 U. S. Statutes 596, sec. 4.

¹¹ *In re Clarke* (1930), 301 Pa. 321, 152 Atl. 92.

the people, are assumed to be moral and of binding effect on all the people. Clearly the law cannot accept any other basis in this matter of morality. To do so would mean inviting anarchic confusion. If individuals want to enter a republican form of society the laws of that society must be accepted as the supreme regulator of their civil conduct. Military service is a civil function which Congress can regulate.¹²

In another case a woman of forty-nine years: linguist, lecturer, and writer on government, testified that she was an uncompromising pacifist and unwilling to take up arms. The Supreme Court affirmed the action denying her citizenship and declared that the "duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our government against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the Constitution." The voice of Mr. Justice Holmes dissented: ". . . the whole examination of the applicant shows that she holds none of the now dreaded creeds, but thoroughly believes in organized government and prefers that of the United States to any other in the world. Surely it cannot show a lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution that she thinks that it can be improved. . . . And, recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant's way, I would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to make this country what it is, that many citizens agree with the applicant's belief and that I had not supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount."¹³

A perspective of the opposing opinions reveals that both sought the same ends—the maintenance and betterment of social law and order. The majority voice argued strenuously that an applicant for citizenship must accept the laws and conditions of the country as they are and from that point proceed responsibly toward betterment. The minority would be less legal and more practical: the applicant was a woman forty-nine years of age, intelligent, constructive, and a firm believer in the American form of government; it was hardly conceivable that she would ever be conscripted into military service and it is obvious that she would be an asset to the citizenry of the nation. But the majority insisted on strict application and reform through the proper legal channels. The courts had no power to question the form of the oath and any policy of qualification and expediency would lead to great confusion.

¹² *In re Roeper* (1921), 270 F. 490.

¹³ *United States v. Schwimmer* (1928), 279 U.S. 644.

Perhaps the best known decision on this issue was the one involving a university professor, an alien from Canada. His application was denied because he wished to reserve the right to determine for himself whether a war was morally justified before promising to take up arms. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, said that "whether any citizen shall be exempt from serving in the armed forces of the Nation in time of war is dependent upon the will of Congress and not upon the scruples of the individual." Congress may deem it proper to relieve the C.O. from military duty but no citizen can demand as a right *a priori* exemption from service and certainly an applicant for citizenship cannot demand it. "When he speaks of putting his allegiance to the will of God above his allegiance to the government, it is evident, in the light of his entire statement, that he means to make his own interpretation of the will of God the decisive test which shall conclude the government and stay its hand. We are a Christian people . . . according to one another the equal right of religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of God. But also, we are a Nation with the duty to survive; a Nation whose Constitution contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go forward on the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the will of God."

If it is the moral will of the people, acting through their representatives in a democratic Congress, to wage war in times of national danger, this cannot be inconsistent with the will of God as the people then know it. This common will must serve as the one for the nation as a whole and any individual will contrary to it must be construed as an immoral and certainly an illegal one. To proceed on any other theoretical basis is to prefer anarchy and not democracy.

Chief Justice Hughes presented the minority view. He based the opinion essentially upon the following words: "There is abundant room for enforcing the requisite authority of law as it is enacted and requires obedience, and for maintaining the conception of the supremacy of law as essential to orderly government, without demanding that either citizens or applicants for citizenship shall assume by oath an obligation to regard allegiance to God as subordinate to allegiance to civil power." The Chief Justice

felt that there was no need for the absolute nature of the oath which was difficult for religious objectors to take. It should be more lenient. An alien once admitted to citizenship would be subject to federal laws like all others. There is sufficient legal authority for maintaining the supremacy of the law and requiring obedience to it without calling for a crisis between moral and civil allegiance.

This minority opinion has been misconstrued constantly by theological commentators. Essentially it is one of expediency based upon an appreciative understanding of a possible conscientious conflict between moral and civil authority. Such conflicts are inevitable between individuals and organized society and when they occur the agencies of society must proceed according to law. But the creation of such a crisis is not necessary when considering applicants for citizenship.

The majority justices might have agreed that the situation was unnecessary but would not agree to the solution offered; namely, a personal qualification of the oath under the sanction of the courts. The correct procedure was to change the law or its administration. No applicant for citizenship can demand that any law be made to conform to his moral standards before being admitted. He must accept them as they are and then through the process of responsible citizenship strive to formulate law to conform to his moral standards. To do this he will encounter the most difficult task of persuading the legislative or administrative forces of democracy that his moral standards convey the greater truth. Legally this is the necessary way for any morally progressive society. Religiously it might be said to be the best way for any progressive Christian society.¹⁴

It is equally difficult for theological anarchists and authoritarians to reconcile their knowledge of the will of God to a collective democratic expression of that will at any given time. One may be revealed through a strictly personal relationship with God, another through a hierarchical pronouncement, and the other through a republican assembly. In the interpretation and application of American law the last is valid.

THE NONRELIGIOUS OBJECTOR

The status of the nonreligious objector should be considered briefly.

¹⁴ *United States v. Machintosh* (1930), 283 U.S. 605; also in accord *Bland v. United States* (1930), 283 U.S. 632.

Pacifists are voicing the view that the nonreligious objector should be placed in the same category as religious C.O.'s. He is just as sincere and conscientious about his convictions as anyone else; the fact that his reasons are not grounded upon religious principles does not destroy the moral sincerity of his position.

The federal government has maintained consistently the distinction between the two types and continues to do so in the 1940 law. Some state laws and constitutions excuse "any person" but federal laws privilege only the religious objector. The roots of American law on this subject are watered by those pacifists who were members of certain sects. They were not classified as social, cosmic, political or economic pacifists. The religious objector will be recognized because of tradition and because the federal government will go a long way to avoid religious controversies. But other objectors are in the same position as any minority group. They may proceed to have the law changed but while in force they are obliged to obey it or suffer the penalties imposed.

Congress is very reluctant to extend policies of privilege; they are deemed as a legal nuisance. The C.O. has his privilege because of tradition and religion but the nonreligious objector will not be recognized.

Considerable argument has been spent over this whole matter of type, class, and terminology. C.O., religious pacifist or objector, relative or absolute, and social pacifist or objector. Differences among individuals run rampant but there is no difficulty as far as the law is concerned. At any given moment when a person refuses to bear arms as legally obligated he is at that point a pacifist in the eyes of the law. Personal interpretations do not deflect the viewpoint of the law. If the pacifism is religious and the position substantiated he will be given certain privileges; if not, he must shoulder the full responsibility of the law.¹⁵

RECENT CONTROVERSIES UNDER THE 1940 LAW

C.O. conflicts under the present law are concentrated around refusals to register, waiver of exemption, and the matter of constitutionality. Regulations concerning noncombatancy or work under civilian direction are of great significance but no major controversy is liable to arise in this field of administration.

¹⁵ See *Fraine v. United States* (1918), 255 F. 28.

The law carries a blanket mandate requiring all men of certain age to register; a failure to do so renders one subject to prosecution and punishment. Despite legal procedure for C.O. exemptions some objectors, including ministers, laymen and students, have refused to register because their religious convictions would permit of no compromise with the selective service system of which the process of registration is but a part. It is obvious that these nonregistrants are motivated by deep conviction and sincerity but legally their position is untenable. They have failed to fulfill a duty imposed upon them by law and the result is no different than any other violation of legal responsibility. Income tax returns, health observations, matrimonial requirements, preserving the peace and quiet, and many other legal responsibilities have been placed upon people. The defense of religious liberty was raised often but to no avail when the primary design of the law was to promote the common welfare. Individuals may contest strenuously the fact that common welfare is enhanced but as far as society as a whole is concerned these decisions must be determined by agencies set up expressly for that purpose. The position of the dissenter cannot predominate.

Those who refuse to register cannot even set up the defense of conscientious objection because specific procedure is provided for that purpose. C.O.'s have followed diverse methods of putting the government on notice of their position but officials are not obligated to recognize them. In view of the enormity of selective service administration the government has the right to adopt uniform requirements. The C.O. who prefers to adopt personal methods runs the risk of being punished for failure to comply with law. Legally there is no difference between filling out a white card and properly returning an income tax blank. Some nonregistrants have been prosecuted while in other cases local officials made certain qualifications, shutting their legal eye and functioning with the more practical one.

Some theological students and ministers have objected to their automatic exemption on the ground that it rendered ineffective a personal protest as a conscientious objector. Their situation was difficult. Refusal to register nullified a C.O. protest and refusal to answer professional questions tended to misrepresent their position. In order to meet this dilemma some states have adopted regulations permitting waiver of exemption and presentation of position as a C.O.

Considerable differences between state policies are inevitable because

a great bulk of administration has been set up under decentralized state units. Though policies may vary they all operate under national laws whose provisions must be obeyed. Administrative rulings may be altered or revoked as readily as they are made.

The constitutional validity of the 1940 law already has been considered in the light of past decisions. No test case has reached the Supreme Court as yet but its constitutionality can be predicted with almost absolute certainty.

This summarizes briefly the major legal aspects of conscientious objection. The C. O. must grasp them; they will lead him to a deeper appreciation of the functional relationship between moral and civil law. Too many C. O.'s view the law as Caesar—an enemy to fight. But in a democracy Caesar is the people. He is, or should be, intimately acquainted with the citizen. Whenever Caesar's actions are deemed immoral there devolves upon the dissenter the tremendous responsibility of transforming him into a different moral being. Whether to obey or disobey Caesar while trying to transform him is the personal crisis to be resolved by each individual.

Frequently religious behavior will come into conflict with governmental laws and policies. When this occurs citizens are legally obligated to fulfill their duties. They may be excused in part or in full because of their religious convictions, but such exemptions come as matters of *privilege and not of right*. When a law is deemed to be immoral, a citizen has a right to influence others by peaceful persuasion to see his picture of the problem in the hope that one day his conception will become predominant.

The conscientious objector believes war to be immoral and he is entitled to that conviction. But the reality of war is still with us. Nations still wage war and governments have power to raise armies by military conscription. If the C.O. would remove war from the face of the earth, he is under the moral responsibility to convince his fellow men, the nation, and the world at large. Until this comes to pass, however, he is still a part of society and as such under obligation to obey its laws. Sound democratic government can function on no other basis.

This is the position of the law,

Central Europe and the Present Tragedy

JOSEPH L. HROMÁDKA

IN these days, as we listen to the heartbreaking news from Europe, a just peace appears far distant. The world situation is graver and more sinister than it was a year ago after the collapse of France. It is becoming more and more evident that all the totalitarian regimes (Berlin, Rome, Moscow, Tokyo) actually form one united front, and that it is futile to expect aid from any of them for the Western democracies. On the other hand, the confusion of minds, the lack of actual understanding on the part of the liberal world, and the question of what is the issue and what can be done about it, is not clearing up rapidly enough.

WE ARE ALL IN THE SAME PREDICAMENT

Our sins and the failures of our fathers must have been beyond our apprehension. Otherwise they would hardly produce such a sinister, political, moral and spiritual agony. "We looked for peace, and there is no good; and for the time of healing, and behold trouble! We acknowledge, O Lord, our wickedness, and the iniquity of our fathers: for we have sinned against thee." (Jeremiah 14. 19-20). We now understand the urgency of these prophetic words more deeply and more existentially than we did some few years ago. One nation after another has tried to preserve peace for itself, and to avoid the consequences of its own sin. And one nation after another has fallen prey to the growing and irresistible world-wide cataclysm. Jeremiah's outcry helps us to comprehend our disease, and to look for adequate remedies. We need to do this now before the war is over. In the world in which we are living it is impossible to isolate oneself, to renounce the responsibility for the rest of humanity and to pretend a single-handed drive for one's own health. We all are affected and infected by countless microbes of moral and political disintegration.

The present-day tragedy of Europe is primarily a gruesome lesson for all small European nations. They are realizing that their independence and free growth depend on the cultural, moral, and spiritual unity of the Christian Europe at large. No sooner is the classic Christian tradition of the

European continent imperiled, than the small countries find their liberty and self-determination in jeopardy. Paradoxical as it may seem, there is no other way to preserve and develop a rich, manifold heritage of Europe—her unity in variety, and variety in unity—but through the channel of the one, common Christian tradition.

However, the very nature of the present maelstrom seems to indicate that the Christian tradition is doomed to vanish. In dealing with the question of what the churches of Central Europe should do when the war is over, I must first touch upon some all-European problems, and then consider the specific troubles and difficulties of what is called Central Europe. A thoughtful reader will realize to what extent we are all in the same predicament, and how far the churches between Germany and the Soviet Union have responsibilities and problems of their own.

THE NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN DISEASE

We, theologians and church members of Czechoslovakia, have been greatly helped by two outstanding thinkers and philosophers to understand some burning issues of our time: T. G. Masaryk, who, in 1918 became President of the new republic, and Emanuel Rádl. Both of them were professors of philosophy in the University of Prague. Being deeply rooted in the old Czech historical tradition, they penetrated, more than any other Czech thinker, into the ailing soul of the modern, critical and skeptical man. Theirs was the desire to help the small and imperiled nation of Czechoslovaks to a really intellectual, cultural and moral greatness, to social justice and political freedom. Masaryk and Rádl had painstakingly studied the political and spiritual situation of the modern Europe. What is the future of Europe? Is she intellectually and morally strong enough to preserve and vitally reinterpret the heritage without which she would cease to be Europe? Will the Czech nation, being small and dependent on the moral and political good will of the German and Russian people, survive should the classic European civilization completely crumble? Masaryk's and Rádl's answers were rather alarming and disturbing.

Before the beginning of the twentieth century, Masaryk grasped the fact that the European peoples were undergoing one of the most difficult and fateful revolutions in history. The national, political and economic upheavals were only external signs of the profound moral and religious

revolutions. The entire spiritual structure of European nations was undergoing a change. The old authorities were crumbling. Ecclesiastical and religious bodies were losing their influence. Man ceased to depend upon what the earlier generations believed, and critically dissolved all that heretofore was accepted as a supreme and binding law and an uncompromising norm. The modern man appeared to Masaryk somewhat like an ill-fated pilgrim upon the ruins and débris of ancient cathedrals and sanctuaries; or like the citizen of a land where the people had rebelled against the old order and were staggering without a blueprint of a new order—without discipline and balance.

Observation of the political and social unrest, as well as the works of modern authors, convinced Masaryk that the restlessness and disintegration of modern society was increasing, and that there was no hope to overcome this trend soon or in an easy way. He studied scientifically the development of the new Europe during the last 150 years: that strange revolutionary fermentation which started acutely with the great French Revolution 1789, repeated itself in 1830 and 1848, and gradually grew into a world revolution in 1914. This cosmic illness of the modern humanity—for every revolution is a result of a social illness just as a fever is a self-defense—cannot be disposed of by a gesture of indifference nor by a forceful police interference. We all are affected by this disease: we ourselves, our children and our friends must wrestle for our souls against the modern uncertainty and uprootedness. We must also guard the integrity of our bodies, for spiritual confusion often springs from moral uncleanness. And revolutionary illness sooner or later ends in common anarchy; in a struggle of man against man, nation against nation, class against class and race against race.

In the modern epidemic of suicide, Masaryk discovered a sinister expression of the same spiritual and moral uprootedness. He maintained that suicide became a social illness in the modern era, when unbelief and skepticism, intellectual confusion and moral uncertainty drove out the former firm world view (*Weltanschauung*)—the definite moral code and faith in God. A person decides to die because he has lost the meaning of life and faith in the mission of mankind. The external, immediate causes: physical and economic hardships, family tragedies and the like, important as they may be, are not the ultimate factors. Under the same external circumstances a spiritually balanced person can resist. He has moral vigor

and energetically strives to overcome personal and social diseases, whereas a skeptical mind sinks without faith or hope.

Skepticism and unbelief not only rob the individual of his inward certainty and strength, but also loosen the bonds which bind him to his fellow men. Social life is impossible without the harmony of the fundamental spiritual, moral (and even basic political) principles. People must agree upon common issues and possess a common program if they wish to live together permanently. They must submit to the same moral standards and believe in the same supreme court of appeal. The idea of "Tacitus consensus" is one of Masaryk's most stressed ideas. Even the state and legal orders are conditioned by the (tacit) unity in moral principles and criteria. When men cannot agree upon what is good and what is wrong, what is valid and what is not, what is decent and what is improper—there, sooner or later, the state or social structure will fall. Police and military force may only temporarily prevent dissolution and anarchy. Without common principles and ideals, without common standards and criteria, society crumbles into an amorphous mass of individuals, into a Babylon of vices and slogans, or into a jumble of plans and programs. From here is only a step to the revolutionary convulsion and spasm, yes—even to such a catastrophe as was the first World War, accompanied by the terrible upheaval in Russia and followed by increasing world-wide disintegration and misery. This is Masaryk's diagnosis which we can find both in his early books and in his post-war, more mature writings. The modern humanity has ceased to attend the old tabernacles and to confess the ancient creeds. However, it has not yet arrived at any new convictions nor a new, unshakable certainty!

"In the number of suicides," says Masaryk, "I find a straight, arithmetical measure of our spiritual, moral, as well as physiological illness (in the stage of transition). The number of suicides in Europe and America reaches now about 100,000 annually! Characteristic is the increasing number of child suicides. For the worshipers of large numbers, let us count the suicides for a period of ten or fifty years: a million, five million! Should we then be appalled by the statistics of wars or even by the World War? Is the despair and suicide of only one child less tragic, and for the life of a person and civilized nations less significant than the victims of war? And what type of society is it, what sort of an organization does it have, what is its moral status when it acquiesces in such conditions calmly and in the mood of indifference?"¹

Masaryk also knew very well the dangers of modern decadence,

¹ *The Making of a State*, 1925.

expressed in the modern mood of suicide, in effeminate mannerisms, in a lustful and pleasure-seeking society which courts not only real but dreamed-of attractions of life. He knew the cowardice of this escape from the responsibilities into a world of dreams, sentimental illusions and mystical intoxication. Masaryk did not keep secret his aversion for people who stagger through life without committing themselves to anything constructive, who do not yield to any faith, who take no responsibilities upon themselves and who value everything in terms of pleasure, enjoyment and happiness. He saw the danger of skeptical spectatorship, of super-critical detachment, of spineless softness which makes all possible attempts to avoid hardship, sacrifice, suffering and clear-cut decisions. Masaryk abhorred any philosophy that worshiped life at the cost of truth and that was ready to save life at the cost of justice and moral responsibility. He was equally hostile to the monistic philosophy of evolutionary processes which obscure the sacredness of the human soul and which worship impersonal economic forces, races, masses, revolutions and movements, denying any essential difference between good and evil, truth and falsehood, justice and injustice, right and wrong. He was sickened by the fact that the modern man, rejecting the old altars and creeds, standards and values, was so weak and indifferent, so careless and cynical in regard to the very idea of truth and moral responsibility. Cynicism and indifference, morbid relativism and philosophy of life deprive man of any moral energy, of any conviction, of any timely decision and of any sense of loyalty. Finally, the modern man will be unable to defend, and die for "whatsoever things are honest, pure, lovely and of good report" (Philippians 4. 8).

Furthermore, Masaryk noticed that militarism as a social system and as a pattern of life rooted itself precisely in that land where extreme subjectivism, pessimistic monism and metaphysical irrationalism was most highly elevated: in Germany, in the land of Fichte and Stimer, Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner, and Nietzsche. It is not an accident that that country which, on the other hand, brought forth so many noble ideas and thoughts, became a land of modern soldiery; that it bowed so deeply before the institution of systematic force and violence; that it believed so much in the grandeur of sword and war; that it so awfully subjected the whole nation to the spirit of military drill.

"If Werner Sombart," says Masaryk, "praises the German militarism in the

spirit of Hegel and prides himself with Faust and Zarathustra fighting in the trenches, then he did not grasp what a bloody judgment he had passed upon the German and European civilization. The warring of these modern and civilized nations is a brutal escape from the agony of the super-human Ego—a German idealism transformed into the spirit of Krupp's ammunition plant. . . . The modern man suffers under the suicidal agony because of the lack of energy, because of weariness and fear coming from spiritual and moral isolation, from titanism and cult of superman. Militarism is an attempt of this superman to escape from his own illness; but by the attempt his disease grows. . . .¹²

To be fair, Masaryk did not blame the German nation alone. He saw also in other modern, civilized nations the thirst of the romanticists and supermen for the irrational animal life of instincts. All the modern nations are affected by moral confusion, by the struggle against inherited principles and ideals and institutions; they all vibrate with revolutionary and destructive revolt against the ancient cathedrals. They all grope hopelessly and not knowing what should be built in place of the superannuated dogmas and the crumbled sanctuaries of brokendown thrones and castoff social forms.

Masaryk accused the old ecclesiastical and political world because of its reactionary blindness and lack of sensitiveness for the human suffering soul. He accused the old authorities because of their stubborn insistence upon the old feudal, hierarchical and aristocratic institutions and systems. However, he was equally severe in his judgment and criticism of the modern thinkers and architects (Goethe and Hegel, Marx and Wagner, Comte and Spencer, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche). But at the same time, he assumed his personal responsibility for the sins of the present era and for the future of the wornout and wretched modern society.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHER WORRIES ABOUT ANGLO-SAXON INTELLIGENTSIA

Masaryk, despite his criticism, still believed that the western democratic world, primarily the Anglo-Saxon nations, had preserved much of constructive, religious, moral, social and political vigor. Being himself a man of enlightenment, he strongly believed in rational and moral capacity of man, in the deep meaning of the human history, in good will and in the Divine Providence. He passionately tried to set forth a synthesis of the deepest Platonic motifs, of Jesus' Gospel, of the Anglo-Saxon and Czech

¹² *The Making of a State*, 1925.

Reformation, of the Kantian moral philosophy and Dostoievski's deep insight into the modern spiritual disease. Masaryk's was the hope that "possibly in the world war we have overcome not only the old regime but also the transitory revolutionary stage." He trusted the Anglo-Saxon people. He trusted their spirit of moral earnestness, political liberty and genuine piety. He challenged the people of Czechoslovakia to reinterpret and to revitalize the most precious legacy of John Hus, the Unity of Brethren, and John A. Comenius. To be sure, he never ceased to worry about the weakness of the modern man, on the one hand and about the Pan-Germanic philosophy of violence and nationalistic lust of domination on the other. Quite specifically he never concealed his misgivings in regard to the Germanic militaristic titanism and the communistic cult of dictatorship. The communists "removed the Czar but have not overcome Czarism." However, he was confident that the democratic world had learned the lesson and would be capable of rebuilding and reshaping the disintegrated society. His slogan, "Jesus, not Caesar," indicated his genuine hope that the morally and spiritually vigorous democratic mind will do its upbuilding, constructive work in the post-war world.

His follower, Emanuel Rádl, was, however, more critical and skeptical in regard to the post-war liberal and democratic mind. He was greatly distressed realizing that the Anglo-Saxon countries after the war were being infected alarmingly by the bacilli of moral anarchy, of spiritual decadence, of cold intellectualism, and of spiritual indifference and disregard to the best tradition of the European civilization, to the Old and New Testament, to the ancient philosophical striving for truth, to the spirit of medieval chivalry, to the puritan moral earnestness, to the Calvinistic principle of discipline. In Rádl's opinion, Oscar Wilde, D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, Aldous Huxley, Lytton Strachey, Bertrand Russell, the abnormal interest for Freud and the cult of subconsciousness, were symptoms of a sinister disintegration of Europe. "Who knows and who can say," wrote Rádl in his *History of Philosophy* in 1933, "how much of our confusion is due to the fact that England has ceased to be the spiritual backbone of Europe?"

Emanuel Rádl loved America and for years was the intellectual leader of the Y. M. C. A. in his country. He saw in it one of the best American contributions to the rebuilding of the European continent. However, he suffered terribly from the fact that the spiritual crisis of America was grow-

ing and thus accelerating the European catastrophe. The breakdown of the pre-war revivalism, the waning of puritanism, the economic convulsions, religious relativism and naturalistic trends in theology, the growing indifference for missionary programs had had an alarming and disquieting effect upon Rádl's outlook. The names of Sinclair Lewis, H. L. Mencken, Theodore Dreiser, the spirit of Marxian economic materialism permeating the American philosophy of history, a lack of passion for truth, the cynical and critical approach to the main events of the old and recent history, the flirting with communistic radicalism and radical pacifism—all convinced Rádl of the disturbing fact that the modern Anglo-Saxon mind both in Great Britain and in America, had been growing in the mood of irresponsibility and in the lack of constructive passion for a better organization of the world. Personally likeable and honest as they may be, the Anglo-Saxon intelligentsia will be, in Rádl's opinion, unable to grasp the meaning of the current history, and consequently will be incapable of acquiring strong convictions, to make right decisions, to work, to fight, to die—if it becomes indispensable for the future of humanity. Ten, fifteen years ago—Rádl had been raising his voice to warn, to challenge and to stir up. If the western world has softened and deteriorated spiritually and intellectually—who then will save Europe and the Central European countries from anarchy on the one hand and from totalitarian tyranny on the other? Modern philosophers, authors, theologians, politicians—you are responsible for the ensuing catastrophe! You are guiding your nations into disaster! You are now facing an unprecedented slavery! *Tua culpa*, yours is the guilt! Thus spoke Rádl as far back as 1932. Once, many years ago, he concluded his comments on the spiritual situation among the European and American intelligentsia, with a deep sigh: "Abide with us, O Lord: for it is toward evening, and the day is far spent."

Observing the sinister growth of communistic and Hitlerian mentality in Europe, Rádl realized that these monstrous systems were the scourge of Divine wrath against the confused mind of humanity. Human society cannot live without pillars and unifying bonds. If men cease to believe in God, in truth, in absolute moral criteria; if they cease to listen to the revelations of the Divine will, sooner or later they begin to believe in an impersonal fate, in instincts, in race, blood, economic interests, in power and violence. Masaryk, as a man of enlightenment, believed in the rational interpretation

of the biblical religion. Rádl realized that the ultimate struggle between truth and falsehood, good and evil, charity and violence, freedom and tyranny, cannot be fought out without appeal to the revelation itself, without discipline and sacrifice, without bloodshed and tears.

The very soul of the unhappy continent of Europe must be transformed and reshaped. That tremendous task must be assumed by the churches of Europe in general and of Central Europe in particular.

THE UNITY OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The Central European situation is complicated by another problem which would require a lengthy analysis; but which I nevertheless wish to touch upon briefly.

Between the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany, there lie less than a dozen small and middle-sized nations: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece. It is in this region that there must be fought the great battle for the unity of Christian Europe. The spiritual disintegration of the last decade had had its disastrous repercussions and implications there, in the classic region of small states. The consciousness of an underlying common European heritage had almost died out in the time of the first World War and the post-war crisis. Then it was replaced by local, tribal, nationalistic, economic, and political interests. Now, the gradual collapse and disappearance of these countries. Nothing is more tragic and pathetic!

Who is responsible for this tragedy? Who has made it possible for Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia to strangle and silence one nation after another? True, the weakness of Western Europe contributed largely to the collapse of Central and Southeastern Europe. But no less responsible are we—Central European citizens. Our lack of vision, our shortsightedness, *our lack of loyalty to the common mother of Christian Europe*, our prejudices, hatreds, misinterpretations, ignorance, self-complacency, egocentrism, our lack of genuine interest for the small neighbors—these are the reasons that make us pre-eminently responsible for the fact that a few totalitarian aggressors have dared to devour our countries without considerable difficulties and obstacles.

It may be argued that this preliminary tragic result of the present war bears sufficient evidence of the incapability of the small European nations to govern themselves and to organize unity and cooperation. Would it not

be better to leave them to the *tender* mercy of the larger neighboring countries in order to avoid, in the future, repeated convulsions and restlessness of this area?

It is, indeed, an intricate and subtle problem. But I venture to say that countless qualities of the respective small nations would be lost and the entire European civilization impoverished to an unpredictable extent. It is definitely the small European countries that have preserved the vital elements of the Christian heritage. Without the independent historical development of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, and the rest, the vast territory of Central Europe would long since have been ideologically and morally transformed into bleak spaces of totalitarian monotony. The very existence of all small nations, the specific spiritual tradition of their history, and the indomitable loyalty of their citizens are promising and helpful indications of the future.

The churches of Central Europe must be responsible for the creative, constructive and vital reinterpretation of the common Christian history, of the common tasks and cooperation, and for the future unity in variety and variety in unity. Heretofore we have been all too negligent and careless; submitting ourselves, our faith and Church to nationalistic narrow-mindedness, to political considerations and to historical prejudices. The future of Central Europe can become a glorious page in the history of world Christianity. But to achieve this it is necessary to reinterpret our particular national history from the angle of common Christian tradition and to understand one another in our best spiritual and cultural interests. The ecumenical movement may help us to create this new atmosphere. The cooperation of Protestant churches and the Eastern Orthodox Church on the one hand and the Roman Church on the other, will be indispensable for our common task of reconstruction.

At another time I hope to outline the details of the vast Central European problem: the problem of common history and of specific achievements on the part of individual nations. At present I have but one ambition: to convince the reader of the fact that the Central European peoples do realize the essential issue of the present tragedy and are ready to cooperate in the reconstruction of Europe on a better and more reliable basis. It remains to the rejuvenated spirit of the Anglo-Saxon Christian heritage, to aspire to be a wise and courageous counsellor.

The Christian's Choice in Time of War

ROBERT E. FITCH

IN THE last analysis, philosophically, there are only three basic attitudes toward life. One attitude says that only one thing matters, or that one thing matters more than all the rest. This is the attitude of absolutism, of moral monism. Another attitude says that many things matter. This is the attitude of pluralism, of experimentalism. A third attitude says that nothing matters. This is the attitude of *laissez-faire*, of trial and error, of moral nihilism. With the third attitude, we, as Christians, are not seriously concerned—except as it defines a problem, rather than states a program. With the other two attitudes, however, we are profoundly concerned, since the conflict between monism and pluralism, absolutism and experimentalism, is the great historic conflict in the interpretation of the Christian faith.

If the present world crisis does nothing else for us, it ought to compel us to reflect seriously on these two alternative renderings of our tradition. But, if our reflections are confined to the narrow perspective of the immediate problem, then our conclusions are more likely to be the product of passion than of intelligence and love. What I propose to do, then, is to examine the issue of pacifism as one among many issues in which we must take our stand either with moral monism or with moral pluralism. This essay, therefore, has the immediate objective of clarifying a certain Christian attitude toward war and peace. But its larger objective will be to reach some kind of decision on the debate between monism and pluralism, absolutism and experimentalism, as devices for implementing our Christian ethics.

I

One of the stock problems in ethics is whether or not it is ever permissible to tell an untruth. The moral absolutist will declare that one must speak the truth at all times, and on all occasions, without equivocation—"the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."

The pluralist, on the other hand, sees a more complicated problem. It was Reinhold Niebuhr who, in the early days of his social ministry,

learned that he must "speak the truth in love;" for, if, like so many of our social reformers, he should speak the truth in hatred, then it would fail of its message, and become a lie. Many of our household gossips might profit from this observation, for, if they speak the "truth," they yet speak it in malice, and their "truth" becomes a social poison. A more critical problem is whether to speak the truth with humility, or with courage. Those who forget humility become fanatics, and those who forget courage become cowards and conformists. On the side of humility, it may be said that there are times when it is best not to speak at all, but to be silent. On the side of courage, it may be said that there are times when one should cry the truth from the housetops, without ceasing. All of this is a source of perplexity to the sensitive conscience, and it may be that only a Christ ever found the right occasions and the right proportions.

One may debate in similar fashion about liberty. The logic of absolute liberty is exhibited in the philosophy of anarchism. But, even here, we are freed only from the authority of the state, while the controls of the mores and of public opinion still remain in full force. Indeed, most absolutists in this respect make an absolute out of specific liberties—the economic liberty of *laissez-faire*, the civil liberties, religious liberty, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

But the pluralist recognizes more explicitly the particular and the relative character of our liberties. Indeed, it is possible to have all the economic and civil liberties, and yet to have none of that liberty of which an Epictetus or a St. Paul could speak. Again, one kind of liberty may come into conflict with other liberties—the economic with the civil and religious. Moreover, in time of crisis, such as a war, it may be necessary radically to curtail many of our liberties in order to ensure their greater security and fuller growth after the war. This last paradox is something that the absolutist can never understand, although there are several instances from history which show that it can be done, and done successfully.

Some persons who care less for truth and for liberty may make an absolute out of the nation-state. If they follow Hobbes and Hegel consistently, then the state becomes the very incarnation of God in his march through history. In this case, the church becomes covertly what Hobbes recommended that it be overtly—namely, an institution at which, on a certain day in the week, people gather to celebrate the constitution of their nation,

to intone its rituals, and to glorify its heroes and martyrs. The family becomes a breeder of robots for the service of the state; business enterprise has as its sole function to supply money and materials for the needs of its master; and science must devote itself principally to discovering cheap ways for maintaining the populace in good working condition, and expensive ways for heightening the efficiency of the war machine. The pluralist, obviously, will insist that the state is one among many forms of human association, and that it must take its place of relative autonomy along with the other associations of the family, of business, of religion, and of science and the arts.

However, the great absolute of the American people till recent times has been, not the state, but private profit. There is no need to examine theoretically the implications of this absolute, for they are exhibited empirically in our own history. It has meant that our morality has become an "economic morality." It has meant that our political machines, instead of being instruments in the service of the public, have simply been tools whereby the political boss could make his own private profit as effectively as any one in legitimate business. It even meant, on one occasion, that a certain reverend relative of the original J. P. Morgan could preach a sermon from his pulpit on the text "Thou *shalt* covet," in which it was demonstrated that a violation of the tenth commandment was one of the great categorical imperatives of Christianity. The pluralist, however, believes that there are other important things in life besides profit and prosperity: there are the rights of labor; there are the needs of the community and of the nation; there are the demands of the spirit for science, for art, and for religion. Profit must take its place with these other goods.

One of the most virulent absolutisms in our modern world is the absolutism of social justice. One would think that this were an absolute ample enough to allow within its scope for many other goods. But even in the "just" republic of Plato, we see that there cannot be too much individual liberty, and we are told that a certain amount of lying to the people by the rulers is necessary. It is quite in accord with this that the fanatical communists today, who make such a fetish of what they call "justice," should be willing to subvert truth and honor, to betray friends and family, to forget all human kindness, in their passionate devotion to their absolute.

In strange antithesis to the absolutism of social justice is the abso-

lutism of the pacifist. For the communist, who believes in "social justice," cares not at all how much war and strife may follow in the pursuit of his ideal; indeed, he glorifies these instruments of social revolution. The absolute pacifist, on the other hand, seems to many persons to have an utter contempt for the principle of social justice in his willingness to surrender all the hard-won gains of democracy—our civil and religious liberties, our respect for human personality—provided only he can maintain what he calls "peace." Indeed, I have heard more than one defender of absolute pacifism who, in his eagerness to exalt the sufficiency of his own strategy and his own goal, has felt it necessary to belittle the difference in the regard for truth, for justice, and for human personality, between the democracies and the totalitarian states. Conversely, it is significant that very few of the great leaders of the social gospel in the United States have ever been out-and-out pacifists.

II

Now it is true that there are some pacifists—like Albert Edward Day, for instance—who have thought through their position with a scrupulous regard for the values of justice, of truth, of liberty, and, be it added, of humility. If pressed for a final statement of their position, I believe they should reply somewhat as follows: Pacifism, so far as it is the expression of active love, is the inclusive value, which lies at the basis of other values, and upon which all other values depend. You can compromise with the other values, but you cannot compromise with the value of peace, because it is prior to all the others.

The trouble is that, when we press another absolutist for a final statement of his position, he will reply in the same language. A Hitler will say that national unity and power lie at the foundation of all other values, and that, if you will but guarantee to him the strength that resides in *Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer*, then justice, and peace, and liberty, and truth will follow suit. A communist will say that his conception of social justice is basic, and that, even though the process of attaining this justice may involve the temporary betrayal of truth, and of liberty, and of peace, yet, in the end, this kind of justice is the only guarantor of all other values. Similarly, the economic materialist will argue that prosperity is the fundamental thing, and that, if you can but ensure this, then happiness, and justice, and spirituality, and all other good things will automatically follow along. Such,

indeed, is the common language of all absolutists, regardless of what particular value they may have chosen for their absolute.

Under these circumstances, all we can do is appeal to the evidence, or appeal to authority. The evidence, I believe, is quite clear to the effect that any form of absolutism is self-defeating. Truth, as an absolute, hardens into dogma, and in time becomes the chief foe of the further discovery of the truth. Liberty as an absolute leads to anarchy, and, as Plato saw so well, its final outcome is the polar opposite of liberty—namely, tyranny and dictatorship. National power and glory as absolutes lead to a blind devotion to the "interest of the stronger," until the "stronger" becomes so intoxicated with his own power that he is no longer able to see clearly what is to his own interest, and so defeats himself by decreeing what, in effect, is contrary to his own interest. Profit and prosperity as absolutes—as Americans should know by now—lead to a blind and brutal rapacity which is so short-sighted in its selfishness that it ends by destroying its profits and its prosperity. Social justice as an absolute involves one in a fanatical passion which soon holds in contempt the most elementary rights of the individual, and prepares the way for a society, not of justice, but of a new and more fearsome kind of tyranny. Peace as an absolute, in these our times, would seem to give us a world in which the apostles of war would have unlimited freedom to work their way as they will, and, far from bringing peace, would yield, for at least one generation, a society divided into two or three great armed camps, in a spirit of hatred, hostility, and mutual suspicion the like of which the race of man never has known.

As for the appeal to authority, I am reluctant to make use of this, since any one with sufficient ingenuity will be able to find such authority as he pleases. I may only remark, with due diffidence, that it seems to me that historically some of the greatest perversions of the Christian faith have come from selecting some one value, and making it an absolute, in contempt for the claims of other values. I find no justification for the common practice of taking the richly varied teachings of Jesus and boiling them down to some one principle—be it love, or purity of heart, or trust in God, or what-not. For it seems to me that Jesus taught many things, according to season, and according to occasion: that, while He could be wonderful in forgiving love, He could also be terrible in denunciatory wrath; that, while He cared for peace on earth and good will toward men, He also had the prophetic

passion for social justice; that, while, in *Luke*, He could denounce the rich for their neglect of the economic needs of the poor, yet, in *Matthew*, He could teach more insistently that the life is more than meat and the body is more than raiment; and that, while He knew that the truth would make us free, He also realized that truth must be mingled with the other values of love, and humility, and courage.

Indeed, it may be doubted whether the absolutistic rendering of Christian ethics can be validated in the light of the total Biblical tradition. Its real formula is the Kantian categorical imperative, which instructs you to "act in conformity with that maxim, and that maxim only, which you can at the same time will to be a universal law." This is ethical nonsense in so far as it ignores the unique character of specific moral problems. And it is ethical obtuseness of a horrendous kind, in that it fails to see that most moral decisions of a crucial sort are made, not in the light of one maxim, but in the light of a resultant which is compounded of the conflict of several positive maxims. Any one can make a decision between pure good and pure evil. But the critical moments are when we resolve a conflict between two goods: between humility and truth, between justice and peace, between loyalty and love. Most of the nobler tragedies in life have been composed on this theme. It is only a brutalitarian kind of absolutism, moreover, which tells us that we must choose humility *or* truth, justice *or* peace, loyalty *or* love; for what we want is humility *and* truth, justice *and* peace, loyalty *and* love. Indeed, it is precisely the task of the sensitive and devoted conscience to effect that compromise balance of the two conflicting values which, in the end, shall yield the greatest need of them both.

Consequently, if any one tells us that we must have peace at any price, or justice at any price, then we must answer: Peace is not worth having at any price; Justice is not worth having at any price; Liberty is not worth having at any price; Truth is not worth having at any price; Prosperity is not worth having at any price; National Glory is not worth having at any price; *Nothing is worth having at any price!* In other words, no one good is worth having at the price of all other goods. For, according to the limits of human frailty, never is our conception of any one good sufficiently inclusive of all other goods. And, when we do purchase some one good at the price of all other goods, then, in the end, we are cheated even of that good for which we surrendered all.

III

If the pluralist and experimentalist is to have some text upon which to base his doctrine, then it can be the text that "in my Father's house there are many mansions." There is the mansion of peace, and there is the mansion of social justice; there is the mansion of truth, and there is the mansion of humility; there is the mansion of liberty, and there is the mansion of discipline and self-control. It may be that our Father which is in heaven can see the single house of which these mansions are but the separate rooms and apartments. But apparently it is not given to the finite mind of man to envisage the larger unity which binds these parts into an undivided whole. And when man forgets his limitations, and persuades himself that, as though with the mind of God, he has grasped the larger unity, then, like as not, it turns out that he has simply invested his particular mansion with sufficient delusions of grandeur to enable it to forget the existence of the other mansions in the House of God.

In any case, such a pluralistic Christian ethics cannot be called, in the invidious sense, an ethics of compromise. Of course, as Dr. J. V. Moldenhawer has pointed out in this journal (autumn, 1939), the Christian idealist is constantly faced with the problem of compromising with the refractory material of physical nature and of human nature. But the compromise to which I point here is a positive one. It is a compromise, or balancing, of two or more affirmative principles—peace, and social justice—both of which have full claim to our allegiance, although, for the moment, the one seems to be in conflict with the other. And the purpose of this compromise is, not a deliberate betrayal of either principle, but such a working adjustment of the two as may ensure for the future the fullest functioning of both.

Such an ethics, moreover, must be an experimental ethics in the strict sense of the term. On the negative side, it forbids us to go off irresponsibly in the abstract elaboration of some one principle in disregard for its empirical hearings. Positively, it means that, just as in the laboratory of science, so in the laboratory of life, we must cultivate a sensitivity to all the factors in the situation, and a willingness to follow our experiment whither it may lead us. This is no easy Christian ethics. It is an ethics which calls on us for all the patience, discrimination, humility, loyalty, love, courage, and understanding that we can muster.

From Canterbury to Calvary

EARL MARLATT

RECENTLY an American visitor in London reported that the songs he heard most frequently in air-raid shelters were "John Brown's Body" and "There'll Always Be an England." The former, he said for one who heard the overtones, was as moving as a Chorus in a Greek tragedy, especially when it came from those underground rooms with its refrain softening the staccato bark of the air-defense guns:

"John Brown's body lies a-mouldering in the grave,
But his soul goes marching on."

Another traveler, not in England but in John Keats's "realms of gold," would have approved the reference to Greek tragedy; he might even have added that these bomb-racked Britons are spirit-brothers over the years not only of John Brown but of a long line of prophets and poets who have defied the tyranny of force in its hour of seeming triumph. Certainly their blithe faith in light beyond the last blackout makes them fellow-seers with Archilochus who sang, twenty-five hundred years ago:

"Tossed on a sea of troubles, Soul, my Soul,
Thyself do thou control."

It also gives them affinities with Aeschylus, who through the tortured but unbroken spirit of Prometheus shouted down those same centuries, "He cannot join death to a fate meant for me."

Those are William Hay's translation of Archilochus and Elizabeth Barrett Browning's translation of Aeschylus. They are typical expressions of the regard for soul-force or spirit-motivations which has until recently been normative for English poetry. Even Geoffrey Chaucer, who was rarely accused of piety, must, perforce, preface his record of a robust pilgrimage with a tribute to the deathless spirit of the souls of Promethean martyrs. I translate his prelude to "The Canterbury Tales" into "modern speech" after the manner of James Moffatt, I hope, or into "public speech"

according to the prescription of our American exponent of intelligibility in art, Archibald MacLeish:

When April with its blossom-scented rain
Has vanquished March and quickened earth again
Till every branch is bursting with the power
That kindles life and brings the bud to flower;
When winds blow jocundly from heath and wood
Across the greening fields, and every good
Returning Spring pours from her shining horn
Falls fruitfully upon a world reborn;
When birds sleep lightly in a moon-lit tree
And sing all day, rejoicing to be free
From Winter's drear, icicle-woven cage;
Then pious folk fare forth on pilgrimage,
And far-crusaders seek to find again
The Holy Hill on which the Lord was slain;
Especially in England do they go
To ancient Canterbury, where they know
The martyr's holy spirit, living still
Can cheer the languishing and heal the ill.

It is to be noted here that Chaucer starts with cosmic forces and objective data, images as they may be apprehended through the senses by any ordinary observer. In fact, the upsurge of color and fragrance which is England—"When Spring trips north again this year and the first meadow flowers appear"—had to wait for Robert Browning and Alan Seeger to be sung again with the mystical realism of Chaucer's prelude. But immediately the old master, whose spirit, like his martyr's, marches on after six devastating centuries, moves spontaneously from images through emotions to subjective selves or souls, emerging as naturally as leaves from buds or a bird's song from a golden bough. Thereafter they dominate his thought as he allows them to react naturally to these external stimuli and, possibly, eternal motivations.

All of this, like Chaucer's rhapsody, is prelude to a consideration of another pilgrimage to another holy hill, Parnassus, as Amos Wilder describes it in his amazingly erudite and arresting book, *The Spiritual Aspects of the New Poetry*.¹ His report is curiously like Chaucer's. That is, he starts by showing that the most obviously revolutionary aspect of the new poetry is its insistence on the use of public rather than esoteric or poetic

¹ Wilder, Amos N., *The Spiritual Aspects of the New Poetry*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1940.

speech. This is virtually what Chaucer did when he wrote the first line of his "Prologue" in the so-called barbarous vernacular of his day—"Whan that Aprille with its shoures sote." For all its music when properly pronounced that line was probably as raucous to fourteenth century classicists as Carl Sandburg's "Hog-butcher for the world" was to Chicago purists six centuries later. Again like Chaucer and his pilgrims, the new poets as they are appraised by Wilder and represented by Geoffrey Scott, are "the sensitive ones that register first and react to changes in climate"; they "bring to light evidence from the inner world and the underworld by a kind of divination" which "is part of the mystery of the word."

Scott's first concern for cosmic things is attested by the refreshingly Anglo-Saxon quotation (p. 4) from his "Map of Spells":

"Fishers of joy and pain
Grey words are we,
Who sift
Man's dream and drift;
Whose net
Under the moon is set
To drag the tidal secret of the world
Up from the shadowy sea."

Nevertheless Scott, like his confreres in the new poetry, cannot rest in cosmic dreams or even objective images from his more immediate environment; he must turn from ecstasies "on cows and trees" (p. 8) to go on pilgrimage . . .

"Lost in a landscape of the mind,
A country where the lights are low
And where the ways are hard to find."

Here the new poets, with the notable exception of T. S. Eliot, leave Chaucer's pilgrims without realizing as the old master did that "the landscape of the mind" stretches far and beyond to Canterbury or the Holy Hill where souls are marching on in spite of the psychologists' and poets' attempts to exorcise them, or at least excise them, from modern poetry.

Wilder is commendably positive on this point. While finding "spiritual aspects" of the new poetry he admits at the outset that its exponents have a definitely anti-soul, anti-ecclesiastical bias. To assure his readers that he is properly representing this aspect of the movement, he quotes at

length (pp. 14-15) from Rodman's "characteristics of modernity" in his Introduction to *A New Anthology of Modern Poetry*:

" . . . imagery patterned increasingly on everyday speech . . . absence of inversions, stilted apostrophes, conventional 'poetic' language generally, except where used deliberately for incantatory effect . . . freedom from the ordinary logic of sequence, jumping from one *image* to the next by *association* rather than by the usual cause-effect method . . . emphasis on the ordinary, in reaction against the traditional poetic emphasis on the cosmic . . . concern with naked consciousness and the newly identified 'unconscious' as against 'the soul' . . . concern with the common man, almost to the exclusion of the 'hero' or extraordinary man . . . concern with the social order as against 'heaven' and 'nature.'"

This is not to say that Wilder approves the anti-soul, anti-consciousness attitude of too many of the new poets. On the contrary, he specifically states in his Preface (p. xii) that "the peculiar ills of contemporary life and contemporary artists can only be clearly challenged by confrontation with the Christian emphasis on personality and the responsible self." Moreover, as an antidote for the objectivist poison which is content to reduce experience to a succession of loosely associated images or disconnected mental states without integration by a logical mind, he quotes (p. 19) Leon Bloy's plea for the unity of the self with which N. Berdyaev begins his significant treatise on *Liberty and the Spirit*:

"Suffering passes, the fact of having suffered never passes. One must give this striking aphorism its fullest sense. One may surmount the experience of life, but the experience lived through remains forever part and parcel of the man and a modification, a widening of his spiritual life. That which has been lived cannot be effaced. . . . The man who has traveled widely through the world of the mind and spirit, who has been tested in the course of his quests and pilgrimages, will have a different spiritual growth from the sedentary individual to whom these worlds are unknown."

It is in these "worlds of the spirit" that the new poets eventually "live, move, and have their being" in spite of their superficial excisions of the word "soul" and their stoical attempts to rest in mechanism, symbolism, or irrationalism. The symbol, either *White Buildings* or *The Bridge*, cannot continuously generate the light that gives it luster, as Hart Crane virtually confessed when he surrendered to futility and the last negation, suicide; nor can the monstrous beauty of a universe as impersonally wise as an owl or as ruthless as a hawk lift Robinson Jeffers's atavistic splendors from a labyrinth of animalism to a love beyond lust and incest. Wilder properly com-

mends both Crane and Jeffers for their attempts to make material and bestial things mystical but admits reluctantly that they fail, despite the perfection of their craftsmanship, because they lose the reality of personal or spiritual forces which might have wrought the miracle. To return to the Chaucerian analogy, they stop their pilgrimage, come April, with "smale fowles" or towers against the sky without following on to a holier shrine where living spirits can still redeem tragedies not of brute nature alone but of reasoning or ill-reasoning men.

It is this follow-through to human and spiritual forces which distinguishes the newer poetry of W. H. Auden in England, Kenneth Patchen in America, and T. S. Eliot in both England and America. True, Auden and Patchen rarely get beyond humanism in either ideology or theology but they do let personal motivations give both images and symbols a livingness they lack in the less spiritual poetry of their confreres. Eliot especially among the new poets goes far and beyond material and elemental grandeurs to Canterbury (*Murder in the Cathedral*) and, with Chaucer's palmers, to the Holy Hill (*Ash Wednesday*), where one can find refuge from the hawks or deadlier vultures that prey on tortured hearts.

Perhaps a key to an understanding of this more completely "spiritual aspect" of Eliot's poetry is to be found in a casual, half-parenthetical observation in Wilder's illuminating preface. "We remind the reader further," he says (p. xv), "that he is to be prepared for an elliptical style in the new work based on the 'stream-of-consciousness' procedure familiar in prose today. . . . For it is a thesis of this study that our post-war era has a significantly changed spirit and that poetry today serves as an index to it." This is so uncannily true of Eliot's poetry that one is left enchanted by the reflection of an era in the iridescent prism of one man's genius.

Eliot began, as the novelists did at the turn of the century, with a bald realism so forthright and brittle that Richard Aldington in his recently published book, *Life for Life's Sake*, claims him, Eliot, for the Imagist Group. These poets, like the realists in fiction, tried to confine life to objective data or images. George Moore even published *An Anthology of Pure Poetry*, from which poems containing subjective, first-personal pronouns were rigorously excluded. But when Freudian psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology began to temper this stark behaviorism by demonstrating the deeper reality of subjective drives and integrations, James Joyce and his dis-

ciples wrote novels which were hardly more than pageants of mental states and uncensored memories. Eliot brought the method into poetry with "The Waste Land." Indeed, this was so bafflingly "stream-of-consciousness" that F. R. Leavis and H. R. Williamson wrote commentaries supplying the ellipses in thought and relating the mental states before critics and casual readers, or even fellow-poets, could understand what "the waste land" really was and how it could be redeemed by water from "The Rock."

As these interpreters point out, the latter revelation was not actually made until Eliot progressed from a strict "stream-of-consciousness" method to the related symbolism of *Ash Wednesday*, impinging upon personal experience so refreshingly and so redeemingly as to give it everlivingness. This emotional fusion of objective images or behavior with subjective motivations or judgments has been completely achieved in fiction only recently by Ernest Hemingway in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, and Jan Struther in her masterpiece of mystical realism—it is as racily English as *The Canterbury Tales*—*Mrs. Miniver*. It is worthy of special mention that Eliot, the poet, anticipated the novelists in this achievement not only in *Ash Wednesday* but more completely and memorably in *Murder in the Cathedral*, a play about Canterbury and the "Martyr" . . . whose

". . . holy spirit, living still,
Can cheer the languishing and heal the ill."

Here the subjective attitudes were revealed behind the objective actions by the speeches of the Chorus or, more naturally, by the Archbishop's sermon in the Cathedral after which the Third Priest said (p. 55):

". . . even now in sordid particulars
The eternal design may appear."

Eliot's pilgrimage from the waste land of agnosticism or negation, as Wilder might call it, to the Holy Hill of spiritual affirmation is even more strangely like Chaucer's prelude if one realizes that it began with lines almost identical in imagery and feeling with the opening of the Prologue: I quote exactly the first lines of "The Waste Land":²

"April is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.

² Eliot, T. S., *Poems, 1909-1925*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1925, p. 83.

Winter kept us warm, covering
 Earth in forgetful snow, feeding
 A little life with dried tubers.
 Summer surprised us, coming over the Starnbergersee
 With a shower of rain; we stopped in the colonnade,
 And went on in sunlight."

And the superficial likenesses to Chaucer's prelude are not more striking than the identical thought-movement from "memory" (objective images) through "desire" (subjective motivations, stream-of-consciousness) to "us," who (experiencing selves or souls) can be stopped in a colonnade—"Winter's drear, icicle-woven cage"—and led on into the "sunlight" which "breeds lilacs from the dead land" and quickens "pious folk" to "go on pilgrimage." I do not mean to imply that Eliot either consciously or subconsciously borrowed this magnificent prelude from Chaucer's; I don't think he did; but I do think that his poetic genius and his spiritual insight were enough like Chaucer's that he reasoned his way with the same psychology and artistry from London in April through Canterbury to Calvary, from which perennial streams of healing still flow to the waste lands of the heart.

This conviction is further confirmed by the fact that Eliot's pilgrimage, his trilogy of redemption—*The Waste Land*, *Ash Wednesday*, *Murder in the Cathedral*—ends as Chaucer's prelude did with pious folk come to Canterbury

"The holy blisful martir for to seke
 That hem hath holpen whan that they were seke."

With the palmers, they go far and beyond to Calvary now tragically reenacted at Canterbury by "murder in the Cathedral." The First Priest mourns over the Archbishop's transfixed body:

"The Church lies bereft,
 Alone, desecrated, desolated, and the heathen shall build on the ruins
 Their world without God."

But the Third Priest, who before had been able to trace "the eternal design" even "in soiled particulars," rebukes him, saying:

"No. For the Church is stronger for this action,
 Triumphant in adversity. It is fortified
 By persecution; supreme so long as men will die for it.
 * * * Let our thanks ascend
 To God, who has given us another saint in Canterbury."

From a faraway choir comes a *Te Deum* sung in Latin while the Chorus chants:^a

"For the blood of Thy martyrs and saints
 Shall enrich the earth, shall create the holy places.
 For wherever a saint has dwelt, wherever a martyr has given his blood for the blood
 of Christ,
 There is holy ground, and the sanctity shall not depart from it
 Though armies trample over it. * * *
 From such ground springs that which forever renews the earth
 Though it is forever denied."

Beyond negation, as Wilder would say, or through sacrifice, as Eliot might contend, the body may die but the spirit goes marching on; perennially reborn, it affirms its own deathlessness for the comfort of penitents on Calvary and the redemption of pilgrims to Canterbury or London:

"Forgive us, O Lord; we acknowledge ourselves as type of the common man,
 Who fear the injustice of men less than the justice of God,
 Who fear the hand at the window, the fire in the thatch, the fist in the tavern, the
 push into the canal,
 Less than we fear the love of God.
 We acknowledge our trespass, our weakness, our fault; we acknowledge
 That the sin of the world is upon our heads; that the blood of the martyrs and the
 agony of the saints
 Is upon our heads.
 Lord, have mercy upon us.
 Christ, have mercy upon us."

With the devastating candor of this confession T. S. Eliot brings all pilgrims to journey's end; for he finds renewal and redemption not on any ground however hallowed by the blood of heroes, or in any century however pious and peace-loving, but in the penitent hearts of common men. Only here can truth outmarch time and spirits outreach space. It is tremendously important in times of crisis to believe in this spirit-world behind and beyond the thing-world of bombing-planes and shattered buildings and the thought world of symbols, hammers, sickles, swastikas, and mailed fists. It is the task of priests and poets in all ages to keep the faith-fires burning. Some of the new poets, like the old masters, are doing this so alluringly that one may still follow Thompson's "labyrinthine ways," and Eliot's, from Canterbury to Calvary.

^a Eliot, T. S., *Murder in the Cathedral*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1935, pp. 86-87.

The Fascination of the Terrible

TROY ORGAN

IT IS commonly held by the critics of aesthetic naturalism and religious humanism that these philosophies of religion are inadequate because they neglect aspects in, and the power of, a transcendently existing God—the God, of course, in which the critic happens to believe. I am here contending that the Achilles' heel of these philosophies of religion is that they are untrue to some of the facts of man's experience. I shall defend man against the humanists and naturalists! Let it be understood at the outset that I am sympathetic toward these religious philosophies, but I feel that they are inadequate at a crucial point. It may be that these approaches to life can be adjusted in such a way as to overcome my objection. If so, it seems to me they will be more adequate as philosophies of religion.

A philosophy of religion must include and conform to all the facts of life. It cannot look at the world through rose-colored glasses, nor can it be blind to any fact of human experience. It cannot limit itself, for example, to the intellect and exclude the feelings. Religion is life. To be adequate as an interpretation of life a philosophy of religion must have something to say about every serious element of man's experience. It must take into account all the possible experiences that a man can meet between birth and the grave. Likewise as an interpretation it must be true to every element in man's physical and mental make-up.

Now I maintain that the "terrible" is a fact in human experience and that "the fascination of the terrible" is natural to the normal healthy individual. Much analysis is necessary! The phrase "the fascination of the terrible" is taken from J. B. Pratt's book, *The Religious Consciousness*. In writing about the conversion experience of Bunyan, Pratt remarks that Bunyan was "extremely suggestible and peculiarly subject to the fascination of the terrible."¹ Bunyan had read in the Bible about "the unpardonable sin." He was not sure just what this most heinous sin was, but he concluded that it was connected with certain words which if spoken would result in ever-

¹ P. 142.

lasting punishment for the offender. Bunyan's thoughts about this sin aroused his curiosity; his sensitive nature was attracted by the awfulness of this sin. He was so fascinated by the thought of saying a word which would automatically bring forth the unforgivable sin that he found himself saying blasphemous words over and over again. Bunyan says, "And in so strong a measure was this temptation upon me that often I have been ready to clap my hand under my chin to hold my mouth from opening, and to that end also I have had thoughts other times to leap with my head downwards into some muck-hill hole or other, to keep my mouth from speaking."² This "temptation," the "fascination of the terrible," is a common human trait. By the "terrible" I mean the ugly, the tragic, the grotesque, the hideous, the evil, et cetera. I am maintaining two points in regard to the "terrible": (1) it is a fact of experience, and (2) interest in and certain motivations by the terrible are natural and normal. The well-nigh universal recognition of the fact of the "terrible" in life is impressive. Consider the following random list of evidences: the Hebrew scapegoat; religious sacrifice and cleansings; the Greek tragic plays, and interest in the tragedies ever since; the desire to read detective, murder, and mystery stories; the minute details of crime in the newspapers; gargoyles on cathedrals; the belief in daemonic powers; the interest in the circus sideshow freaks; the desire to see the victims of auto accidents; the concept of the unpardonable sin; and so on.

Not only is the "terrible" an undeniable fact of life, but interest in it is not abnormal. Bunyan was mistaken in thinking that his "fascination of the terrible" was a sin. It would have been an indication of mental stupor if he had learned of the unpardonable sin and had not been curious about the concept. A healthy, well-balanced person feels a certain attraction toward that which is ugly, tragic, or grotesque. Victor Hugo in his *Hunchback of Notre Dame* tells the story of how on a carnival day the citizens of Paris, being disgusted with a moral play that was being presented, threw out the actors and staged instead a "feast of fools." He was to be crowned "pope" who could make the ugliest face. The crowd reveled in this show of Paris's ugliest as we today enjoy a contest to find America's most beautiful girl. Interest in the ugly is as natural and normal as is interest in the beautiful. There is a passage in *The Republic* that illustrates this fascination of the "terrible." Socrates tells of Leontius and his desire to gaze upon the hideous.

² *Grace Abounding*, Sec. 104.

"The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran to the dead bodies, saying, 'Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.'"³³ Schleiermacher, the German theologian, once said, "the taste for grotesque figures is as natural to the young imagination in religion as in art, and let it be richly satisfied."³⁴ As a further instance of the place of the terrible in religion recall Saint Francis kissing the sores of the lepers, Augustine's struggles, Origen's self-mutilation, and Jesus' interest in the sinners, the blind, the lame, and the lepers. One of the outstanding examples of a healthy interest in the "terrible" is found in the life of Robert Browning. To my knowledge no one has ever accused him of being psychopathic or abnormal, yet he was thoroughly interested in the unusual and the grotesque. As a boy his mother used to persuade him to take disagreeable medicine by promising to catch a frog for him by way of reward. In the backyard of their home he had for his pets, monkeys, parrots, hedgehogs, magpies, toads, and lizards. Later he became known as an authority on gargoyles. After his wife's death he had as his companion in his house a pet owl. He once said in reference to the beetle, the spider, the worm, and the eft, "I always liked all those wild creatures God set up for themselves." In the middle of some of his most beautiful poems he inserted an extremely ugly line. For example, in "Rabbi Ben Ezra" is found the line which many critics say is the ugliest line in poetry,

"Irks care the crop-full bird? Frets doubt the maw-crammed beast?"

Students of Browning claim that his interest in the ugly was the result of a marked balance and a strong sense of humor.

This element of the "terrible," which includes the ugly, the tragic, the grotesque, the evil—and hell itself—is too basic and essential in the life of strong and healthy individuals to be omitted in a philosophy of religion. The "fascination of the terrible" I take to be an indication of sympathy, of regard for others, of curiosity, of strength, of a sense of humor, and of other

³³ 439E. (Jowett tra.)

³⁴ *Speeches on Religion to Its Cultured Despisers* (Oman tra.), 126.

qualities desired in the normal person. He who cannot tolerate anything except the pleasant, the beautiful, and the good is too narrow in his view of life and too weak to become a strong character. The noble, the clean, the strong, and the healthy are able to appreciate the value of the "terrible" without dropping into cynicism. They even find it necessary to give proper balance to life. Because of the presence of the "terrible" in life and because of its natural appeal to strong characters, a vital religious philosophy will regard it realistically. It may, and probably will, regard evil and ugliness as something to be overcome (although there have been religious cults that worship the devil), but it will not play the ostrich with the problem.

There are certain modern religious philosophies which do not take account of the "terrible" in life—or else take a very unsatisfactory attitude toward it. Christian Science of course openly denies the existence of evil. However, I am directing my criticism against two groups of American religious philosophers usually known as religious humanists and aesthetic naturalists. Wieman and Meland in their book, *American Philosophies of Religion*, list as religious humanists, Max C. Otto, Roy Wood Sellars, A. Eustace Haydon, and Walter Lippmann; and as aesthetic naturalists, George Santayana, John C. Ransom, Baker Brownell, and Hartley B. Alexander.

Basically religious humanism is social idealism. It contends that the historical religious views of life have directed men's attention toward a transcendent realm and have thus caused men to neglect the social and ethical values that might be realized on this earth. The humanists hold that a bird—or a value—in the hand is worth two in the bush. Humanism offers a needed criticism of most orthodox religious systems, but often their optimistic view of human life becomes almost as utopian as the early Christian's Paradise. The humanist overlooks the "terrible"—its place in life and man's interest in and need of it. This naïve and incomplete view of life is seen especially in the writings of Max Otto. In *Things and Ideals* he says that we must "accept the stern condition of being psychically alone in all the reach of space and time, that we may then, with new zest, enter the warm valley of earthly existence—warm with human impulse, aspiration, and affection, warm with the unconquerable thing called life; turn from the recognition of our cosmic isolation to a new sense of human togetherness, and so discover in a growing human solidarity, in a progressive ennobled

humanity, in an increasing joy of living, the goal we have all along blindly sought, and build on earth the fair city we have looked for in a compensatory world beyond."⁶ I do not quarrel with his "affirmative faith in the non-existence of God"⁶ but rather I disagree with his assumption that the beautiful side of life makes a complete life for man. It is interesting to note that when he writes on the life of Jesus he sees only the beautiful and lovely side of that winsome life. Nothing is mentioned of the stern and tragic aspects of the life of Jesus. He says, "Whatever else the record discloses it is clear that the young Nazarene who taught for a brief but glorious season in Palestine regarded it as His mission to arouse mankind to the possibility of a more abundant life on earth."⁷ Otto fails to mention that the record also indicates that the Galilean left a cross, a sword, and a yoke in His legacy. In the closing pages of his latest book Otto finds himself unable to account for the evils of the world but still he thinks he has overcome them with a half-hearted optimism: "The march has been long and trying—a march not of forty years or forty decades, but of forty times forty centuries; a march through the wilderness of brute nature, through ice ages, floods, and earthquakes, through Black Deaths and World Wars, through terrors born of superstition and the cold ingenuity of reason, through selfishness, laziness, weakness of will—on and on toward a Promised Land pictured by an unconquerable urgency in the human spirit."⁸

Otto and Sellars represent the early stages in the development of religious humanism. Sellars does not seem so extreme in his social optimism, yet he too emphasizes the value of the pleasant and fails to see the value of the tragic. For instance, in his book, *The Next Step in Religion*, he writes, "The humanist's religion is the religion of one who says yea to life here and now, of one who is self-reliant and fearless, intelligent and creative."⁹

In *Religion Coming of Age* he rejects Bertrand Russell's over-emphasis on the tragic¹⁰ as a stoical rebound from religious romanticism. Sellars himself chooses here a middle ground between stoicism and romanticism. "Let man stand on his own feet and trust his own powers. The universe is not unfriendly; rather it is the natural scene of his birth and achievements. It is

⁶ P. 290.

⁷ *The Human Enterprise*, 334.

⁸ *Things and Ideals*, 278.

⁹ *The Human Enterprise*, 368.

¹⁰ P. 212.

¹¹ *Philosophical Essays*, "A Free Man's Religion."

something within which to work in a human way, bravely, creatively, gently, wisely. Here is a new attitude, that of an adult shifting for himself, set on carving out his own fortunes, aware that life is not a path of roses, knowing that tragedy may claim him, and yet fighting a good fight for whatsoever things are honorable and of good repute."¹¹ But one thing is lacking, I do not find Sellars asserting that the tragic is a necessary constituent of man's life.

Haydon, I believe, takes a more realistic attitude toward the fact of the "terrible." "Idealism," he says, "is sobered by knowledge. Utopias are outmoded. There is no longer a search for panaceas. In a growing and changing world there will always be problems and new forms of evil."¹² He recognizes the fact of the "terrible," but does he recognize that interest in it is normal and valuable? Of this I am not certain. In fact I do not believe that he faces the question of all that is involved in the "terrible" as I have used it in this paper. Haydon regards evil as something to be gotten rid of as quickly as possible. He says, "When evil is faced realistically as removable, a method may be found for the actualizing of social ideals."¹³ Social ideals might be realized with the removal of evil, but a society without the ugly, the grotesque, the tragic, and the grim would be jejune. Remove the "terrible" and you remove that which gives stamina to our morality and strength to personality, and that which acts as a gadfly to social melioration. Haydon himself says, "If the world had been made good, religion would never have emerged."¹⁴

Turning to the aesthetic naturalist we note that Wieman and Meland say, "for Santayana religion is simply an inward and intimate expression of man's evaluations, arising as with wings in contemplative imagination and aspiration."¹⁵ For him the religious life is the poetic life. Baker Brownell is especially guilty of thinking of man's proper life as exclusive contemplation of the beautiful. The ideal religious life for him would be one of continuous poetic inspiration—a life of perpetual spring. In one place in *Earth Is Enough* he suggests that the ideal religious life is the Tahitian existence! "Religion is vitality in things. Moments of living that hold thus within

¹¹ P. 156.

¹² *The Quest of the Ages*, 148.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 148.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, 189.

themselves their value and significance are hardly temporal moments. . . . They are unique, as life is unique, and religion, in this sense, belongs to no other system. In three ways, more logical than temporal, religion of this sort may be located: It is a primitive integrity first of all, as in children or Tahitians, before salvation is needed. It is a moment, second, found many times through life amid the fragments and abstractions of a mature world. It is a fusion, third, of mature diversities and fragments into a life, so called, of spirit. In these places and times this religious life is found."¹⁶ Brownell's philosophy of religion would be adequate for Peter Pan, but not for a normal person.

Brownell does not seem conscious of the fact that the poetic is not all loveliness and beauty; he does not realize that the ugly also can inspire. An art that includes the beautiful as an aesthetic type but not the characteristic nor the tragic, would be flat and weak. Flaccus in *The Spirit and Substance of Art* says that the characteristic gives us the pleasures of mastering, of tensing ourselves, of intensified and broadening experience, and of biting into things.¹⁷ Further he warns, "The Characteristic demands a tough-mindedness and a far-flung sympathy which not every one has or can summon. But to exclude it from art because one has not a taste for it is to cut down the range and dwarf the growth and meaning of art to a narrow and delicate beauty, or an amiable pleasingness."¹⁸ In the tragic as an aesthetic type he finds the following pleasures: the dramatic, psychic revelation, workmanship, intensified life, and universalized and detached sympathetic feelings.¹⁹

The characteristic and the tragic intensify interests and deepen sympathies as much in actual life as they do in art. Indeed one can do no better than to paraphrase Flaccus and say that to exclude the "terrible" from a philosophy of religion is to cut down the range and dwarf the growth and meaning of life experiences to an amiable pleasingness, a delicate beauty that produces nothing noble. Naïve social optimism is not an adequate philosophy of religion. A philosophy of saccharine sweetness lacks backbone. When the inescapable "terribles" of life are faced, such a philosophy has nothing to offer. The perfectly beautiful life which some of the aesthetic

¹⁶ P. 279.

¹⁷ P. 242.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 247.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 286, 7.

naturalists seem to desire would be as empty as a perfect face. An interesting experiment in this connection is that of making a portrait in which the two sides of the face are identical. A frontal view photograph is taken. Then the film is developed twice, one on each side. The pictures are cut in two and the photograph of the right side of the face is put together to form a perfect face. The same is done with the left side. The two composite pictures differ, but more than that the perfect portraits give an uninteresting and insipid effect. Even imperfections in the human features add desired qualities!

Thus to conclude and to summarize: Certain of the modern religious humanists and aesthetic naturalists, especially Otto and Brownell, do not appreciate the value of what I have termed the "terrible" as an element in human life. They give a partial view of life because of this serious omission. It may be that these philosophies of religion can be formulated to make up for this deficiency. As I have indicated, Haydon does seem to have a partial appreciation of the value of the "terrible." I certainly do not believe that the only alternative to naturalism and humanism is orthodox theism. My first criticism of these philosophies is that they do not do justice to the entire life experience of man nor to all man's interests. They omit a fact of life, the "terrible," and an interest of man, the "fascination of the terrible." My two secondary criticisms are that these philosophies of religion are unjustifiably utopian, and that they savor of the armchair and the student's lamp. They are too anemic to live in the everyday world where men find the ugly, the tragic, the grotesque, the evil, and the painful, and where men show a strange fascination for "nature, red in tooth and claw."

The Bible in the Strategy of the Christian Enterprise Today

ERIC M. NORTH

THERE will be those to whom the idea that there is such a thing as "strategy" in connection with the Christian religion will seem very strange. They are hardly aware that Christianity even has a history. The long centuries between the New Testament and the present Sunday morning congregation in which they sit, or which they face, are an almost meaningless void. Yet the very fact that they are there, is because someone in the past saw that there was something that must be done, chose between it and lesser issues, and did it. So Samuel J. Mills, as a student at Yale a century or more ago, became conscious of the opportunity for Christianity that lay in the millions of unchurched and Bible-less settlers between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, the advance of God's Kingdom if the Gospel could be preached to them, and the terrible set-back if it were not. His endeavors led to a new organization of Christian forces and to an extension of Christianity which has had illimitable consequences to America.

Such strategic opportunities are frequent in the history of the Church. There was a time when reinforcement of the Christian missionary enterprise in Japan, and of Christian policy in America, might have prevented the present conflict in the Far East and its peril to Christianity might not have taken place on so extensive a scale. But the Church in America was not keyed to see and to seize strategic opportunity with sufficient rapidity. There are several such situations now. In China, for example, the Christian middle schools, the feeders of the Christian colleges and the trainers of a considerable part of the leadership of the local churches are in great peril. The rise in the cost of living for middle school teachers is equivalent to a salary cut of 80 per cent! The monetary gain in exchange on the small amount of Western contributions to these schools is too little to remedy the difficulty. Consequently teachers are leaving for better paid positions or taking excessive outside work and student enrollment and educational effectiveness are dropping to the point where the number of trained Christian leaders for China may be cut in half at the very time it should

be doubled! Again, among the Government officials in China and many other classes of people, especially the important student class, tens of thousands are actually eager to learn about Christianity. Here is a new nation, surely one of the greatest on earth, coming into being under conditions which cause men's hearts to be open to the Gospel. The struggle and danger of the times, the presence of Christian moral and religious leadership in positions of great responsibility, the glorious personal demonstrations by national Christians and missionaries of the meaning of Christian faith and of Christian love—all these give the Christian message an opportunity a thousand years might not see again. This opportunity has come when Christian minorities—and majorities!—elsewhere in the world are being throttled or suppressed. In such a nation as China this combination of creative ferment in national life with freedom for and interest in the Gospel is very nearly the greatest strategic opportunity for Christianity in several generations. The adequacy or inadequacy of our dealing with it may set the clock of Christian civilization ahead or behind by centuries. "Ye can discern the face of the sky, but can ye not discern the signs of the times?" is being said to us now. This paper is an effort to suggest some of these strategic situations in respect to the Bible.

In our American parishes we take the Bible almost for granted. We praise it. We make on the whole a modest use of it. We think little of its relationship to other people save to marvel that it has been translated into so many languages. If we reflect at all on the strategy involved in the advance of Christianity we just assume the Bible and do not endeavor to appraise its place in that strategy and our consequent Christian duty.

Yet the Bible is our primary source of knowledge, our sole but adequate source of knowledge of Jesus Christ and the revelation of God He brings to mankind. Christian experience cannot add to that knowledge though it can enrich it and increase our capacity to assimilate it. Not only we but any man, seeking the truth, must have the Bible. Yet it is more than the book of reference, though the facts it contains are the most important facts in the world. Because of its nature it has the capacity to open men's minds to truth and to nurture them in it. It is indisputable that it possesses this character without an intermediary. It is the principal ally, as must be the case by its nature, of the preacher, the teacher, the pastor, the missionary, of any one who bears Christian witness. Few of us in any capacity realize

its resources for our work save in small degree. In fact we might say we are simply allies of the Bible, for the sword of the Spirit is the Word of God.

For historical demonstration of the place of the Bible in strategic situations one has but to remember the part it played during the Reformation; not solely as an authority to which the reformers might appeal, but because by the invention of printing it began to circulate more widely and in more vernaculars. What a vast debt we owe to Tyndale's sense of strategy that in that fermenting time when the English language was crystalizing, and English religious life in agitation, he should produce the printed English New Testament! Again it is significant that the century which Professor Latourette names "the Great Century" of Christianity's advance in the world, the last century, should be the one in which there was a vast expansion of the circulation of the Bible in Europe, Great Britain, and America, and in which in turn was attained the translation of the Bible into all the great languages and most of the lesser. We will do well to be more conscious of the strategic part played by the circulation of the Bible among the multitudes as we appraise Christian history.

But our major concern here is not historical but with the tremendous struggles and issues of today. What is the place of the Bible in our Christian strategy now? First, the paralyzing conflict over the relation of the Bible to science is largely out of the way and the uncertainty of the results of historical criticism has changed to assurance. The Bible has come out of the conflict actually in a stronger position than ever. Archaeology more and more evidences its historical value. More and more clearly the Bible's distinct and unique witness to religious truth stands forth. More and more the things of greater importance in it are distinguished from those of lesser importance. Thus the Bible is better qualified to give mankind its unique message and render its unique service. In the second place, there is now a hunger for it that there has not been for many many years. The terrible and disturbing events of these last two years with their dislocation of millions of persons, their suffering, and their bewilderment have not only caused multitudes to seek for an answer to their soul's despair but has set millions more, seeing their plight, to feel the need of a similar search. This is an open door for the Bible, for the Bible has the answer. These two conditions are of great strategic importance. What a tremendous opportunity to bring men and women into fructifying contact with the indis-

pensable Book! And more, it is an opportunity which is world-wide. There is no parish which does not feel these conditions and have in it the possibilities they create, to say nothing of the vast areas beyond parish boundaries.

Many of these persons already are turning to the Bible, as increasing circulation has been showing. They know its reputation; a memory of its truth glimpsed early in life returns; the sight of some Bible-centered person steadfast in the storm evokes a hope, and they seek its pages. But multitudes are not sure enough about it to carry to the end the quest for its help. And multitudes more, hungry for help, are utterly unaware of its power. Here is the duty of every Christian and every church for only the Church's full strength can take up so wide a challenge.

There are signs of an awareness of this opportunity. They are of a varied character. Two simple leaflets, for use in encouraging and guiding ordinary reading of the Bible, have been requested by pastors and others to the extent of nearly a million copies annually. The leadership of our religious educational forces is studying afresh the relationship of the Bible to the program of religious education. The great Amsterdam Conference of Christian youth spent the first hours of every day in definite Bible study with consequences which are being felt all over the world among Christian youth organizations. The Madras session of the International Missionary Council again and again pointed out the place of the Bible in various practical aspects of missions and national church life in striking contrast to the earlier conferences at Jerusalem and Edinburgh, where the practical use of the Bible was overlooked or erroneously taken for granted! The seminars of the National Christian Mission have included one on the use of the Bible which in a dozen cities got down to the real consideration of the use of the Bible by and among the laity.

The most striking recent indications of a new era of influence, upon which the Bible may be about to enter, are the signs of greater facilities for its use among Roman Catholic people. A few years ago definite Bible selling campaigns fostered by the local hierarchies took place in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. More recently new vernacular translations of Gospels and the New Testament have been published by Catholic societies and scholars in Italian and German. Active Bible study among the laity was appearing in France before the war broke. The Westminster revision of the New Testament is gradually appearing in Great Britain. Father

Spencer has issued his able translation of the New Testament from the Greek into English. And now the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine has published a 1941 revision, in current English, of Dr. Challoner's 1750 revision of the New Testament in the Rheims-Douay version. These scholarly products are not so significant as the fact that the Confraternity plan to put this New Testament into not less than 2,500,000 Catholic homes in America! To many Protestants this will seem a bewildering reversal of policy after what they have presumed to be the standing tradition of the Catholic Church. One can venture a conjecture on the background of this event. First, the Catholic attitude to the Bible has been, with occasional exceptions, not nearly as narrow as Protestants ordinarily think. In the second place, by and large the Protestants have fallen out of the practice of using the Bible to controvert the Catholic position, perhaps because the Protestant attitude to the Bible is less rigid and also because all Christians are now faced with more engrossing issues. The Catholics are therefore freer to promote the Bible's use in a non-controversial atmosphere. But perhaps the deepest reason of all is that they desire to bring afresh to their people the great resources of the Scripture itself for encouraging the love of God and holy and righteous living. In the preface of the new revision the 1920 Encyclical of Benedict XV is quoted: "Our one desire for all the Church's children is that, being saturated with the Bible, they may arrive at the all-surpassing knowledge of Jesus Christ." Surely the new revision is a recognition of the place of the Bible in our Christian strategy today. It may well be that, when the revision of the American Standard Revised Version, sponsored by the International Council of Religious Education and forecast for 1945, is completed, the Bible will be better prepared than it has been for generations to lay hold of the life of America.

It is at this point, however, that we must look sharply at the place of the Bible in our evangelical churches. None will question its authority and its power. But it is a fact that for millions of homes of church members, the use of the Bible consists only in hearing it or reading it in the church service Sunday morning—if they attend—and the children's contact with it in the few moments of the church school. And would it not be fair to say that the use thousands of ministers make of the Bible is restricted to a factor in personal and family devotions, a source of prayer-meeting and sermon material, a repository of helpful passages for funerals and for parts

of the worship services? Thus there is a whole indispensable function of the Bible that is neglected by millions of Christians, namely the capacity of private and family use of the Bible to nurture and inspire life and to direct creatively their sharing in the Christian enterprise. Surely this in turn means that there is a major technique in the work of the ministry that is undeveloped or not attempted, that is, the application of effective methods to bring the laity into such a use of the Bible. Still further it raises the question as to whether our processes of religious education have adequately established such use as one of their principal aims.

This, then, is a major move in Christian world strategy: here in the United States, where there are more unused Bibles and more nominal Christians than in any country in the world, to develop a great tide of new wholesome use of the Bible in this critical moment of deeply felt spiritual need and of the Bible's enlarged powers to meet it. The strength or weakness of the Christian Church depends upon the capacity of its members to live as children of God; to follow Christ. Unless there is within the hearts and minds of its individual members personal religious experience and conviction, no religious leadership, however brilliant, can carry the Church through its continuous testing. Upon everyone who bears any responsibility for leadership there must rest, as his most important commission, the effort to multiply greatly the number of Christian persons who—aided and nurtured as they may be by parent, teacher, pastor, and friend—nevertheless can and do keep their religious life active *on their own initiative*. Any Christian leader who faces this task must speedily realize that his one primary dependence must be the encouragement of affection for the Bible and wise grounding in its use. Surely an indispensable part of the work of the ministry is to help men, women and youth not simply to receive the word of God as it is preached and read and taught in the church, but to have it, to love it, and to use it for themselves. The permanent fruits of such a ministry are incalculable.

It has been therefore somewhat of a surprise to discover that while there are numberless books on Bible study, on sermon preparation and on religious education, and definite instruction in every denomination on the administration of the Sacraments and other phases of the work of the ministry, there seems to be no collected body of varied and tested experience about the processes by which the pastor and church worker can develop a

vital attachment to the Bible as a constant factor in the program of the local church. The cumulative effect of consecrated parish service in the life of individuals and of a community gains its greatest permanent lifting power when it issues in a life-long attachment to the Bible on the part of the adults and youth of the parish, no matter how far they may roam in this migrating world. While there are some theological issues about the Bible available for discussion, on the whole for the lay mind the bitter battles of a generation now past have subsided. What is needed now is a vast new discovery of the Bible's real power by the lay members of the Church.

This is not the place to take up what is involved in attempting such a major move, but some beginnings have been made. On the occasion of the 400th Anniversary of the First Printed English Bible a considerable number of ministers contributed material to a sizable pamphlet on the subject. Quite a number of local campaigns using various educational and promotional processes have taken place. The Seminars on the Use of the Bible, held by the recent National Christian Mission, have yielded many very worthwhile suggestions which it is hoped will be published. These processes ought now to be quickened and extended, ministerial conferences and training centers should give constructive effort, editors and publishers be seeking simple effective material, better adapted than any we now have, and above all thousands of pastors take it on their consciences and day in and day out seek and use ways of increasing the practical effect of the Bible among the lay people. Similar effort is needed by all those responsible for the programs of the church schools, Sunday and week-day. Even the primary child by seeing the Bible on the teacher's knee can know that the story comes from the Book. Youth should reach the upper grades of the church school possessing, enjoying, and using the Bible. A related opportunity for the Bible in our American life lies in the extension of week-day religious education which is being stimulated by the current sense of national spiritual need.

Again and again in the reports of the Madras Conference emphasis is placed upon the need of more effective aids to Bible study and better techniques for encouraging its use in the home. While this is being developed in the younger churches of Asia, Latin America and Africa, one hears of an increasing desire for Bible study in Europe. Bible study groups are multiplying in refugee camps and among prisoners of war. Within some Ger-

man, Scandinavian, French, British, and other churches devotional study of the Bible is growing among the laity and reports of Bible circulation, where supplies are available, reveal a considerable increase. It may well be that there is coming a new and widespread focussing upon the Bible among all the Christian churches throughout the world, but it will not go far unless those who see its strategic meaning put great effort into it. It is in the United States that the greatest effort is required.

Though a greatly increased use of the Bible in the United States is a major strategic factor in the Christian enterprise now, there are other factors also related to the Bible and of similar import. One is the acceleration of the growth of literacy. This is coming both by the expansion of elementary education, as in Russia and Mexico, for example, and by new and successful campaigns for the reduction of adult illiteracy, notably in the Philippines, in China, and in India. The enthusiasm which Dr. Laubach and his techniques and spirit have aroused in India has resulted in hundreds of thousands of people learning to read in a very few weeks and has offered hopes that the elimination of adult illiteracy among great populations is, if taken up by government and public-spirited agencies, an entirely realizable goal. This makes possible a new advance in the capacities of actually tens of millions of people! But it puts before the Christian Church some great opportunities. It should mean that the assimilation into the Church of the great numbers of illiterate, though not unintelligent, adults who are included in the mass movements can proceed more rapidly and further. In this the Bible must have its indispensable place. It has been discovered, however, that the vocabularies of the classic translations and of the Indian villager are so far apart that fresh studies, new texts, and new printing in large type are required. The peril in the situation is that the British and Foreign Bible Society, which had prepared a constructive program on this matter before the war broke, may be limited in its capacities to carry matters through. But there is a further opportunity which the growth of literacy puts before Bible lovers and that is the extension of its distribution among unreached people. The pioneer work of the colporteur in breaking ground for the missionary and the evangelist must be very greatly extended. Surely it is of the greatest importance that early in their literate experience these multitudes of new readers, wherever they are, have the Best of Books, at least the New Testament or a Gospel,

before propaganda and literary trash have hammered their new optimism into cynicism. A decade of delay may raise barriers that a century of struggle may not break down.

A third strategic action now required is the supply of the Scriptures at crucial points. The first of these is China. The critical opportunity for Christianity there has been referred to in the third paragraph of this paper. To grasp the opportunity with all its possibilities for the world's future requires urgent action by many Christian forces. Essential among these is the supplying of Scriptures. Year after year for several years the sales of whole Bibles and Testaments has risen. Now, under prodigious difficulties of publication and transportation, the demand becomes acute. Students compete for the chance to buy a visitor's last copy. Stocks brought into the West at high cost are swiftly sold out. Yet if the agencies concerned are to meet the challenge, they must face doubled or tripled production costs and transportation costs multiplied even more. And doing this they must still keep the actual prices far below the full cost. The second point in urgent need of supplies is Latin America. Here again demand is rising faster than supply. The younger churches are consuming a large proportion of the available books. Their own and other missionary endeavors, coupled with Latin America's share of the world-wide sense of spiritual need, so multiply the possibilities of distribution that two or three times the supply could easily be placed. How is it that the books are not available? Because of two economic facts. The printed book is a product of an industrial civilization. Most of humanity's multitudes live in an agricultural civilization of a very simple type. If Bibles were to be priced to cover the cost of their production and sale, most of the working people of the world would have to pay a price equivalent, in terms of the income of the readers of this article, to \$8 to \$30. Few persons, having little familiarity with books, would pay from a day's to a week's whole wages for one. The distribution of the Scriptures is a missionary process requiring missionary support. Only a marked rise in the available subsidies will make possible the grasping of this strategic opportunity in Latin America.

The final urgent element in our strategy is required to meet a peril. Americans generally do not realize that three-fourths of the supply of Scriptures for missionary service and for the younger churches in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific Islands have been produced by the

subsidies and the work of the British, Scottish, and Netherlands Bible Societies. The Bible Societies of Germany, France, and Scandinavia are essentially Bible publishing houses doing little or no missionary work. The only other large Society is the American Society. That three-fourths of the world's supply which has come from the British Isles and Holland is now gravely imperiled. The Netherlands Society cannot send funds to its work in the East Indies. Yet here are a million and a half of Christians and over two hundred languages. The British Society under war restrictions has ceased its work in at least seven European areas and is on the point of closing out in two or three more. Though maintaining work elsewhere with amazing persistence, the terrific war taxes and the dislocation of personnel are reducing income, causing budget revisions downward. Publication costs have risen, paper is rationed, printing plants are bombed, shipments are lost at sea, buildings next to and across the street from the London headquarters have been destroyed by incendiary bombs. Each month sees the time drawing nearer when emergency financial measures in one field agency after another will have reached their limit. The British Society's work extends to nearly a hundred countries; translations in more than seven hundred languages are on their list. The British people have through that Society in the century past supplied five times as much per capita for promoting the distribution of the Scriptures as have the American people. Even under war conditions they are putting up for the cause 50 per cent more than the Americans, though Americans outnumber them about two to one. When so great a stronghold of the Bible is so seriously burdened and threatened, there are thousands of churches, of new Christians, of pastors, missionaries, and teachers, and millions of open hearts who will not receive this Book unless others step into the breach. Where the Bible is blacked out, from any cause, there the hope of the world dies.

These then are four of the major moves now demanded in our Christian strategy: first, a vast increase in the effective use of the Bible, especially in America; second, multiplied effort to supply the Scriptures in suitable form to the newly literate; third, an unfailing supply of the Scriptures in increasing quantity to China and Latin America; and fourth, the complete reinforcement of every point where war conditions threaten the supply of Scriptures that men and women and youth hungry for Him who is the Bread of Life may not fail to receive His Word. These moves are required *now*.

The Church in the United States Maps a Plan

JAMES C. BAKER

THE strategy here to be considered is limited to the Church in the United States. We do not isolate ourselves, however, from the universal Church, for the American Church has come so far along in its ecumenical consciousness that this must of necessity be acknowledged in any description of its life and purpose. It is there in the finest and best of our thinking and practice.

However, the Church in each country is set in its own environment and must describe its strategy in recognition of that fact. Therefore, while there should be a grand strategy for the ecumenical Church, there must also be a strategy for the Church in each separate country. In broad essentials these strategies will coincide, but even so, they will have local color and application. There will be special problems and opportunities which in various national contexts will help to clarify the meaning of the Christian teaching and the Christian society.

I

First, we must be sun clear in our realization of the instrumental character of the Church—using “Church” as the visible, organized fellowship of all Christian groups. Every institution is always in danger of becoming preoccupied with its own maintenance and extension as an end in itself, instead of being concerned with the purpose for which it exists. Many outsiders believe that the Church is primarily interested in assuring its own life at whatever cost of timid evasion and compromise. It lacks for them the note of adventure and sacrificial reality—and consequently moral candor and sincerity. It is to them a pious irrelevancy.

In the past the Church has lost the interest of large numbers of thoughtful men and women because it has been more cautious than courageous and has refused to participate actively in crucial situations arising out of the new conditions of life. Refusing to align itself in great human struggles, too often it has actually aligned itself with the wrong side.

When we talk about strategy in these perilous times, the question uppermost is not how can we save the Church in the midst of this hostile world, but how can we relate the Church in sacrificial ways to human problems, necessities and needs and so help to save the world? It must be lifted out of self-conscious anxiety about itself and its organization by the pursuit of its redemptive tasks. The law for the Church, as for the individual, is that it loses its life in seeking to save it and saves its life by losing it. There is in our churches altogether too little of daring and heroic purpose. "The real peril of the Church today lies not in its doing a perilous thing, but in its drifting on in a kind of conformity to the world which has no peril in it." It is no wonder that the Christian witness has lost its sting and the gospel its relevancy and power in the critical issues of life.

II

Second, a constantly recurring note in the Oxford Conference of 1937 was the acknowledgment of sin and guilt and the summons to repentance. Here is a typical illustration taken from the "Message" to all the Christian Churches of the world: "We do not call the world to be like ourselves, for we are already too like the world. Only as we ourselves repent, both as individuals and as corporate bodies, can the Church call men to repentance. The call to ourselves and to the world is to Christ."

Some men at Oxford thought that this note was sounded too frequently and that the sense of sin was overdone. It is very difficult to scrutinize our own individual lives and our corporate fellowship and to recognize the evil in them. For example, note the resentment among many "Christian" Americans at any criticism of our historic and current national policies and activities. It is amazing how smug, complacent and self-satisfied we are. Too many of us are not willing to acknowledge our complicity as Americans in the world catastrophe. Just as amazing is our refusal to bring our churches and our own lives before the Judgment Seat of Christ.

I have long carried in my pocket Testament this sentence from Reinhold Niebuhr: "It is the business of true religion to preach repentance without reducing man to despair and to preach hope without tempting him to complacency."

This is an essential emphasis in our Christian strategy today. It is the point at which our Lord Himself began His public ministry.

III

A third element in the strategy of the Church in the United States is suggested in the root meaning of the word translated "repent" in Jesus' initial message. I am completely convinced that we must see the Church as a "*community of thought*"—a corporate fellowship of men and women determined to bring their minds to the understanding and clarification of the Christian teaching. Professor Glover, student of great civilizations with which Christianity came face to face in its beginnings, describes the world that the early Church had to win as a "thought-out society"—a civilized world with a great education and a splendid past. "The grandeur of its (the Church's) task," he says, "and the greatness of its victory give us the measure of its powers." Glover insists that "Christianity triumphed because it squared best with the world's best intelligence, because it liberated the human mind and gave it a chance to develop to the full range of God's conception for it." It "outthought" as well as "outlived" its opponents.

Let this historian's description of early Christianity at its best challenge the Church of today as it faces both thought-out systems which deny its fundamental affirmations and "the mass organization of society on a purely secular basis" which threatens to crush out religion from our modern life. That is to say, whether because of direct attack by intellectuals or because of unconscious mass pressures, it is imperative that we "get a new mind."

There is much talk of evangelism today and too often it means the renewed sentimentalizing of Christianity in the call for conversion. "If all men were Christians, the reorganizations of society so imperative would take care of themselves," so the evasion of the real problems repeats itself. The fundamental questions which cry aloud for answer are: "What is the Christian world view" and "what does it mean to be a Christian" in the multiplied relationships of human life? We must have thought-out beliefs and thought-out conduct if we are to achieve Christian character and a Christian society.

The Oxford and Madras Conferences showed sound insight in their emphasis upon theology. The Church in the United States has been woefully weak at this point. Taken in the large, it has been much more concerned about practical programs than about the Christian ideas underlying those programs. Now we are seeing in increasing measure that we have "no foothold to change the world unless we lay hold of a truth beyond

the world." If the Church is to have kindling power, its members will have to apply their minds with passionate purpose to fathoming and interpreting the great beliefs of the Christian gospel. As Madras truly saw, "The Faith by Which the Church Lives" is at the very heart of the Christian task. We make no progress toward a Christian civilization save as we understand and apply that faith. And it goes without argument that the interpretation of that faith must be in the thought forms and related to the actual experience of present-day life if it is not to seem entirely irrelevant. So we have had, and always must have, an American theology. Or let us say that a part of the strategy of the Church in the United States is so to think through and expound the Christian gospel in the terms of American life as to *outthink* the American interpreters of other systems.

IV

The fourth element in our strategy has to do with the ethical and social aspects of the Church's task. We have a strange tension and conflict in the Church in the United States at this point. On the one hand there is a rising tide of social conscience in the Church unparalleled in its history. The evidence is in the studies and pronouncements of separate denominations, the Federal Council, and great ecumenical gatherings. Two far-reaching papal encyclicals and "Catholic Action" based thereupon, together with a growing Catholic social literature, must also be taken into account. Hymns and litanies stressing the social gospel reach into the emotional centers of our life, and there are many practical ventures in social living.

On the other hand there is a sharp and bitter opposition both without and within the Church to the charter set up at the Oxford Conference—to seek "the practical meanings of the Christian faith in relation to the concrete problems of the modern world." The socially-minded Bishop of Chichester may cry out: "We have been fiddling in the vestry while the world outside burns." Emphatically the answer will come back from various opponents: "Let us continue to fiddle in the vestry; that's where religion belongs." I am amazed and appalled at the number of people who hold that Christianity belongs in the inner world of the individual conscience and private religious experience. In addition many are confused, dismayed and angered at the very idea that religion should make a difference in social, economic, and political life.

I am quite aware of the pitfalls along the way of the social gospel. I have seen men evade the plain implications of Christianity under such clichés as “let the church be the church,” “you can’t make blueprints of the new order,” “we must preserve fellowship and such discussions of the social gospel are inevitably divisive,” or “you can’t legislate the Kingdom of God”—and many others. On the other hand, to many of these same affirmations I myself agree if I may put them in my own context. “Let the Church be the Church” is a stirring and proper slogan if you make the purposes of the Church as inclusive as Christianity. I too am afraid of “blueprints” and do not propose to confine the Church to any party or ism or complete “Christian social program.” I am, however, completely committed to the conviction that we must work away at the task of bringing to the questions which the Church in itself may have no competence to settle, the Christian principles without which there can be no settlement. The Church “can be no social party—for it has a higher calling; but it can produce the men who can take sides and reach conclusions, and also demand the spirit in terms of which conclusions must be reached.”

In a true sense the Christian religion will always be disturbing and divisive. Fellowship which is obtained by telling religion “to get off the earth” is not worth the cost. It is the business of the Church to challenge existing ideas and prejudices which if allowed to prevail will forever make impossible a Christian way of life and a Christian organization of society. Further, the fact that I myself am so “imperfectly moralized or Christianized” must not stay my hand or silence my voice. Vachel Lindsay serves us here:

“I am unjust, but I can strive for justice;
My life’s unkind, but I can vote for kindness;
I, the unloving, say life should be lovely;
I, that am blind, cry out against my blindness.”

In so doing the individual and the Church are on the way toward a cleansed and serviceable life and become part of the moral might of God Himself.

I desire to make it unmistakably clear that I believe that one of the major strategies of the Church in the United States today is to enlist all its members—and any others who will share in the task—in bringing to the Judgment Seat of Christ all our social, economic and political life. Too often, as T. S. Eliot suggests, when we speak of a Christian Society “we mean only that we have a society in which no one is penalized for the *formal*

profession of Christianity; but we conceal from ourselves the unpleasant knowledge of the real values by which we live." Those "values" must be brought out into the open, examined and tested for their Christian significance and truth. If the Church is to have moral and spiritual leadership, it must walk along this path. If it will not do so "the public impotence of religion" will increase, for men will rightly conclude that Christianity has nothing to say to them in the crucial situations of life. I recall a remark of Tawney's in an Oxford group, which bit into my consciousness, to the effect that anyhow on great social issues the Church has always been twenty years behind the best opinion outside the Church. This will not continue to be so if we exercise "the habit of free and social thinking" which is in the great tradition of Christianity, and for which we have "both the incentive and the ideal."

V

Here, briefly, something should be said regarding the strategy of the Church as regards the issue of Church and State. We are face to face with new pressures for conformity to the Nationalistic State. Most of these pressures the ordinary citizen is not conscious of as pressures. Christopher Dawson has written trenchantly in regard to this particular peril: "The great danger that we have to meet is not the danger of violent persecution but rather that of the crushing out of religion from modern life by the sheer weight of a state-inspired public opinion." This opinion is forever at work through the movies, the radio, and the press. A continuous process of dechristianization is going on and one of our sharpest needs is to learn how the Church can in positive ways develop Christian public opinion. We are not dealing here with an academic question. Due to World War II far-reaching and fateful choices are being forced upon us. Already many preachers and educators are yielding to "state-inspired public opinion" and becoming a part of the military machine.

The central issue is whether the Church in America is to become the tool of the State as it was in World War I or whether it will claim its freedom. Will it say with Masfield's Pilate: "For me there is but one religion—which is Rome"? Or will it say that no state is worthy of a free man's worship?

As an administrator constantly coming in touch with many communities, I could document altogether too copiously the startling failure of many "Christian" laymen and preachers to realize that the Christian gospel and

Christian civilization are at stake. This is due, perhaps in a large part, to "an invincible sluggishness of imagination." They cannot grasp what is involved. And, of course, the leaders of the Church must acknowledge that education for Christian citizenship through the Church's own channels has been pitifully inadequate and weak. The formation of a Christian mind is a long and arduous task which we have not taken as seriously as we should.

A very important Memorandum has been sent out by The Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches. In it occurs this paragraph, which is in thorough accord with the Oxford and Madras affirmations:

"In the face of the tendency to absolutize nation or State and to put loyalty to the State on the same level as that towards God, it is *the duty of the churches to disentangle patriotism and religion and to teach fearlessly* that State and nation belong to the sphere of relative, earthly values. God alone is absolute and He alone has a claim to our unconditional loyalty." (*Italics mine.*)

The truth of this we have seen in times more quiet than today. Now the great testing hour has come.

"Tasks in hours of insight willed
Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled."

Will these tasks be fulfilled? The answer the Church makes will have far-reaching consequences both now and in after-war days. The Church at this point must not be uncertain of its aims and ends or vague in its strategy.

VI

The central strategy of the Church in the United States—or anywhere else—is in its worship. I have here stated my conviction of the need of rethinking the great doctrines of our faith and integrating our theology with all our other human interests. We must explore the imperatives of religion in our varied social relationships and throw its light upon the art and conduct of life. But religion culminates in the vision and experience of the living God—the source of all truth and beauty and goodness. Until the Church has helped to give this vision and experience it has given men no certain motive and power to practice the wise lessons they may have learned nor does it satisfy the often inarticulate hungers of the heart for the unseen. Life which is unlit and unwarmed by worship at the very heart of it is always in danger of becoming sterile and ineffective.

I believe, with Canon Barry, that the worship of the Church "is not only

its primary means of grace, but also its chief instrument of evangelism and its most vital contribution to the Christianization of the Social Order."

I am concerned now only to emphasize the relation of worship to the Christianization of the Social Order, as we are thinking of the strategy of the Church in relation to the overwhelming crisis of our civilization.

That worship has social and political significance is developed with great insight by Hocking in his *Man and the State*. In the heart of this book on political science is one of the most illuminating discussions of the far-reaching meanings of worship I have ever seen.

Worship may be one of the most "practical" acts of the human spirit. It may accomplish marvelous things in the individual life and in the reshaping of society.

Why, then, does worship for so many socially-minded people seem so futile? Because it is not related to the pressing problems of society as it should be. The Oxford Conference said accurately that "the daily business of the modern world, and the problems and issues dealt with in this report, are not sufficiently woven into the Liturgy and worship of the Church. Unless men are required to ask forgiveness, to make petitions and to give thanks for the things with which they are chiefly concerned day by day, public worship will begin to seem secondary . . . for the God we worship cares for the whole of man's life."

One of the strange remarks I hear often is that the Church has "gone to seed" on the Social Gospel. I wish there were some real occasion for this statement. It would give me great hope. My observation is that even among ministers the vast majority apparently have not even heard that there is a Social Gospel, or at best it is merely a rumor to them.

My chief illustration of that statement is the prayer life of the average minister. It is my fortune, or misfortune, to hear many pulpit prayers in churches of all denominations and they are a deadly revelation of a man's religious consciousness. What is of the very warp and woof of his religion in private, comes out in his public ministry of prayer. Often there is evidence of pitiful and shameful poverty, and I solemnly affirm that very seldom is there any disclosure in prayer of social consciousness. There is an evident lack of social convictions, of social needs and aspirations, and worst of all, of social confession and intercession. Some ministers do pray for missions, but even that prayer is seldom informed with the profounder

meanings of the mission enterprise. Rarely do I hear a prayer for the various vocational groups of a community living and working in the midst of grievous perplexities, for "all sorts and conditions of men," for racial understanding and co-operation, for escape from devastating provincialisms or pagan nationalism. Still less often is there the deep note of social penitence acknowledging the common responsibility and guilt for war, poverty, the exploitation of childhood—for the flame of separations and hatreds, for brutal selfishness and the other social ills that threaten to crush out our very physical existence as well as our spiritual life.

Surely no one will misunderstand and think that I am asking for the giving of social information or argument through prayer either to the people or to the Most High.

In closing I use Oldham's words to sum up my argument regarding this central strategy of the Church. "In so far as it achieves its true and full purpose the worship of the Church may be regarded as the most potent and fruitful form of social action. Who can tell what life-giving energies it may release or what hidden, secret forces it may set in motion to spread from person to person and insensibly transform the thought and spirit of the age? But such release can take place, it would seem, only if the connection with actual life is never lost; only if worship imparts a significance to the daily round, if it consecrates and illuminates with meaning the relations of family and neighborhood, recreation and friendship, and the various interests of the common life; only if those who kneel at the altar are in that act rededicated to the service of God and man and go forth with loins girt and sword unsheathed to fight in the name of the Lord against all iniquity. To believe that such results can flow from worship, that they have in fact so flowed in the course of Christian history, must not lead us to assume that the worship of the Church today is active as a mighty leaven in the life of the world. To speak as we have done of the worship of the Church is to call for searching self-examination."

The Menace to China Missions—An Administrator's View

WYNN C. FAIRFIELD

IN CHINA, it is a source of real satisfaction to an aged person to have his descendants purchase a suitable coffin and keep it in a place in the home where, as he draws near death's door, he may cast reassuring glances at it and reflect that when he passes away, his bones will have an honorable resting place. It is questionable whether even in China a healthy and vigorous person would enjoy having one of his friends provide a coffin for him. Certainly from the Western point of view, such an action would be unpleasantly suggestive and might well be resented as premature. The article by Dr. Gale in the Spring number of *RELIGION IN LIFE* comes perilously close in its implications to placing a coffin on one's doorstep with a suggestion as to the wise way to proceed if one is not to need it!

A highly placed American diplomat in China once suggested that what was happening in China at the time was the unfolding of an historic drama of international readjustment and that the best thing for the wise man was to remain a spectator and not to leap upon the stage to take part in the dramatic process. It is true that what is happening in China today can be understood fully only against the background of millennia of history. From the time of the Han Dynasty onward, Chinese history reveals the alternating recurrence of periods of national integration and external expansion, followed by periods of internal strife, aggression by outside forces and loss of much of the territory won. A strong and vigorous leader would succeed in fighting his way to the dragon throne, establish his dynasty, and then employ the armies developed in the process to reestablish the old boundaries of the empire or go beyond them. This process would continue for several generations, as a rule, and then would give place to decadence in the reigning house, followed by national weakness, and the eventual rise of another strong dynasty, sometimes after the lapse of several hundred years.

Paton in his history of Syria and Palestine pointed out a similar rhythm in the history of Babylonia, which borders the Arabian Desert as China borders the great deserts and steppes of Central Asia, Mongolia and Man-

churia. As the population of the Arabian desert grew in each period, it would cast increasingly envious eyes upon the fertile, luxurious valley of the more advanced and increasingly effete culture; conquer it and infuse new blood and energy into it; gradually accept its culture, attain security and in its turn fall prey to a fresh invasion from the desert. Something of the same sort of ebb and flow has been going on along the northern border of China from very early times, as attested by the Great Wall which goes back to the third century before Christ in most places, a futile attempt to substitute bricks and mortar for men.

We are living in the chaos following the decline and fall of the Manchu dynasty which determined the bounds of the Chinese Empire as most of us learned them in our geographies. The Manchus were tribes to the northeast of China proper which had already been culturally assimilated by China, but brought with their conquest fresh vigor which lasted for two centuries, only in its turn to break down one hundred years ago. Since the first Opium War destroyed the myth of China's military might, piece by piece the foreign powers of West and East have gnawed away at the Manchu Dynasty's boundaries, enabled to do so by almost a century of decadence and the series of rebellions that split the country and laid it wide open to such spoliation.

In such a process years and even decades are of relatively little significance compared with the trend. Portugal, Russia, England and France had each had its turn when in the closing decade of the last century, Japan and Germany entered the picture. The last fifty years have witnessed a dual or even triple struggle going on. China has been struggling to defend her tributary states, her dominions and her central eighteen provinces against all "barbarian" comers, European or Japanese, whether attacking by force of arms or by economic exploitation. The predatory powers have been fighting not only at times directly against China, but also in various combinations against each other, sometimes combining against Japan as was done after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, sometimes linking forces with Japan against other Western powers. Even now, we witness the curious spectacle of members of the Triplice working against each other in China while trying to maintain a common front against Britain and the United States. The real issue in Eastern Asia is whether a new Chinese dynasty in the form of a republic can develop enough power to stop the inroads of the outer barbarians

(and eventually restore the Manchu or even larger boundaries) or whether the Chinese people will be dominated for a century or two by another "barbarian" dynasty, which eventually they may overthrow.

An obvious difference between the present situation and similar ones in the past is that then the barbarian conquerors had a less highly developed civilization and cultural assimilation was easy, whereas now (as Lattimore has pointed out) both Russians and Japanese bring with them not only fresh vigor, but also an even more highly developed civilization, stemming out of western Eurasian culture in an independent tradition. Whether the situation is comparable with the clash between the Semitic culture of Babylonia and Arabia, and the Indo-Germanic cultures of Persia and Greece is hard to determine. This essentially new situation as far as China's history is concerned is abundant ground for Dr. Gale's warning against the "wishful thinking" that assumes that a Japanese hegemony will eventually meet the fate of the equally foreign Manchu dynasty.

In this framework, it is well worth noting that the drama of Japan's attempt to secure the hegemony of Greater East Asia is not a matter of a few years, and does not date from 1937 or even from 1931. As history goes, internal unity in Japan had barely been achieved after the Restoration when it commenced to beat against the continent, and to gain its foothold in Korea for the Sino-Japanese War. Temporarily prevented by European opposition from reaping the full gains of its victory over China, in less than ten years it challenged Russia and forced it to share Manchuria. Ten years more brought the European war and Japan's opportunity, under the cloak of evicting Germany, to seize Shantung and take advantage of the early aftermath of China's Revolution and consequent disunity to present and partially secure the Twenty-one Demands. Once again, as in the case of the Liaotung Peninsula, the West compelled Japan to turn back to China a part of its gains, and lengthened from a decade to a decade and a half the interval between the waves of invasion. Curiously enough, the invasion begun in 1931 with the Mukden incident developed its own two-year rhythm, so that 1931, 1933, 1935 and 1937 represent successive waves of invasion which resulted in the strategic occupation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, coastal China, the Great Plain and the main portion of the Yangtze Valley. The wave of 1939, however, broke in vain against the mountain ramparts of West China, and no strategically significant victory has been won by Japan

since the fall of Nanchang. Instead, the wave of 1941 threatens to swirl past the China Coast and down into the more alluring South Seas.

The strategic occupation of parts of China is much less complete than most maps imply. For most of "occupied China," it seems to be no more than a very large-meshed net, with Japan occupying the knots and strings—cities and the connecting channels of communication—and the large "holes" under the control of Chinese forces more or less closely related to the central government located at Chungking. Attempts at economic exploitation have not yet been successful in producing returns on any large scale for the Japanese, although they have to a very large extent strangled the wider economy of China. Recent reports were to the effect, for instance, that guerilla forces in North China had succeeded in limiting the cotton crop to 10 per cent of its pre-war quantity, and limiting the farmers almost entirely to subsistence rather than commercial farming. Lack of the heavier *matériel* required by modern offensive warfare and the shutting off of most of the avenues by which it might be imported seem to render the vastly greater Chinese armies impotent in themselves for a great offensive. The present picture seems to show a military and economic stalemate perilously resembling the experience of a snake that has tried to swallow too large a toad. It seems as likely that both will exhaust themselves as that either side will win a decisive military or economic victory, unless there is outside intervention.

What are the forces that still drive Japan forward in this effort which practically everyone in Japan is reported to believe unprofitable? Undoubtedly a primary one is the failure of the effort to pattern after England and to support a doubled population by manufacturing imported raw materials into goods that can be sold at a reasonable profit in world markets. Probably with free competition, this effort would have gone far to solve Japan's problem of livelihood, but everywhere, even in China, political measures have been taken to close the markets to Japan. Persistent diplomacy has failed to open those doors, and the pressure of hungry farm families and the unemployed proletariat of the cities upon the rulers of Japan has led even civilian leadership to accept a program of forcible creation of an economic bloc in Greater East Asia dominated by and tributary to Japan. (The difference between such a conception and the recent voluntary reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine by the republics of North and South America should be obvious, although there have been times when our

practical interpretation of that Doctrine gave some grounds for accusing us of seeking a similar hemispheric hegemony.)

Such a program, having once been launched, the element of prestige or "face" has entered in to prevent Japan's proposing any peace terms which China with the present stalemate is willing to consider. One well-informed resident of Japan has pointed out that the average Japanese has about the same attitude toward the Chinese that the average Northerner in America has toward the Negro. He may be benevolently inclined toward him, or he may dislike or exploit him, but he himself is always a member of a superior race. That is one reason why classing Japanese with other "Asiatics" in immigration legislation has particularly wounded sensibilities, and why the refusal of the Versailles Peace Conference to recognize "racial equality" has stung. Quite aside from the Samurai tradition of never surrendering, the loss of face for the Japanese army in making less than a conqueror's peace with China might be an inconceivable price to pay.

In certain elements of the army and to a certain extent in the navy, there seems to be also a yearning for the glory of imperialistic conquest. With most of the population and leadership, however, the urge to expansion is tied up with the almost indescribable political mysticism which provides ready-made the basis for fascism which Nazi Germany has tried to supply by creating an artificial religion of the state, divorced from the standards of Christianity. That political mysticism identifies the individual subject with the state and the state with the emperor in a way that defies definite, logical elucidation, and yet emotionally has a powerful hold on the springs of will and action. Among the idealistic, this results in a "mystic sense of mission" to extend the sway of the divine personalized state and even to share with less favored races some of the divine blessings inherent in relationship to this state. Some even go the length of the logical outcome of this theory, and think in terms of a world-culture unified by this political religion. So we find the phenomenon of the imperial shrines established in Korea, Formosa and more recently Manchuria as well as in Japan proper, symbolizing as in the days of Assyria and the Caesars the recognition by the subject nation of its identification with the religio-political pattern of the suzerain. The nearest parallel to the thinking of idealistic Japanese about this mission is perhaps found in the phrase "the white man's burden" which was coined from a similar mixture of imperial pride, patronage and

idealism. For Greater East Asia at least, Japan is prepared to relieve the white man of that "burden." Economic pressure, "face" and this idealized imperialism unite in "justifying" the sacrifices increasingly necessary to bring in the New Order, and constitute a dynamic not easily devitalized.

What real chance, then, has China and particularly "occupied China" of surviving, maintaining its administrative integrity and ultimately regaining a large share of its territorial integrity? Probably the most significant factor is the mass inertia of the Chinese people. Through the centuries they have learned to adjust themselves to domination without becoming servile in the process. The Japanese began to welcome Western culture in many of its phases in 1868, within a decade and a half of their reluctant reopening of their ports under the stimulus of Perry's armed diplomacy. The comparable date in China is 1906, practically a century and a half after comparable Chinese intercourse with Westerners began. The great mass of the Chinese peasantry tend to go their way regardless of changing governments, and to judge disturbing forces by their own standards rather than to judge their standards by the disturbing impact of those forces. Probably the most devastating judgment on such modern totalitarian methods as the terroristic bombing of villages far from the scenes of actual fighting is the almost instinctive pronouncement of the peasants that it "mei yu li"—is unreasonable. During the almost three centuries of Manchu rule, there were always underground movements of potential revolt which often became actual. Japanese troops in China and their puppet henchmen have to deal with the inertia of this mass of more than four hundred million Chinese who refuse to admit that the Japanese invasion and the settlements proposed are reasonable. Until they can change that attitude of the Chinese people, their domination must continue to be dependent on force. Any relaxation of force will find the elastic populace springing back to take advantage of every weakness and exercising infinite ingenuity in non-cooperation and sabotage. So far, the Japanese have not succeeded in finding a single puppet leader whom they can really trust.

A newer factor for which the Japanese themselves are largely responsible is patriotic loyalty to country. When China dominated the whole life of Eastern Asia from Tibet to the Pacific, the people had practically no national consciousness. The Chinese expression for patriotism is a recent combination of two ideograms. The old political virtue was loyalty from

the inferior to the superior. In the family, this became the still more fundamental virtue generally translated as "filial piety." Lack of communications contributed to provincialism; and the absence most of the time of a general external enemy made loyalty to family and province more significant for most of the common people than loyalty to the country or even to the emperor. The inroads of a common enemy, bringing suffering to and disrupting the life of almost all the people of the whole country, have served to give China a sense of unity which she has not had at least since the integrating principle of unity in the common emperor was destroyed with the Revolution of 1911. Because of its newness, it is hard to estimate the real effectiveness of this factor, but it is not to be lost sight of.

This sense of unity is undoubtedly strengthened by the personality of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who has an amazing ability to hold together naturally diverse elements and to coordinate the efforts of men activated by a wide range of worthy and unworthy motives into a program of reconstruction as well as resistance. His loss or disability would be a tremendous blow to the cause of China and probably greatly lessen the hope for early success in convincing Japan of the futility of her present course. Nevertheless, even such a disaster would still leave Japan facing the fundamental unwillingness of the Chinese people to bow in spirit, or to bow in body any further than the circumstances actually require. The ultimate outcome of that meeting of the seemingly irresistible force and the seemingly eternally resilient object is so hard to estimate that I am convinced it is premature to buy a coffin even for political China, to say nothing of Christianity and the missionary enterprise within it.

The real concern is not for the missionary enterprise per se. Missions are only a means, not an end. The end in China or Korea or Japan is the establishment of a vital Christian movement, expressing itself in churches and institutions suitable to carry on the process of constant reinvigoration of Christian experience, the introduction of each new generation into that experience, the extension of the circle of believers in each generation, the types of service with which the Christian heart responds to need, and the necessarily gradual process of applying Christian ideals to the social and political life of the nation and its relations with other nations. In all three countries, such a measure of success in this matter has been attained that while the Christian movement is still a very small bit of leaven hid in very large meas-

ures of dough, it does not require a large amount of faith to believe that even if the missionary process of adding new leaven from outside had to cease, the leavening process would not cease, even if its tempo were retarded. A Christian movement stripped of all its schools, hospitals, service institutions and right of public worship would be handicapped and might have to exist in the catacombs, but Christian history shows that if a living faith continues, so does the leavening process.

Modern missions with their emphasis on education have produced a group of leaders whose service has not been limited to the Christian movement as narrowly conceived, but has reached out into other spheres of national life. The fact that in China modern education was carried on by missions for many years before the state adopted it has had much to do with the responsibilities placed upon the shoulders of such leaders. It has recently been stated that 51 per cent of the men and women listed in a China "Who's Who" had studied in a Christian school. Even among "returned students," however, the Christian group is still comparatively small, and returned students from America are in a minority, especially as compared with the many thousands who have studied in Japan. Even with Christians and graduates of Christian schools in so many places of prominence, it is a mistake to think of the government at present as being controlled by them. National policy even in a dictatorship is the resultant of many conflicting forces. The group with Christian associations is a leavening force, but by no means a decisive force in the government of China.

The growth of the Protestant churches in China in numbers is significant. Seven years elapsed after 1807 before Morrison baptized his first convert. By 1830, there were reported to be only three Protestant Christians in China. At the end of fifty years, it is stated that there were only 400 Protestant church members, and that in those fifty years, four hundred missionaries had died. Before the critical Boxer Year, 1900, the membership had increased to approximately 90,000. In large areas of the country, Boxer persecutions sifted the church and reduced its membership, but with the change in the attitude of the government that followed, the next quarter-century witnessed a growth to 400,000 that was probably too rapid to be thoroughly sound. Anti-Christian movements linked up with the anti-foreign emphasis in China's revolutionary drive of 1926-28 once more tended to purge the Christian church of members adhering to it from un-

worthy motives, and slowed down its net increase. In spite of measures taken to test the sincerity of new applicants for baptism, the last four years of conflict have again witnessed large accessions of well-instructed members, particularly in regions where the devotion of Christian Chinese and foreign missionaries alike had "preached by deeds rather than words."

It is this body of perhaps half a million Protestant Christians, together with approximately five times as many Roman Catholic Christians, that will determine the success or failure of the more than a century of Protestant missions and the six centuries of Catholic missions. That success or failure will be independent to a very large extent of the form of government which may prevail. Democracy is a fruit of Christianity, the application to government of Christ's principle that he who would be first must be servant of all, and not the soil in which alone Christianity can flourish. These Christians may face a long series of acid tests. They may find the presence of foreign missionaries with them an embarrassing evidence of intimate relations with forces politically opposed to the powers that be, rather than a help. Whatever policies are followed must be determined by what appear to be the best interests of that living church of China rather than by the desire to conserve the framework and institutions of the missionary enterprise. So long as assistance from the mission boards of America is an asset rather than a liability, it should be given and given wholeheartedly, whether missionaries are present or are not present. But if that aid should cease, there is abundant reason to believe that Christ's church will survive all hardships and become stronger in times of difficulty than in times of popularity and ease.

The problem of the immediate and more remote future of the American missionary in China is a related, but distinctly different problem. Since the close of the War of 1812, American missionaries everywhere have had the favored status of neutrals in the various mission fields where they have worked. The United States has refrained from direct hostilities against the countries of Asia and their European overlords (with the exception of the Relief Expedition to Peking in 1900), although it has often claimed for its nationals the same privileges which other nations had wrested by force. As a consequence of this traditional status, American missionaries have been enabled even in the midst of actual hostilities to remain in their fields and to minister with deeds of mercy to the victims of war. Cyrus Hamlin's care for the wounded in the Crimean War and the sacrificial ministry of many

American missionaries during Turkey's attempts to root out the Armenians within its body politic are but two examples of what has been true in the past.

This has continued true during the half-century of Japan's expansion into the continent. Missionaries were able to continue their ministry while two wars were fought in Korea. As the successive waves of invasion in the past ten years have beaten farther and farther into China, the mission "compounds" have as a rule been recognized as oases of safety, as sanctuaries where under the double aegis of religious philanthropy and American citizenship it has been possible to shelter many tens of thousands in the aggregate from the worst horrors of war. There have been unfortunate exceptions to this general rule, defended on the ground of military necessity or apologized for as regrettable errors by subordinates, but the rule has been respect for a rather inclusive interpretation of the privileges of neutrals.

One unforeseen consequence of this situation has been that the Japanese army has become far more aware of the missionary movement in China than its officers and members had become in Japan. In very few if any places in Japan do mission stations and institutions stand out against the landscape as they so often do in and near the smaller cities of China. It is reliably reported that among some groups, this has resulted in a respectful appreciation of Christianity on the part of men who had never known much about it in Japan. With others, it has led to suggestions that the Christian churches of Japan should immediately begin to develop missions in China to assist with the penetration of China by Japanese culture, a proposal which the Christian movement of Japan as a whole has wisely squelched, though individuals have attempted to fall in with it. (This in no sense discounts the very sincere efforts of some Japanese Christians on their own initiative to alleviate the sufferings of warfare both for their own soldiers and for the Chinese.) With still others, this new awareness has resulted in comparisons between the almost unanimous support of China's national cause by American missionaries in China, and the almost complete silence of American missionaries in Japan concerning the issues.

Since the army is so largely the determining factor in Japan's policies, it is possible that these comparisons have contributed to the growing uneasiness about the fact that as a rule, missionaries in Japan have not supported the continental policy among their constituency in America as the China missionaries have supported China's. This has been true throughout most of

the last ten years, and especially so since 1937. For the first years, Japanese reaction took the form of regret that their neutral guests could not or would not do so. More recently, particularly since the formation of the Konoye government last July, there has been a growing feeling even among fellow-Christians that silence on the issue was not enough, and that missionaries who expected to continue to be welcome in Japan should give more positive support to the national policy.

The problem so created is similar to the one in India a few years ago when an over-zealous district collector demanded that the missions in his district see that their employees, particularly school teachers, actively support the British overlordship as over against the growing drive of nationalism. It was pointed out to the government of India that missionaries in taking the pledge required of all non-British missionaries coming to India had bound themselves to refrain from political activity, and that such a commitment worked both ways. To the credit of the government, the validity of this contention was recognized, the local matter was adjusted, and a rather more liberal system of providing the necessary assurances was adopted. It would seem that a similar policy might well be the maximum requirement for American missionaries in Japan, if more than the traditional recognition of the right to silence is demanded.

Up to the present, no similar pressure has been applied in China, so far as known. Perhaps it was obvious that it was more than could be expected. Of course, the army has required that American missionaries observe the responsibilities while they enjoy the privileges of neutrals, and render no aid to the opposing Chinese army. There have been hints through friendly Japanese that more "cooperation" would be acceptable, and that it would be well if the missionaries would recognize the New Order as a *fait accompli*. Dr. Gale's article, with all due respects to him, sounds curiously reminiscent of a similar point of view. If war between the United States and Japan is averted, which still seems possible as this article is written, there is every reason to believe that the missionaries in China will either continue to adapt themselves to the *de facto* government, or if they find themselves unable to do so, withdraw. There are many tens if not hundreds of millions in penetrated China who are included in the "all the earth" to which we are commissioned to go. So long as peaceful relations between Japan and America make it possible, American missionaries can be expected to continue

their Christian witness and ministry to those millions without departing from their technically neutral position in politics, or conceding prematurely the permanent nature of the New Order.

The problem of immediately greater concern to the administrators of mission boards is the status of missionaries throughout East Asia in territory controlled by Japan when, as and if a state of war should classify them as enemy aliens for the first time in the long history of missions there. To enable active workers in vigorous health to continue, most mission boards have advised mothers of families and people with health problems to return to America, and have permitted all others, both men and women, who wished to do so to remain at their own discretion. This problem is a matter of grave concern to all mission boards. Two or three have ordered all missionaries to leave these areas. Most boards desire to give full liberty to the conscience of the individual missionary in determining where duty lies, to share with him so far as distance and present conditions make possible in the thinking that precedes the final decision, and to give him all the backing in their power in carrying out that final decision. They fervently pray that the problems dealt with in the main body of this article may not be further complicated by the tragic rupture of the traditional good relations between Japan and America. Nevertheless, when all measures and precautions human wisdom dictates have been taken, and when they have done all they feel they can do to cooperate in reestablishing peace with justice and good will in East Asia, they can only follow the petition that this cup may be taken from them and their missionaries with that other petition of their Master, "Nevertheless, not my will but thine be done!"

Theism and Pragmatic Naturalism

J. S. PENNEPACKER

I. THE PEIRCEAN MOVEMENT

IN THE course of that fascinating dialectic of the human mind which we call the history of philosophy, we come occasionally upon periods that stand like mountain divides across the trail of the human spirit; periods marked by such names as Socrates, Aristotle, Descartes, or Immanuel Kant: men who initiated new ways of thinking, new outlooks on life. Not that their fellow pilgrims in the human quest, toiling wearisomely or jovially as the case may be toward the summits of their generation, were always aware that they were marching across watersheds of thought. Far from it! We may be sure that usually they had no realization that anything really important was happening in their midst. If they had—but that is another story.

Will the centuries to come look back on the first half of the twentieth century as such a watershed of human thinking? Who in this day can tell? Yet it is an idea worth pondering; for at least, in considering such a possibility, we may succeed in getting far enough above the noise and confusion of local and particular controversies to be able to sense the significance of one of the major conflicts in the religious and philosophical thinking of our own times.

A little more than a century ago, on September 10, 1839, to be exact, there was born in New England one whose name may well come in time to be ranked with the pioneers of human thought: Charles Sanders Peirce, now recognized as the father of American pragmatism. True, during his long lifetime—he died in 1914—he did not publish a single philosophical book,¹ and he held an academic chair or lectured in philosophy for but a few brief and not too successful periods. He had admirers, but no true acknowledged disciples during his life. There are stars that shine much more brightly in the galaxy of pragmatism, even today: William James, John Dewey, George H. Mead, F. C. S. Schiller—to mention but a few. Nevertheless, these all,

¹ His *Collected Papers* (6 vols.), edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, have been published by the Harvard University Press, 1931-1935.

with practically one accord, point us back to Peirce as the source and fountain-head of inspiration of a great new movement of the human spirit: a way of thinking that may indeed change the whole course of philosophic, scientific and theological thought before its influence wanes. *If*—and please note carefully this “if”—we are passing over a divide of the human trail, it is the spirit that was in Peirce that is leading us. On one side of the divide are the idealisms and realisms, the theisms, materialisms, and absolutisms of yesterday. On the other side will be—or better, will *run*—the transformed, activist, naturalistic systems of tomorrow, whatever name or sign they bear.

It is the permeating, transforming quality of this movement, initiated by Peirce, that concerns us here: not the school called pragmatism, as such. We may agree to a large extent with the charges of superficiality, fallacy of neglected aspect, overspecialization, et cetera, continuously leveled at the pragmatists and their work. Still we cannot deny, and we should become consciously awake to the fact that the avowed followers of Peirce have something vital and perhaps transforming to say to every thoughtful worker in the human enterprise, religious, philosophic, scientific, of whatever school or persuasion.

Naturally we cannot here trace out all or even many of the lines of influence of Peirce and his cohorts on the thought of today. I have selected but one phase of that influence: namely, the impact of Peircean naturalism upon the theism of today; and even there we shall have to limit ourselves more or less arbitrarily to a few most important, selected aspects. Before going farther, however, it should be pointed out (if that is necessary) that Charles Sanders Peirce is not to be credited with, nor blamed for, all that has arisen in the wake of his thought. He had a great, revolutionary insight; yet, humanly enough, he could not follow it to all its logical conclusions. His followers have been busy ever since exploring those possibilities. He, himself, for example, lived and died a convinced objective idealist,² not a pragmatist in the full present-day sense of that word! Since it is just his basic insight, rather than all the detailed extremes of positivism and of pragmatism, that most concerns us here, and since that insight is no longer strictly limited to the pragmatic school, but is shared to some extent with

² “The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws.” C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. VI, par. 25, p. 20.

others (for example, personalism and some schools of realism), let us be free to speak henceforth of "the Peircean movement."⁸

At the heart of the Peircean movement lies empiricism. In fact, we may safely say that the heart of it, in its later developments especially, *is* a transformed empiricism. It is an empiricism which avoids, for the most part, the sensationalistic psychology, the discrete individualism, and the strictly materialistic and mechanistic implications of British empiricism. Yet its whole emphasis is scientific and evolutionary, and at the hands of William James, John Dewey and George H. Mead, it became truly a "radical empiricism." As is well known, applied with rigor by Mead, Dewey, *et al*, this empiricism leads, inevitably, to complete scientific naturalism. This empirical naturalism, in which we are here vitally interested, and which is perhaps the most important development of the Peircean movement, may be expressed in nontechnical language in this preliminary and summary fashion: philosophy and religion (in so far as there is or may be any religion) are concerned *only* with the interpretation of human experience; human experience must be understood in terms of human organisms reacting intelligently with their total, dynamic, natural environment; scientific method (careful observation and controlled experimentation) is the one sound, available, technical approach to the problems of philosophy and philosophy of religion.

It will not be beside the point, perhaps, to note parenthetically the tremendous popular vogue and application achieved by this point of view. It is necessary but to call attention to the fact that, largely through the teaching and influence of John Dewey, the Peircean philosophy underlies almost our entire American educational procedure today, being especially vocal in those circles called "progressive"; that from associated theological centers, especially in New York and Chicago, a stream of influence has gone into the religious thought and experience of the nation. The fact that scientific, empiricistic naturalism is, therefore, increasingly affecting the mental and spiritual structure of American life, with inevitable results upon social and religious thought, activities and institutions, needs no argument. It is high time that more than merely a few technical philosophers awaken to the changes which are being—or have already been—wrought in the American mind.

⁸ Remembering that, New England fashion, Peirce pronounced his name so that it would rhyme with *purse*, not with *pierce*!

And so we come to the raising of a question which seems vital to all who are intellectually concerned with "religion in life," today and tomorrow. We may phrase it this way for the sake of completeness, clumsy though it may seem: Assuming that theistic religion is an integral part of human experience, not to be lightly brushed aside; and granting that the Peircean movement may represent a vital shift in human thinking; what are the important bearings and directions of influence of this movement's scientific, empiricistic naturalism on the theism of today and tomorrow?

II. RADICAL EMPIRICISM

Since the heart of the Peircean movement is empiricism, let us first note and discuss this aspect of the problem. We may well remind ourselves in the beginning that, historically, "radical empiricism" became the first real rallying-point of American pragmatism, somewhat to the dismay of Peirce. In the cases of James, Dewey and Mead, undoubtedly this represented a strong reaction from their earlier Hegelian convictions and practice. In fact pragmatism as a whole, it may be truly said, represents a rebellion against the extreme rationalism and the grandiose, metaphysical systems of absolute idealism. All through the earlier years of the movement, those "futile decades in which discussion centered almost exclusively around the concept of truth" (as one present-day pragmatist describes them⁴), pragmatism was pleading with philosophy and religion to get and to keep their feet on the ground of human experience. Let us hope and pray that that general lesson is well learned. If so, the pragmatic concern about truth will not have been as futile as Professor Morris thinks it; vain or mistaken though its concept of truth, that "what works is true," may have been.

As the years have gone by, however, the Peircean movement has laid more and more emphasis upon the scientific nature of radical empiricism. An important factor in this, undoubtedly, was the teaching and influence of the late Professor George H. Mead, of Chicago University.⁵ Let us note some of the results of this growing emphasis.

The most obvious effect of the scientific emphasis is, undoubtedly, a heightened intellectual caution and methodological rigor, with a correspond-

⁴ C. W. Morris, in *The Philosophical Review*, 47 (1938), 109.

⁵ Cf. Professor Morris's article, *op. cit.*, 109-127, "Peirce, Mead and Pragmatism," to which I am indebted for several suggestions here made.

ing disparagement or abandonment of general metaphysical and religious hypotheses. Consciously or unconsciously, the tendency is to adopt the methods and viewpoint of the so-called natural sciences. Particulars of experience displace the larger aspects of the universe in interest and importance. Attention is centered more and more, and more rigorously, on the analysis of concrete particular situations; and the adjustment of the individual to his particular environment, natural and social, becomes the essential aim and purpose both of philosophy and religion.

Another effect of the growing scientific emphasis within the Peircean empirical movement is the tendency toward positivism. This is to be noted in several ways. First, there is the narrowing of the meaning of the term "experience," and of the meaning of "meaning" and "value" within that experience. The result is that pragmatism and extreme "logical positivism" more and more converge, as noted by Professor C. W. Morris, in the article cited above (n. 4 and n. 5). However disguised, the practical result would seem to be positivistic and behavioristic: everything finds its meaning and significance, its ultimate reality, in terms of the activity and reactivity of the natural individual organism, in relation with a completely natural environment. This behavior is all there is to experience. Further, the term "truth" takes a secondary place, or had better be abandoned altogether.⁶ Again (as similarly noted above in connection with empiricistic method) the growth of positivism is seen in the complete abandonment of metaphysics; or in the substitution of science for metaphysics, sometimes under the guise of a "scientific metaphysics," which turns out to be no metaphysics at all, but simply a scientific, evolutionary account of nature.

That the extreme forms of this positivistic empiricism are completely antithetical to and destructive of any form of theism, needs no elaboration. We may well raise the question, however, as to the validity and endurance of these extreme types. In the last several decades, independently of the Peircean movement, there has arisen the school of logical positivism just referred to, centered, before the Hitlerian invasion, in Vienna. This school, less hampered than American pragmatism by social and biological interests, has rigorously pursued to their logical conclusions the principles of positivistic empiricism. The net result has been not only that theism is rendered

⁶ Cf. Bertrand Russell's criticisms of Dewey's pragmatism from this angle in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, edited by Paul A. Schilpp, p. 144f., and Dewey's reply, p. 527f.

logically impossible, nay meaningless, but that philosophy itself is reduced to a mere business of defining terms and clarifying sentences. Important, instrumentally, as that may be, one is tempted to think that, especially in its complete rejection and denial of all, or practically all historic philosophy, this represents a *reductio ad absurdum*, calling imperatively for a re-examination by the disciples of Peirce of the whole structure of empirical method. A re-examination? Yes, and a return perhaps to the sounder, more balanced wisdom of the father of pragmatism, who writes that:

He would venture to suggest that it (the methodological maxim of pragmatism) should always be put into practice with conscientious thoroughness, but that, when that has been done, and not before, a still higher grade of clearness of thought can be attained by remembering that the only ultimate good which the practical facts to which it directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; so that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all, but in the manner in which those reactions contribute to that development.⁷

Whether the pragmatists will ever attempt such a return to Peirce is perhaps very doubtful. But the lessons for theists would seem to be clear enough. That there are real values in pragmatic, radical empiricism, the practical and technical achievements of men like James, Dewey, *et al*, would seem to indicate almost beyond question. This empiricism needs to be tempered, however, by the valid contribution of rationalistic metaphysics and logic: the "concrete reasonableness" that Peirce, and even James to some extent, refused, wisely, to abandon. As Professor Brightman strikingly put it in his article, "An Empirical Approach to God,"

What we need is a genuinely empirical approach to the problem of God; empirical, not in the rigid sense of Hume or the vague sense of Mill, nor yet in the still vaguer sense of much contemporary naturalism (which is as speculative as is idealism), but—to borrow a phrase from the late Mary Whiton Calkins—in the sense of "a truly radical empiricism." . . . Personal experience, apprehended as completely as possible, analyzed as thoroughly as possible, tested as experimentally as possible, and then grasped synoptically as a system or totality—that is the basis and method of metaphysics. That is the process of verification. That is the empirical approach to God.⁸

III. FUNCTIONALISM AND ACTIVISM

The consideration of radical empiricism, as developed by the Peircean

⁷ C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. V, Sec. 3, p. 2. Cf., also, Sec. 433, p. 289, same volume.

⁸ *Philosophical Review*, 46 (1937) 154-155.

movement, leads us naturally to inquire next concerning empiricism's usual running-mate in pragmatic and realistic philosophies: functionalistic activism or activistic functionalism. This phase of the movement's naturalism goes back, also, to its very fountainhead for its inception. The original pragmatic maxim, written by Charles Peirce in September, 1877, and published the following January in *Popular Science Monthly*, reads as follows:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.⁹

True, this may be regarded as mere epistemological or psychological functionalism—and so it was by Peirce. But it was not long before it led to a functionalism which could no longer escape metaphysical implications. This disturbed and alarmed Peirce himself, and, as we have noted, he attempted to guard his own metaphysical convictions. In this same connection he remarks that, in his essays, "The Will to Believe" (1896), and "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" (1898), William James

has pushed this method to such extremes as must tend to give us pause. The doctrine appears to assume that the end of man is action—a stoical axiom which, to the present writer at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so forcibly as it did at thirty.¹⁰

Nevertheless, he himself admits that in his 1878 article he has "applied the stoical maxim most unstoically,"—but still, we may note, metaphysically—"in such sense as to insist upon the reality of the objects of general ideas in their generality."¹¹

Peirce's practice, then, rather than his preachment, became the guide and inspiration of such of his followers as have developed a metaphysics, or anything that may be called a substitute for metaphysics. This tendency may be seen in its full development, for example, in George H. Mead's *The Philosophy of the Act* (University of Chicago Press, 1938), and in Dewey's metaphysical writings.¹² The important general result of it for our problem

⁹ *Op. cit.*, vol. V, par. 2, p. 1. Cf. par. 402, p. 258, and par. 526n, p. 268, same volume.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 2. First published in Baldwin's *Dictionary*, in 1900.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Cf. especially, Dewey's, *Experience and Nature*, Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1926.

may be simply expressed by saying that anything in the nature of the static substances of the older metaphysical systems, idealistic or realistic, completely disappears. Reality is viewed as fundamentally active and functional, much in the spirit of Aristotle, from whom, incidentally, occasional encouragement is drawn. Since this view of the nature of reality seems peculiarly difficult for the traditional theist, usually unpracticed in pragmatic logic and metaphysics, to grasp, let us seek to state as clearly and simply as possible the general nature of the universe, of "mind" and of "matter," as they present themselves in Dewey's philosophy. This metaphysic is typical of pragmatism.

The basic notion of this view of the world is that existent reality—"Nature"—really *is* neither matter nor mind nor neutral entities nor any other kind of substance or "stuff." Essentially nature consists of a vast concatenation of "events," acting and reacting upon and with one another. In the experience of certain complexly related groups of natural events (commonly known as human organisms) problematic situations arise. And in such relationships these organisms manifest awareness, through which knowledge is attained. At this point, Dewey says,

... attained knowledge produces *meanings* and ... these meanings are capable of being separated from the special cases of knowledge in which they originally appear and of being incorporated and funded cumulatively in habits (of the organism) so as to constitute *mind*, and to constitute *intelligence* when actually applied in new experiences.¹³

Note, then, that for Dewey, mind is nothing but an organized group of habits learned in and through experience by an organized group of natural events.

Similarly, Dewey contends that what we call *matter* "is a character of natural events and changes as they change; (it is) their character of regular and stable order."¹⁴ He insists, furthermore, regarding matter, that

it is no cause or source of events or processes; no absolute monarch; no principle of explanation; no substance behind or underlying changes. ... The name designates a character in operation, not an entity.¹⁵

And to any objection to this strange similarity of matter and mind, as "char-

¹³ Dewey, in Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 564.

¹⁴ *Experience and Nature*, p. 74.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

acters of events," which one might naturally be disposed to raise, he has already given this answer:

Natural events are so complex and varied that there is nothing surprising in their possession of different characterizations, characters so different that they can be easily treated as opposites.¹⁶

Thus we have in essence some of the basic "first principles" of a typical present-day pragmatism. Do not forget for a moment that this view of reality is a conscious attempt to dispense with "the vague and mysterious properties assigned to mind and matter, the very conceptions of mind and matter in traditional thought," which, says Dewey, "are ghosts walking underground,"¹⁷ and to concentrate entirely on a simple description of the deliverances of *experience*. Many of us find it extremely difficult to be so radically empirical: our thinking continues to be haunted by pale ghosts, some of which, even, impolitely refuse to stay underground!

Although such a marked transition has thus been achieved, from the vague, functionalistic pluralism of a William James to the incipient activism of a John Dewey, we must nevertheless not overlook the fact that traditional "first principles" are never first in the Peircean movement, either consecutively or logically.¹⁸ "Experience" is the important and basic consideration, and consequently little or no concern is shown over the metaphysically naïve term "natural events." These events may be analyzed and described empirically; also they must be defended against any attempt to give them an assumed metaphysical status as mental, material, or even neutral; but anything more is to be frowned upon as futile, if not meaningless.

These latter considerations should make it clear, if the description of pragmatic reality did not, that the Peircean movement becomes increasingly difficult for any able-bodied theism. This despite the fact that practically all the leaders of the movement, from Peirce and James to Mead and Dewey, have expressed a consistent and genuine interest in religion and a recognition of the reality and importance of the religious aspects of experience. But what can be the place and significance of God in such a system? Obviously not that traditionally held, in spite of the "will to believe." A

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Cf. William James' definition of pragmatism as "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts." *Pragmatism*, pp. 54-55.

caustic wit at the turn of the century redubbed James's famous essay "The Will to Make Believe." James himself began to see dimly that in the end the logic of pragmatism was leading him in the direction of a polytheistic metaphysics. In a genuine, complete pluralism of events, any god, if there be any such, becomes just one event or group of events or relation among those events that make up the total natural universe (which perhaps in that case we should call the "multiverse"). How can God be anything more than that (that is, be ontologically real and transcendent) without denying the fundamental principles of radical empiricism and the functional approach to reality? In which latter case, exit pragmatic pluralism!

IV. RELIGIOUS NATURALISM

The radical inconsistency, shown by the logic of the facts revealed in our study thus far, of trying to embrace at the same time an undiluted pragmatism and *traditional* theism, has not been realized by many theists whose primary interest is not in philosophy. The true situation is apparently much more clearly seen, as would naturally be expected, by those professional philosophers who have embraced pragmatism. Hardly a theist of the traditional stamp is to be found among them today: and this in spite of their announced interest in religion and their concern over the recognized values of religious experience, mentioned above, and expressed admirably by John Dewey in the following passage:

Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received, that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class or race. . . . It remains to make it explicit and militant.¹⁹

What have the pragmatists done, in the face of the dilemma of such keenly felt religious demands and the logical impossibility of faith in the supremely transcendent God of theism? Many, of course, have dispensed with God altogether; either wistfully, like Walter Lippmann in his *A Preface to Morals* (1929), or joyfully and confidently, like M. C. Otto in *The Human Enterprise* (1939). Humanity, human welfare, the common good are often supposed by such thinkers to be adequate substitutes for deity,

¹⁹ *A Common Faith*, p. 87.

and sufficiently substantial supports for religious experience with its priceless values. This humanism is nothing new under the sun. Sufficient volumes of criticism, perhaps, have been written concerning it. In any case, such humanistic atheism can have little or no direct effect on the development of theistic philosophy, although indirectly it undoubtedly has exerted an influence in and through the field of social ethics. For, as B. E. Meland has said, "At heart, then, the religious humanists are social idealists, stripping their philosophical bulk to fighting weight."²⁰

More important for our consideration here is the work of those humanistic philosophers, fewer in numbers though they may be, who in "stripping their philosophical bulk" have not found it either logically necessary or advisable to go to the extreme of bare atheism. With A. Eustace Haydon they have admitted that "the elements of support and security, of hope and promise, which come to man from his cosmic and social environment are real and effective."²¹ Going farther than he,²² however, they have been willing to retain the term "God" for those factors, aspects, relations or conditions effective within or part of the supporting cosmos, and worthy of present devotion. Thus John Dewey means by "God" what he describes as "ideal possibilities unified through imaginative realization and projection," and manifest entirely through human nature. Again, he says, "It is this *active* relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God.'"²³ Edward Scribner Ames inquires "whether God may not be more truly and more fully understood as the reality of the world in certain aspects and functions—in what is here characterized as reality idealized;" and again he speaks of Him as "the Other," into which, in "the supreme crises of life, as when facing death, or the ultimate demands of honor," there enters "the whole meaning and urge of life." "This Other," he continues, "is of the same nature as all the lesser 'others,' constituted of social groups of varying scope and function. . . . Philosophy calls it the Universal or the Absolute; science designates it as Nature or Life; religion names it God. . . . In every case this other is reality functioning vitally and impressively in the

²⁰ Wieman and Meland, *American Philosophies of Religion*, p. 260.

²¹ *The Quest of the Ages*, p. 111.

²² Cf. Haydon, *op. cit.*, 120-121: "To call the natural-human milieu, as it now exists, even in its ideal phases, by the old and honored name of God seems like trifling with words. The name implies too much—God in this sense of unified cosmic support and leadership belongs to the far future."

²³ *A Common Faith*, pp. 50-51. Italics his.

behavior and emotions of the self."²⁴ Similarly, for Gerald Birney Smith God was the "Creative Order" of the universe;²⁵ and for Henry Nelson Wieman He is "that Something upon which human life is most dependent for its security, welfare and increasing abundance."²⁶ Wieman further makes clear that this "Something" is really an aspect of the behavior of the universe, displaying a "certain pattern. It has a certain order and structure . . . which is God because it is that upon which greatest human good depends."²⁷

From this point of view then—thoroughly naturalistic and empirical, yet religious, even devout, be it noted—pragmatists have been bringing the influences of the Peircean movement strongly to bear on present-day thought about God. And, of course, on the naturalistic side, they are joined in this influence, at many vital points, by thinkers like Whitehead, Northrop and Overstreet, among the so-called "cosmic theists," and Montague and Calhoun, among the "evolutionary theists."²⁸

V. THE THEISM OF TOMORROW

What the ultimate outcome of the tremendous intellectual pressure of this religious naturalism will be, no one, of course, can yet say. Christian theism has been subjected to terrific pressures and strains heretofore, at the crossing of every divide of human thinking in the last two thousand years. It has survived them all, and we have no reason to suppose that it will not endure the heat of the present conflict. But, also, it has emerged from each crisis more or less changed. Certain elements have receded or have faded from view; others have assumed importance or prominence. That the changes being wrought today seem to be so vitally basic and far-reaching may be due simply to our lack of perspective, due in turn to our nearness in time and to our traditional loyalties.

Whatever and however vital the enduring changes in theism, due to present-day naturalism and the forces which have generated it, may turn out to be, we think we can at least begin to see the direction they will take. Also,

²⁴ Quoted by Wieman and Meland, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-278, original sources not given.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 297, quoted from his *Religious Experience and Scientific Method*, p. 3.

²⁷ *The Wrestle of Religion With Truth*, p. 61. Note the entire Chapter II, pp. 54-67, where this impersonal concept of God is developed at length.

²⁸ Cf. Wieman and Meland, *op. cit.*, Part V, p. 211f., for a valiant attempt to classify those whose religious philosophy is "rooted in tradition of naturalism."

as this discussion has endeavored to point out, we can see the important part that the Peircean movement has played and is playing in this process of change. In general, the pragmatic naturalism of today is forcing to a sharp focus and issue the problem of the metaphysical transcendence and immanence of God. The straddling position of much modern so-called liberalism is becoming more and more difficult to maintain. Not that we are in much better position now than men ever were to give a *final* answer to this or other basic questions of theology and the philosophy of religion; but the whole influence of the scientific empiricism and functionalism of the Peircean and related movements, exerted through their resultant naturalisms, is in the direction of a clear-cut theory of complete immanence and a genuinely "finite" or "limited" God. Providentially, perhaps, this movement is contemporaneous with the upsurge of neosupernaturalism, as represented particularly in the work of Karl Barth and his disciples. With this metaphysical opposition is logically linked an opposition of ethical and social philosophies, in each case. Here then is the central conflict in religious philosophy today; out of it will arise a transformed Christian theism.

In the slang of the day, the foolish man who ventures to predict the course of theistic thinking in the next generation is taking a long chance. Having already done that by implication, however, let me conclude by summarizing my own views explicitly.

That the scientific view of the world and its nature as activistic can or ever will be set aside, short of the annihilation of all civilization, is practically unthinkable, even though it be logically possible. A sound empiricism, however, as we have seen, need not be antagonistic either to religious faith, or even to reasonable hypotheses of a metaphysical nature. The theism of tomorrow will follow naturalism in finding God more and more as the guiding, controlling, ideal-achieving, ordering force within the natural universe—"the center and soul of every sphere" and of this whole; a "finite" or "limited" God who yet transcends completely our human nature or any other "sphere," aspect or part of the universe, and gives increasing meaning and value to the whole of Nature and all its parts. What God may be more than that—if anything—will be of less and less importance, as on the basis of such a theism, men of good will become more completely concerned with "His Kingdom and its righteousness," realizing that "the stars in their courses" do fight on the side of the divine-human enterprise.

The Spirit of Greece

ROY LESLIE SMITH

THURSDAY, April 24, the last Greek broadcast was heard in America. It consisted of reports of correspondents in tribute to the heroic fighting of the Greeks and British against heavy odds. There was a note of despair in the voice of the broadcaster, yet he closed with the words, "The spirit of Greece cannot and will not die."

Thus ended another moving act in the drama of human history. This action took place in the old classical region. The old heroes have found their modern counterparts. There was the battle around Mt. Olympus, fabled home of Zeus and the gods. There was the struggle for the pass of Thermopylae, where 2421 years ago Leonidas and his 300 Spartans died. Theirs was the laconic epitaph, "Stranger, tell the Spartans that we lie here obedient to their commands." There was the fall of Salonika, the Thesalonica of the New Testament; the fall of Thebes, birthplace of Hercules and Bacchus.

In this modern drama there followed the evacuation to the island of Crete, legendary birthplace of Zeus, Crete the center of a great Aegean civilization that flourished from 2000-1400 B. C. Here Daedalus built the labyrinth where Theseus slew the Minotaur.

Spades of archeologists have unearthed on Crete the remains of Cnosus, the first large city of Europe, with an estimated population of 80,000 in 1500 B. C. Crete was "the doorstep of Europe." The world now knows that Aegean civilization began in Crete, not in Greece itself, and that Pericles could look back to a great civilization as ancient to him as Charlemagne is to us. "Civilization is older than we think." This Cretan civilization was the forerunner of the amazing development of the human spirit which took place in ancient Hellas. Hellas was their name for their land. They never applied to themselves the term by which the world knows them. The name Greeks came from an insignificant tribe Graii, which established a colony near Naples in Italy. The Romans gave to all the Hellenes the name Graici, Greeks.

What is the Greek spirit that "cannot and will not die"? It has four characteristics:

- 1.—A love of physical excellence;
- 2.—A love of beauty;
- 3.—A quest for a rational basis for right conduct, and
- 4.—An intense love of liberty.

The Greeks' love, almost worship, of the human body led to their just fame in sports. Their love of beauty produced unparalleled works of art in sculpture, literature, architecture and painting. Their search for an adequate philosophy of life produced minds like Socrates who said, "Know thyself," and Plato who said, "The unexamined life is unlivable for a man." The Greeks are a perfect example of humanism and of the heights and depths to which unaided human nature can go. There is a great bulk of literature dealing with each of these characteristics of the Greeks. Let us dwell on their love of liberty and the fruits of their intense individualism. The very essence of life to the Greeks was liberty to be, to think, to speak, and to do. The surrounding nations cared little for liberty. All, except the Phoenicians, lived under despots. They surrendered their lives to tyranny and their souls to superstition. They had small experience of the stimulation of freedom or the life of reason. The Greeks called them Barbarians. A Barbarian was "a man who could believe without reason and live without freedom." But the Greeks identified liberty with life.

This love of liberty led the Greeks at Thermopylae, Marathon, and Salamis to stand up against the Barbarians of the day, the Persians under Darius and Xerxes. The odds against the Greeks were such as the lad David faced against Goliath. Today the modern Greeks have shown a flash of the old spirit. In the face of defeat, they have defended the liberty of their land against the modern counterparts of the Persians.

This same tribute should be given Yugoslavia. The world has seen peoples for the sake of their liberty sacrificing their homes, cities, and life itself, refusing to yield to tyranny and degrading acquiescence. It strengthens the hope that liberty and honor will not perish from the earth.

The ancient victory of the Greeks over the Persians decided that Eastern absolutism should not prevail. It made possible Europe, America, and Western civilization. There developed the Greek City State, the first

step in democracy. Self-government was something new in the world. Men had not dared to try to live without kings.

Freedom and progress go together. After democracy won its victory at Marathon, it organized itself under Pericles, built the Parthenon, and the noble temples whose beauty still stirs the world, made Athens the most intellectual city that ever existed and reached incredible heights in arts, letters, science and philosophy.

A dictatorship may be more efficient than a democracy in getting material things done swiftly but not in the making of great personalities. That is the glory of Greece. She has given the world an unparalleled galaxy of great men. "They were men who stood on tiptoe, reaching toward the sky." The eccentric cynic philosopher Diogenes illustrated the independent spirit of the average Greek. Alexander the Great one day came to Diogenes lying in the sun. "I am Alexander."

"I am Diogenes."

"Ask of me whatever favor you choose," said Alexander.

"Stand out of the sun," answered Diogenes.

"If I were not Alexander," said the youthful conqueror, "I would be Diogenes."

There is no record that the philosopher returned the compliment.

In the Ecclesia, which was the ruling Assembly of the Athenians, each member was held responsible for the result of his proposed legislation. Something similar might be a wholesome check for modern lawgivers.

The liberty which the Greeks prized and won at a great cost made possible their amazing contributions to the life of the world. Our modern world is made up of many elements but its two greatest sources are Greece and Christianity. As Durant says, "There is hardly anything secular in our culture that does not come from Greece." It gave us the beginnings of democracy, philosophy, art, science, and the scientific spirit. The Greeks gave us the theatre, the stadium, and the Olympic games. From them came our literary forms, the drama, history, oratory, the novel, and the essay. The sermon came from them, not the Hebrews. This culture was passed on through the numberless colonies Greece established all around the Mediterranean. Rome took it over and passed it on. After the sleep of the Dark Ages, this culture was rediscovered in the Renaissance and its rushing tide has overflowed into the modern world. "All civilized nations in matters of the intellect are colonies of Greece."

There is the contribution of its language. Twenty-five per cent of our daily language is Greek. Greek is said to be the most beautiful and expressive language ever known. Says Durant, "Attic Greek is a noble tongue, vigorous, supple, melodious, as irregular as any vital speech but lending itself to expressive combinations, delicate gradations, distinctions of meaning, subtle philosophical conceptions and every variety of literary expression from the 'many-billowed surge' of Homer's verse to the placid flow of Plato's prose." In Gibbon's fine phrase, "It was the Greek language that gave a soul to objects of sense and a body to the abstractions of metaphysics." "Logos" used by St. John is the Greek word which expresses man's special prerogative over the lower animals. It stands for both reason and speech.

We remember that the New Testament was written in Greek, which was the universal literary language of the day. That great statesman of South Africa, General Smuts, starting out one day for a political speech, took time to cut out an article on Emily Bronte's poems. It told how her sister Charlotte had corrected the punctuation and gave the poem "No coward soul is mine" exactly as Emily wrote it. Said General Smuts, "No, I do not agree that a comma doesn't matter, and the poem did very well all these years as it was. A thing like this belongs to the search for truth—the meaning beyond. It is the soul. You alter a word and you alter the emotional figure—you alter the shape of the torso of the soul. . . ." "That is why," continued Smuts, "I am glad I can read the New Testament in Greek. Those people were grappling with something beyond their understanding, trying to express the unattainable truth. Translate their words, change a shade of their meaning, and you throw them out of the straight line of their quest, and what they were about to touch is lost."

A reason for the amazing contributions of Greece to civilization is found in the Greek mind. It was eager, curious, and fearless. It is described in the Book of Acts when Paul visited Athens. "For all the Athenians, and strangers which were there, spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear of some new thing." Said the old Egyptian priest to his visitor, "Ah, Solon, you Greeks are always children. There is not an old man among you. You are always young in your minds." In this land there was love of knowledge for its own sake. "What holiness is to India, wisdom was to the Greeks."

While masterpieces of Greek art are in ruins, Greek literature still

lives. (The *Complete Greek Drama*, in two volumes, edited by Oates and O'Neill, is a rich possession for lovers of literature.) Said Chesterton, "The *Iliad* is great because all life is a battle; and *Odyssey* is great because all life is a journey." Michelangelo said, "When I read Homer I look at myself to see if I am not twenty feet in height."

As to Greek mythology we are not to suppose that the myths were seriously believed in or served to regulate conduct. What they did was "To further the picturesqueness and the joy of life, to temper the harsh prose of actual life." A myth, too, often gives a clue to the dynamic, intangible energies and motives of men.

Greek plays reached heights left dormant until the days of Shakespeare. The prevailing themes of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides are the nemesis of punishment by jealous gods or impersonal fate for insolent presumption and irreverent pride (*hybris*), the transitoriness of prosperity, the wisdom of a good conscience, honor, and moderation. "It was this combination of philosophy with poetry, action, music, song and dance that gave Greek drama a grandeur never equalled again."

These dramatists share with Shakespeare the power to move the heart. *The Trojan Woman*, by Euripides, is one of the greatest anti-war plays ever written and is still staged. *Iphigenia* grapples directly with the timely question whether one should obey the State or his own conscience when they come into conflict. Greek drama declares that "character is a man's fate." Says Aeschylus, "Grief walks the earth and sits down at the feet of each by turns." Says Sophocles, "The avenging gods are shod with wool." How could it be said better that punishment walks with quiet feet? What a beautiful final tribute to a good man is this by Sophocles:

"Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail,
Or knock the breast; no weakness or contempt,
Dispraise or blame; nothing but well and fair
And what may quiet us, in a death so noble."

Modern life passes on without the classics. We live in a time when "Greek and Latin cease from troubling and the classics are at rest." But there is impressive testimony for the value and necessity of the classics. Matthew Arnold says: "Culture is to be familiar with the best that has been said. Imagine a man with a sense of sculpture not cultivating it by studying the remains of Greek art, or a man with a sense of poetry not cultivating it

with the help of Homer and Shakespeare, or a man with a sense of conduct not cultivating it with the help of the Bible!" In *A Pilgrim's Way* Lord Tweedsmuir uses this striking figure: "In the cycle in which we live we can see only a fraction of the curve, and properly to appraise that curve and therefore to look forward, we may have to look back." Dr. John Newton Davies of Drew University once said at a Summer School for Ministers, "One should know three centuries: the fifth century before Christ when Greek culture came into flower, the first century when Christianity came into being, and his own century."

It would be onesided to portray the excellencies of the Greeks and to pass over their faults. We know now what brought the downfall of Greece. We see the drama through to the last act. This most brilliant of civilizations committed suicide. Greek met Greek on the battlefield. There was disintegration from within, the decay of morals and of patriotism and the degeneration of a people. The Greeks were cruel. Their wars were almost as brutal as our modern conflicts. The Greeks were given to deception. It was natural that the "crafty Ulysses" was their hero. If they practiced honesty as the best policy it was because they had tried everything else first. Their social structure was based on slavery and it was a cruel system. Slaves were sold for salt which was collected in salt pans from the sea. A cheap slave was called "a salting" and a good one was "worth his salt."

Yes—we know the defects of the Greeks: their insane and pitiless wars, their vices, subjection of woman and lack of moral restraint. They had no word for sin or for unselfishness. Their greatest men had their grave faults and blind spots. They were baffled in the presence of suffering and death and their literature is pessimistic. Yet David Livingstone was right. "The Bible, Homer, Shakespeare, and Greek art remain the stars by which we may direct our courses over stormy seas." (*The Legacy of Greece*.) How poor the world would be without the Greeks and their contribution but the world needed the fuller light which dawned over the hills of Bethlehem. Our hope is that "the best the Greeks have given and Christianity shall be harmonized into one glorious civilization."

The Greek Broadcaster of the latest Greek tragedy spoke with the voice of a prophet: "The Greek spirit cannot and will not die!"

The Christ of the Gospels

FREDERICK C. GRANT

IT IS a commonplace of the modern study of the Gospels that they are not biographies of our Lord, but are written to set forth and to prove the Christian faith in Jesus as "Lord" and "Christ"—who had appeared upon earth, had lived a truly human life, preached, taught, healed the sick, exorcised demons, raised the dead, had been unjustly condemned and put to death, had risen from the dead and so entered into His glory. The whole pre-supposition of the gospel story is theological: Jesus was more than an ordinary man, and His career was not self-chosen: He was "sent" by God for the salvation of Israel—and of the world—and His whole life, death, resurrection and glorification represented the saving Act of God at the end of the final age of human history. Thus the gospel story is the story of Redemption, of the inauguration of the New Age, the beginning of the new era of salvation which should speedily sweep within it all that was good in this world, abandon or destroy all that was evil. In the coming of Christ the great change in the course of universal history had been begun by God, who was now taking His great power and setting up His Kingdom over the whole world. Thus the emphasis has shifted, from (1) Jesus' own preaching of the coming Kingdom of God, now already begun to be fully established, to (2) the faith of the early church, which centered everything upon the person of Christ, and tended to view the Kingdom as still future, when Christ should come again, this time in glory, hold the last judgment, and set up God's rule forever over a chastened, condemned, and renovated world. The crucial question for present-day gospel study is, accordingly, How far is the belief of the primitive Church, reflected in Gospels as in Epistles and Book of Acts, continuous with and true to the teaching of Jesus Himself?

There is no question that the Gospels represent Jesus as conscious of His own Messiahship, as claiming to be Messiah, whether the claim was made openly or secretly, and certainly as acting as if He were Messiah already, i. e. during His earthly life, though the most primitive community, just after the resurrection, undoubtedly held that Jesus *became* Messiah by His resurrection and exaltation. To many persons it appears wholly impossible to get behind the Gospels and their sources, and behind the primitive oral

tradition upon which they are based, to a point where we can trace the genesis of this faith. This conclusion may be set forth either positively or negatively. Bultmann, Lightfoot, and others state it negatively. How little we ever can know of the historical Jesus! Others state it more positively. We cannot know all that we would like to know, but the probability is that the Christian faith was inspired from the beginning with a recognition of the superhuman and divine character of Jesus' life, ministry and person.

For even within the Gospels themselves, when studied in the light of the general history of tradition, we can make out different types of material, different levels of historical probability. First of all we can recognize the editorial material, the settings, the arrangement, the revisions, the moral or theological inferences they draw, the grouping of materials, the combinations, parallels, doublets, the scriptural (i.e. Old Testament) quotations inserted, the transitions from one paragraph to the next, the chronological or geographical locations and sequences (not always infallible!)—all this material can be isolated at once and underlined or placed in brackets. Even the most conservative scholars do not question the presence of editorial matter in the Gospels. The point of view of this material is naturally that of the final editors, authors or compilers of the tradition—i.e. their own personal point of view or that of the church of their time in their own particular locality or region. (1) The background of Matthew, for example, is entirely different from that of Mark. Matthew writes for the Syrian Church at the end of the first century (or early in the second), and his purpose is didactic, somewhat legal, perhaps even liturgical. He arranges his book in five major sections, like the Psalms and the Pentateuch and the rabbinic Sayings of the Fathers—obviously for purposes of study and teaching. (2) Mark, on the other hand, is addressed to a martyr church, probably the church in Rome in the days of Nero, toward the end of the sixties, when to be a Christian meant a prospect of persecution and probable death: "He that saveth his life shall lose it; he that loseth his life for my sake and the gospel's, shall save it" unto life eternal (8: 35). "For even the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many" (10: 45). (3) Luke writes a longer work, a two-tome or two-"book" treatise in defense of the Christian movement, designed to prove to dispassionate but interested readers—say to a Roman official like Theophilus, if that is who he was—that neither Jesus, the Founder, nor the apostles, His

followers, were dangerous radicals or represented an influence subversive to law and order, either in Palestine where the new religion began or in the Eastern provinces, where it soon spread, or in Rome—where the leading apostle to the Gentiles lived for “two whole years in his own hired dwelling, and received all that went in unto him, preaching the Kingdom of God and teaching the things concerning the Lord Jesus Christ with all boldness, none forbidding him.” Those two verses (Acts 28: 30-31) form the climax not only of the Book of Acts, which is volume two, but of Luke’s work as a whole, Gospel and Acts taken together. Indeed the climax comes in the single final word, which closes the crescendo with a great chord, *ἄκωλύτως*, unhindered, without molestation or opposition!

The editorial material, then, i.e. the authors’ own contributions, are generally recognized and can be labeled as such. They are of extreme importance for dating, and for interpreting, the gospels as they stand. But the remaining material, the bulk of the content of the gospels, is of course older than the gospel writers. How old it is, and how accurately it records the sayings and deeds of the Saviour, is the question that immediately confronts us. But it is not a question that can be answered immediately or off-hand. Anyone, of course, can pick and choose and say, “I like this. . . .” “I think this passage sounds authentic and unquestionable. . . .” “I am sure Jesus must have said or done exactly this. . . .” “And so, when I write *my* life of Christ, this, and this, and this will be the key-passages; everything else will be explained in conformity with these sayings or passages, and I will set aside or ignore whatever disagrees with them.” It is to be feared that some such method has been followed, consciously or unconsciously, by many of the novelistic writers of recent popular lives of Christ—a thoroughly subjective principle: “*I* like this . . . *I* don’t care for that . . . *Therefore* the one must be authentic, the other not!” The method is perverse, whether it is followed consciously or unconsciously. Of course any study of the Gospels is likely to produce some good results, thanks to the subject itself; and we would not deny any man the privilege of writing about Christ as he personally sees Him. So perfect is the jewel it shines in any light, unfolds its hidden splendor when viewed from any angle. But to write with authority, with anything like historical finality and trustworthiness, no one has the right who has not spent laborious months and years in minute study of the text of the Gospels, and of the literature and history of the ancient world,

both Jewish and Graeco-Roman, during the Hellenistic age. Even so he may make errors in interpretation, he may know too much, may lose his balance and fail to see things in true proportion. But the dangers involved in the task cannot dispense him from the duty of undertaking it! A romantic, purely subjective, purely impressionistic life of Christ is not enough. We want to know the Jesus of History whose life and teachings were handed down in the tradition that eventually got crystallized in the Gospels. And so the first step in a true method of study is to compare the Gospels, passage by passage, word by word, letter by letter—for often the tense of a verb makes considerable difference in the meaning of a sentence. The first result will be the isolation of the editorial material, as already described. Then other facts begin to merge. Matthew abridges Mark; Luke omits a long section of Mark; Matthew and Luke have a great amount of material not found in Mark, and in some of this they agree as closely as when following Mark; further, they are usually—but not always—more careful to keep the sayings of Jesus in the form handed down to them than they are in relating the narratives of His deeds. Even so, the inescapable impression one gains is that the gospels were written before either Christian tradition or Christian books had become sacrosanct and infallible, i.e. unalterable. The gospel writers do not hesitate to restore, amplify, revise and reformulate the traditions not only of Jesus' life but of His teachings; and they do so, not necessarily in order to carry through some one principle of interpretation, the expression of some "tendency" or other, but for a variety of reasons, and taking each passage by itself, trying to render it more clear, more cogent, more direct in application. For, let me repeat, they are not writing biographies; they are proclaiming the Christian message of salvation, they are setting down in writing the "wholesome traditions" which have circulated in the church and have been its possession from the beginning. Only so can we explain the divergences we find—even in such crucial passages as those that contain the Lord's Prayer, the Beatitudes, the narrative of the Last Supper, the Words from the Cross. Some of these alterations may have taken place—many of them, I should say, have taken place—before the Gospels were written. They result from the normal process of reformulation and restatement in the course of early Christian preaching and teaching. No one in that world had ever heard of the principle of verbal accuracy in reporting extended narratives or discourses. The sole exception is the rabbinic schools. But, as

we have seen, the sayings of Jesus are also, for the most part, repeated verbatim in the Christian tradition and are so cited in the Gospels. Even so, there is no slavish servitude to the letter. Few early Christians shared the rabbinic ideal—"Let the students' minds be like well-plastered cisterns that lose no drop of their master's teachings, and absorb no drop of alien infiltration!" (Cf. Aboth 2: 11.)

Now we shall not have gone far in this process of minute and detailed comparison of passages and words, using modern commentaries as our guides and searching widely in the ancient literature for parallels and relevant background, before we begin to be aware of the fact that some of the evangelic material is more trustworthy than the rest—or, to put it differently, that some is less trustworthy, historically, than the rest; that some is clearly "secondary." (Even conservative scholars now use that term.) Take a passage like Peter's walking on the water, or the stater in the fish's mouth, or the death of Judas (all from Matthew): Does anyone fail to recognize here the growth of legend?—legend of the kind that meets us on every page in the Apocryphal Gospels and Acts and in the later Lives of the Saints. It is not baneful legend, the result of some subversive, mythological tendency, but naive, childish, wholly imaginative and romantic legend, meant to express what simple believers would infer anyway. If the Lord bade Peter to have faith, then Peter *must* have responded—and here is the story. If Judas deserved a horrible death, as the traitor who betrayed his Lord, then He *must* have died that way—and here is the story. (A very different one is given in Acts.) If the Lord refused to recognize the right of the authorities to impose a temple-tax (the time may possibly be *after* the Fall of the Temple, when the Romans still went on collecting the tribute), and yet made the concession ("lest we cause them to stumble," Matt. 17: 27; a very different attitude is expressed in the famous passage regarding tribute to Caesar, Mark 12: 13-17), then He *must also* have provided the wherewithal for the poor fisherman Peter to pay his own and Jesus' tax—and here is the story.

But it is not only in Matthew, and in Luke-Acts which is also late, but even in Mark, the earliest Gospel, that there are traces of legend: take the story of the death of John the Baptist, or that of the demoniac with a legion of demons, as an example. We are certainly confronted here with the products of folk-lore, and may as well recognize the fact. But the *inference* to be drawn from the existence of legendary material in the Gospels is not

provided by the stories themselves. That inference depends upon further study of the Gospels, and the resulting view of their character as a whole, and of primitive Christianity as a whole. Christianity was, from its beginning, a popular religion—not in the modern sense but in the ancient, i.e. what used to be called “vulgar,” in the good old-fashioned meaning of that term. It was a religion of the common people, the poor, the uneducated, the rank and file of day-laborers, small artisans, farmers, villagers, fishermen, petty tax collectors, slaves in the great households and on the estates in Italy and elsewhere. As Paul wrote very bluntly to the Corinthians, “Take a look at your calling, brethren: not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called; but God chose the foolish things of the world . . . and the weak . . . and the base . . . and the despised . . . that no one should glory before God” (1 Cor. 1: 26-29). To put it still more bluntly, the congregations of the primitive church were more like many Roman Catholic parishes of today, with their multitudes of uneducated or half-educated poor people, than like the comfortable, fairly educated, fairly well-to-do, average Protestant congregations. Of course that is a generalization, and like all generalizations (including this one!) it states only a part of the truth. But it is significant, surely, that the *Lives of the Saints* are read by a hundred Roman Catholics for one Protestant reader. And the *Lives of the Saints* are simply continuous, from a literary or a historical point of view, with this element in the Gospels and the Book of Acts.

In the next place, it was not simply the uneducated of the ancient world who were uncritical and loved legends; even the educated, and all, in fact, save the rare few who had come under the influence of philosophy or science, accepted such stories without question; and for the very reason that they accepted them readily, and without effort, without qualms of scientific conscience, they did *not* lay upon them the enormous weight they must have if maintained in a scientific age or milieu. “It might have been so—or perhaps otherwise; the explanation is only a probable one, and other explanations are not impossible; which would *you* prefer?” Such is the mood and temper of the Hellenistic age as a whole, both Graeco-Roman and Jewish; and such is the background that must be presupposed for more than one story in the Gospels and Acts. The sacred scripture itself, the Old Testament, suggested alternative explanations: two accounts of creation, two accounts of the crossing of the Red Sea, two—perhaps three—accounts of David and Goliath,

and so on. The world was full of miracles, at least of tales of miracles; they proved much, but they did not prove everything—certainly they could not prove everything when they were not unique, and other religions and cults could point to similar evidences of supernatural power and authority.

And so I say the *inference* to be drawn from the presence of some legendary material in the Gospels depends upon a view of the Gospels as a whole (including the Book of Acts) and of the primitive Christian Church as a whole. The presence of legend helps to anchor the tradition in the soil of the ancient world; but legend is not unique—it was age-old, and universal, in the first century. It is worth while making this point, since many persons have rushed to the conclusion that, if the Gospels contain anything of this sort, they are thus shown to be completely untrustworthy—a “mere mass of legend.” But the inference is utterly unsound. Would you dismiss every ancient historian who included a bit of legend in his narrative? Who then would you retain? Would you cut out of every ancient religious book whatever was told in the manner of elaborated tale, i.e. upon the basis of elaborated hearsay, or legend? Then what would you have left?—have left, let us say, not only of the Old Testament as well as the New, but also of early Christian literature generally, and equally of ancient classical literature, especially in the Hellenistic age. No; the problem is not to be solved in this easy manner; but only by studying each piece by itself, and in the light of the background, the environment, the world of religious ideas and motives which suggested its proper interpretation and significance from the very beginning of the Christian tradition. From this point of view, nothing in the New Testament—or in the Old, or in contemporary Jewish or pagan religious traditions, beliefs, presuppositions—can fairly be discarded. Everything tells us something, at least something about the beliefs and hopes and religious presuppositions of those who handed down, recorded, and revised the tradition. And often they tell us—even some of the most elaborate legends tell us—more than this: they tell us what was the nucleus of the story, before it was elaborated, and the thought, or the saying of Jesus, or the incident in His career which shines like a gem within the filigree work of the later setting and embellishment. Here the study of the growth of legend in other religions, other literatures, helps us—and certainly cautions us not to draw our inferences too hastily.

But the element of later legend is only a relatively small part of the

contents of the Gospels. As we proceed with our minute comparative study of the Gospels we find a large element that, although told and retold by a generation or more of Christian believers, preachers, teachers, still retains its original form almost unaltered. The teachers of the early church were almost as important as the preachers, from the beginning, as was perfectly natural in the Jewish environment of the earliest church, and also in the early Gentile churches, modelled as they were on the Jewish synagogue. Much of the material in the Gospels, as every one knows, appears in almost identical form in all three synoptics. The explanation now generally held is that they used sources, viz. Mark, and the Sayings Source ('Q'), and perhaps other written or stereotyped oral sources as well, chiefly 'L' and 'M', as they are called, and perhaps other sources as well. Even Mark, the earliest Gospel, appears to rely upon earlier sources; and the same is no doubt true of 'Q', the Sayings Source. And all these early sources, as far as we can make out, rest back upon oral tradition. The evangelic material was oral, was repeated, was told and retold hundreds of times before it was ever written down. This also is thoroughly Jewish: there was a prejudice against written books, which might compete with sacred scripture, in favor of the oral transmission of all later teaching, interpretation, and translation. It is significant that the Gospels, and their sources, were written (or stereotyped orally) in Greek, not in Hebrew or Aramaic.

Now it is the virtue of the new school of Form Criticism, as it is called, that it takes seriously this whole situation: the tradition underlying the Gospels was an oral tradition, or body of traditions, handed down not by one channel (say the recollections of Peter) but by many: and in the course of transmission, very naturally, some stories and sayings, parables and discourses were somewhat altered and revised. No one ever repeats a story exactly as he hears it, even with the best will in the world; though he may memorize a saying, or a poem, and repeat it verbatim the rest of his life. Many of Jesus' sayings were in poetic form, and were handed down intact. This factor, plus that of reverence, would preserve them practically as Jesus first uttered them, first taught them to His disciples. But with the stories it was different—and hence the larger amount of elaboration and divergence, which one may see for himself by studying a Harmony of the Gospels. Some persons have drawn very negative conclusions from Form Criticism, and they quote Bultmann and Lightfoot to show that its motive is thor-

oughly skeptical. But let them read other books—e. g., those of Professor Martin Dibelius, *From Tradition to Gospel*, *Gospel Criticism and Christology*, or *The Message of Jesus Christ*, and it will be clear to them that more positive conclusions are possible. The chief value of Form Criticism, perhaps, is its clear recognition of different levels of historical probability in the gospel tradition. Dibelius's classification is sound: The old stories (simple and unelaborated), sayings, parables, the great miracle tales, the legends. And it is upon the basis of the older and simpler materials that our picture of the historical Jesus must be drawn. The later, more elaborate, more secular stories must be reinterpreted before they can be used.

As a result of the Source and now the Form Criticism of the past fifty years, our Gospels have come to be seen in a truer light and setting: they are "traditional books," as Gilbert Murray used the term of the Old Testament histories and of the material used by Homer. The Gospels "grew"—they are not literary creations by individual men, their authors, but represent the crystallization of a tradition, or of traditions, which were handed down by many persons in many places, but chiefly in the great centers of the early church—Jerusalem, Galilee, Caesarea, Antioch, Rome, perhaps Ephesus or even Alexandria. And the Jesus of the Gospels is not only, or chiefly, the Jesus of history; He is the Jesus of history as seen by the worshipping and believing Church; the Jesus of the Gospels is the Jesus of history who is also the Jesus of Christian faith. Or better, He is the Jesus of faith who is also the Jesus of history—for we believe that there is no hiatus but a direct continuity between the Jesus of history and the Jesus of faith.

I have not mentioned the Fourth Gospel, for it stands in a somewhat different class from that of the first three. It is a kind of dramatic reinterpretation of the whole evangelic tradition, or rather of a large section of it, or of a type of tradition somewhat parallel to but not identical with the tradition underlying the synoptics. For example, there are no exorcisms of demons in the Fourth Gospel—the synoptics are full of them. Why? Probably because Jesus, according to the Gospel of John, was no popular thaumaturge and traveling exorcist but the incarnate Wisdom or Logos of God, indeed God Himself appearing in "flesh"; not only was He above such a lowly ministry, with its involvement in crude superstition, but in His very presence the foul demons would flee away of their own accord, and leave the possessed free and sane and responsive.

The Gospel of John is a polemical work, designed to refute Judaism and Jewish attacks upon Christianity in the author's own time, say the first quarter of the second century. Its author does not aim to write history, as historians aim to write, but to produce faith (John 20: 30-31). Instead of the many miracles of the synoptics, Jesus manifests His glory through seven—and only seven—great “signs,” beginning with the change of water into wine at Cana, and ending with the raising of Lazarus from the tomb after he had been dead for four days: stupendous miracles, which only a God could perform, and which required no antecedent faith (as in the synoptics) on the part of the persons concerned with them.

New Testament scholars tell us from time to time that the Gospel of John contains the clue to interpret the riddle of the New Testament. By this they probably mean one of two things, perhaps both: (1) It is the final outcome of the religious development of the literature we call the New Testament, and so we can see how the whole process took place. The earlier books, the earlier stages of growth, were leading up to this. John's Gospel shows us how a religion that began as a sect within Judaism finally grew into a universal religion, how the naïve ideas of the Last Judgment and the New Age soon to come were supplanted by an ethical-spiritual system of doctrine, and how the one steadily grew into the other. Or perhaps they mean (2) that the Gospel of John is the supreme religious book in the whole religious collection, the New Testament; and it is only by sharing in that final religious outlook that we can grasp what was implicitly there, and essentially there, from the start. The Gospel of John leaves Judaism farther behind than any other New Testament writing. It is more cosmopolitan—a European book, we might almost say (though it is almost certainly Asiatic!); closer to our interests, offering more satisfaction to the ceaseless questions that we are habitually asking. Certainly it is a more “Catholic” Gospel than the others—closer to the doctrine of the great creeds and liturgies of early Eastern Catholicism, more *en rapport* the religious outlook of the orientalized eastern half of the Mediterranean world from the first to the eleventh centuries, than the much more Jewish, much less Hellenistic three earlier Gospels.

Whichever of these is the real reason, and whether either of them is correctly explained, it is clear that the book sets forth in a dramatic way the truth of the Christian religion—and some of its great truths—in a manner

quite unique, and very different from anything found elsewhere in the New Testament (save in the First Epistle of John, with which it is closely related). Jesus is made to teach the final form of the faith, to which believers had arrived at the end of the first century or early in the second, almost a hundred years after Jesus lived and died. The Jesus of the Fourth Gospel is supremely the Christ of faith, the Cosmic Christ, the eternal Logos, one with the Father from the beginning of things, perfectly united with Him, so that His words are God's words, His will God's will, His self-revelation God's self-revelation. The author does not hesitate to place upon the lips of Jesus, and even in the prayer of Jesus (John 17: 3) a definition of eternal life: "This is life eternal, to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." This is not tradition, but interpretation, or reinterpretation, dramatically placed upon the lips of the heavenly Christ during His temporary life upon earth. It is, as we say, the final form of Christian teaching and belief, as it had been reached about the first quarter of the second century. And the heart of it is the knowledge of God and of Christ, God known in Christ, God loved in Christ, God obeyed in Christ. And the end of such knowledge (not faith, but knowledge, let it be observed), and of such love and obedience, is eternal life: not something quantitative, which begins after death (though "I will raise him up at the last day"), but something qualitative, which begins in this world, here and now. If a man grasps that, John seems to say, he has grasped the very essence of the Christian religion. There is nothing beyond this, nothing higher—no gnostic can outbid this! For it is the true and final apprehension of the meaning of life, and of God's whole relation to man, of man's whole dependence upon God. And, say our New Testament scholars, if a man once grasps that, the whole New Testament will be clear to him: for it is a book that grows out of life, out of experience and faith. It is not science, it is *art*; it is not history—or not history only—it is *interpretation*; it is not philosophy, it is *vision*; it is not even knowledge, in the ordinary sense, it is *insight*; it is not a record, merely, it is the clue to the unravelling of a sublime record. The New Testament itself comes from faith, speaks to faith, leads to faith: it is "from faith unto faith."

Thus the Christ of the Gospels is the *interpreted* Jesus of history. And it seems to be clear that the interpretation was continuous from the start, from the very beginning of the tradition—though John marks a much

greater advance in interpretation than any of his predecessors. The interpretation is not uniform. In some of the earliest strands of tradition Jesus is a prophet, a teacher, a beloved *Hasid* who goes about teaching and healing the people and announcing that the Reign of God is now coming to pass in its full realization. In other strands of tradition He is the Son of Man, the final judge of mankind coming on the clouds of heaven; or He is the Jewish Messiah, soon to mount a throne in Jerusalem and reign over a regenerate earth, with His apostles as His appointed "judges" over the several Jewish tribes; or He is the Saviour who comes chiefly to suffer and die and so by His own self-sacrifice to put away the sin of His people, ransom their souls, and inaugurate the new covenant between God and Israel—between God and all mankind. But back of all this variety, as men loved and followed and worshiped Him from the start, and after His appearances to them following the Resurrection began the movement of preparation for His Parousia, the Last Judgment, and the final inauguration of the Kingdom—back of this whole rich and varied movement of faith which inspired the primitive Christian church is one who was and is utterly unique among the sons of men. There is no use in arguing—or in controverting—His "claims," as older apologists were wont to do, e. g. Canon Liddon in his famous Bampton Lectures, *The Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ*. As a rule they relied upon the Fourth Gospel—as well they might, in a pre-critical age, and as we cannot do, recognizing what the Fourth Gospel really is. And they also rang the changes upon the older apologetic maxim, "Aut deus, aut homo non bonus." But did they ever convert a single skeptic? I doubt it! Unless the Christ of the Gospels Himself speaks to us, unless the miracle of His person—not merely of His deeds—captures our imagination and devotion, fires our enthusiasm, inspires our wills to response and to obedience, unless we recognize that He, and He only, "has the words of eternal life," then our time will be wasted in trying to prove or to disprove the "claims" men later made for Him in His name. But I believe the modern approach to the Gospels not only clears the way to a better understanding of their origin and to a clearer view of the Lord whose records they enshrine, but really leads us to the affirmation of faith.

The Validity of Religious Knowledge

J. M. SHAW

IT IS an idea widely held today that scientific knowledge is the only kind of knowledge worthy of the name, that indeed scientific knowledge and true objectively valid knowledge are practically synonymous terms. The purpose of this article is to set forth and support the position that religious knowledge is concerned with facts of experience which are as objective and objectively valid as any facts of the so-called objective natural sciences, with facts indeed which are ultimately more objective in the sense of being more vital and determinative for a total objective and objectively valid view of the universe.

I

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the French scientific philosopher, Auguste Comte, the founder of Positivism, in his *Law of the Three Stages of Thought* advanced the position that religion and religious thinking, with its belief in divine supernatural agency or power, represented a prephilosophical and a prescientific stage of human thinking which would ultimately disappear when man became truly scientific. "Science," he predicted, "would finally conduct God to the frontier and bow Him out with thanks for His provisional services." Few scientists or scientific philosophers today could be found to subscribe to Comte's dictum. Yet there are scientific influences at work contributing to the belief that religious knowledge is concerned with a department of experience which is "subjective" and illusory as compared with the "objective" facts with which science is concerned. Chief of these influences is the dominance of that way of thinking which is associated with, or at least encouraged by, what is called "the New Psychology," more particularly in its psychoanalytic aspect.

A dominant characteristic of the psychoanalytic school of the New Psychology is the emphasis on the unconscious and nonrational as a far more determining factor in human thought and behavior than was acknowledged by the older psychology, with its practical concentration on the study of the conscious mind and its processes. The central thesis of the psychoanalytic

study of the religious consciousness may be said to be this, that the belief in God and the spiritual world generally is but the product of the unconscious nonrational projecting of man's own wishes or desires into the world of outer objective or transsubjective reality, the mere self-painting of the human spirit on the world outside. In the endeavor to escape from the discomforts and disharmonies of life, both outer and inner—such is the representation—man under the influence of an unconscious nonrational impulse, what is called “an infantile father-complex,” the child impulse of implicit faith and confidence in the power and willingness of his parents to deliver him from his difficulties, has resort to belief in a Being or Beings outside and above himself whom he calls “God,” his relation to whom he thinks of after the analogy of the relation of a child to its earthly parent. Such a belief, however, is a mere fancy or phantasy-structure, a self-generated belief, the product of man's “wish-thinking,” with nothing really corresponding to it in the world of outer or transsubjective reality. As the supporters of this position usually put it, God is “a mere projection” into the world of objective reality of our own purely subjective wishes and desires.

It need hardly be pointed out that the result of such a position, if carried out logically or consistently, would inevitably be to reduce religion and religious knowledge to illusion. If in religion and religious experience man is not holding commerce or communion with a Power outside and above himself, but naïvely worshipping a mere projection of his own wishes or day-dreams, once man has discovered that this is the situation, religion will soon cease to be a dynamic force in his life. As an American authority on the psychology of religion, Professor J. B. Pratt, in his work entitled *The Religious Consciousness* has frankly acknowledged, if this is all there is in religion, “we wise psychologists of religion had best keep the fact to ourselves; otherwise the game will soon be up, and we shall have no religion left to psychologize about. We shall have killed the goose that laid our golden egg” (p. 336).

The value of the new psychoanalytic investigation of the religious consciousness, and religious belief, must indeed be frankly acknowledged. Among other things, it has anew emphasized the fact that man's belief in God represents a natural instinct or impulse of the human spirit; that the belief in God is not in the first place and primarily the product of conscious rational argument about the universe in the way that the old traditional

"theistic arguments" suggested, as if the need that the belief satisfied were primarily an intellectual or theoretical need. Rather is the belief the outcome primarily of man's practical need, the need, under a sense of his own weakness and insufficiency, to come into association or fellowship with a Power outside and above himself, and greater than himself as the father is greater than the child. In this sense, the idea of God may very well be a natural instinctive projection of the needs and wishes of the human spirit. But the further question is, Is it a mere projection? Is there nothing corresponding to the idea in the world of objective reality? In the vivid words of the present Dean of Saint Paul's, Dr. W. R. Matthews, "Does the projection hit anything? Does the idea of God meet the fact of God?" (*The Gospel and the Modern Mind*, p. 90.)

These psychoanalytic investigators, or at least many of them, think that if they can show how the idea of God has arisen in the mind, whether of the individual or of the race, if they can trace the psychological process through which the belief in God has arisen, that they have thereby shown that it is a merely subjective idea or belief, an illusion of human wish-thinking. But in such a supposition they are surely mistaken. To trace the psychological rise or origin of a belief does not settle the question of the truth or falsity of the belief thus arising. That has to be determined on other grounds than those of mere psychological analysis, and is outside the proper province of the psychologist; it is a question rather for philosophy or theology, the question of validity or worth. After all, the idea of God, as Dean Matthews shows in the context of the passage from the book just quoted, is not unique in being a projection of our desires or the product of "wishful thinking." The idea of Nature as an orderly system, for example—the idea which is at the root of all scientific thinking and construction—is in the same sense a "projection." The assumption that we live in an orderly world, a world of law or system, the assumption commonly though somewhat inaccurately called "the uniformity of nature"—an assumption which is the basis not only of all science, including psychology, but also of all rational life and purpose—how did we come by this assumption or idea? It is certain that no one has ever examined all the events of the whole range of time and space, and shown that they fit into an orderly scheme. That were an impossible task. No, the idea of Nature as an orderly system is an idea which our minds have projected on Nature, it is the "objectification" of the desire for harmony, for

release from conflict and disorder which, as the New Psychology has shown, is at the very basis of our being. But we believe nevertheless that it is true, that Nature is really like that. Why? Because the idea has "worked." Because we find when we go out into the world that we discover order, system, uniformity of cause and effect, enabling man to forecast events, control circumstances, and adjust occurrences to ends of personal choice and purpose. So also with the idea of God. It is the projection of our conception of a helpful principle or Power outside and above ourselves, just as the idea of Nature as an orderly system is a projection of our ideal of unity and harmony. And we have the same kind of reason for believing in the reality of God as we have for believing in the reality of Nature as an orderly system, namely, that the idea "works." The proof of its truth is an experimental one, it is ratified by cumulative experience. It satisfies the pragmatic test. "By its fruits ye shall know it." It is essentially the same test or criterion as that of any scientific theory, namely, the ability to give a coherent and intelligible account of the facts of experience under investigation. And the more areas of experience a theory or hypothesis rationalizes, the wider the range of facts it explains, the truer and more objectively valid is the theory or hypothesis in question. To suggest, as the way of thinking we are criticizing tends to do, that the idea of God and religious knowledge or belief generally is an illusion, a subjective illusion, simply because it is a creation or "projection" of the human mind, is after all to strike at the root not only of religious knowledge but of all knowledge. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would render all knowledge untrustworthy or illusory, inasmuch as all knowledge is subjective, in the sense of being a mental construction, a creation of the mind. To take up that position, to suggest that because knowledge is thus a construction of the mind, therefore it is subjective in the sense of being merely subjective—this is the very essence of skepticism. It is to make man an alien in the world which gave him birth, doomed to look at the universe through mental spectacles which distort reality and cut him off forever from knowing the universe truly. Rather must we think of man, in the words of my old teacher of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh University—Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison—as "organic to the world," in whose thought the world becomes articulate and attains to self-knowledge and self-expression. (See especially his Gifford Lectures, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, Lect. VI.) As Hegel expressed the

matter, in his criticism of Kant, "Thoughts do not stand between us and things, shutting us off from things; they rather shut us together with things."

II

Religious knowledge, then, and religious belief as concerned with the facts of religious experience are concerned with a department of knowledge which, so far as it is able to rationalize or explain the facts with which it deals, is as properly called objective and objectively valid as any so-called objective natural scientific knowledge. The conditions of our knowing the facts of religious experience may be indeed somewhat different from the conditions required for the knowledge of the facts with which the objective natural sciences deal. But this is another matter, and brings us to the *second* point to which we wish to refer, namely, the specific character of religious knowledge as compared with ordinary so-called natural scientific knowledge, the knowledge of more properly natural scientific facts.

That there are specific conditions for the attainment of religious knowledge follows from and is involved in the fact that there are different levels of reality or of objects to be known, each, as Aristotle "the master of them that know" already had pointed out, demanding conditions of its own for its proper knowledge. At all levels of reality, the knowing subject or personality is active in its knowing, but in different ways and in different degrees. This truth, that the knowing subject or personality is active in the formation of all its knowledge or experience, that "nothing is but thinking makes it so"—this is the great truth which Kant emphasized in the history of modern philosophy. But according to the kind or level of object to be known, the knowing personality is active in different ways or degrees. In particular there is the difference between the degree or kind of activity of the knowing personality involved in the knowledge of Nature and the world about us, the knowledge of *things*, and that involved in properly personal knowledge, the knowledge of *persons*. In the rational scientific knowledge of Nature and the world about us, that knowledge which comes to its perfection in the exact knowledge of the natural sciences, what is involved and demanded is a certain degree of the development of the rational understanding or intellect. Given a certain degree of the development of intelligence or reason, that degree of development involved in the conception of causation or "cause and effect," and scientific knowledge of things becomes possible. It is pos-

sible and accessible to all of a certain degree of intellectual or rational development. But for the more concrete knowledge of persons, that knowledge of practical understanding and appreciation such as friends have of one another, other conditions are demanded on the part of the knowing subject. For the attainment of this kind of knowledge there is needed more than a certain development of the intellectual powers, namely, a certain quality of character and disposition, an attitude of trustful sympathetic insight which is more than purely intellectual perception. Treat a person simply as an object or thing, after the manner of the natural scientist and the natural scientific method of investigation, fitting him as we do things or objects into a system or scheme of understanding, and you will never know him as a person, much less as a friend. To do that you must give him your trust, your sympathy, in a word, yourself. In other words, you must respond to his personality with your own total personality, and only in the degree in which you do this will your knowledge of him be true. Which means that moral and spiritual as well as intellectual conditions are necessary for knowledge of a person.

Now what is true of the knowledge of human persons is most of all true of the knowledge of the supreme Divine Personality whom we call God, the knowledge with which we are concerned in religion. In this case *par excellence* a certain attitude of the heart and disposition, a certain degree of moral affinity, of sympathetic and trustful relationship, is necessary as well as a certain development of the intelligence or understanding. This is what the old theologians meant by saying *pectus facit theologum*, "the heart makes the theologian." Religious knowledge, the knowledge of God and of things spiritual, that is to say, is conditioned, morally and spiritually conditioned, in a way and to a degree in which natural scientific knowledge is not. The objects of the latter are accessible to the mind apart from qualifications of moral character or spiritual sympathy. In chemistry, for example, or physics, and much more in mathematics, nothing is needed but open eyes and a certain degree of development of the rational understanding for truth to be perceived. So that a bad man may be quite a good mathematician. (With apologies to any mathematicians among my readers!) But in religious knowledge we are concerned with a subject matter which cannot be properly apprehended or appreciated, cannot be properly known, apart from a certain condition or attitude of the heart and the conscience and the will. F. W.

Newman put it this way: "He that would be a true theologian must live the *vita theologica*." But the truth we are emphasizing is much older in its statement than Newman. "The secret of the Lord," said the Old Testament psalmist, "is with them that fear him." "If any man willeth to do the will he shall know of the doctrine (or teaching)," said Jesus Himself. And to like effect Paul, the Christian apostle, said, "The natural man," the *ὁ ψυχικός*, as opposed to or contrasted with the spiritual man, the *ὁ πνευματικός*, —as we would say today, the merely intellectual man—"receiveth not the things of the Spirit, neither can he know them for they are spiritually discerned." The knowledge of God, that is to say, is the possession not of the clever or intellectually acute, but of the simple, in the sense of the true-hearted, the sincere. So that Jesus could say, as He is recorded as saying, "I thank thee, O Father, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

This is sometimes put in this way, that religious knowledge as contrasted with natural scientific knowledge is knowledge which is conditioned by faith or trust. But faith or trust in this sense and in this connection, as a condition of properly religious knowledge, is not to be thought of as something that is opposed to reason or unsupported by reason, as if faith supplied some knowledge for which the reason or the intellect could give no defense; the view of faith naïvely expressed by the Scottish Sunday-school scholar in these terms: "Faith is believing what you know ain't true." This is a misinterpretation of faith which has been aided, though unintentionally, by what is called the Ritschlian doctrine of religious knowledge as consisting in "faith-judgments," or, as it is more usually put, in "value-judgments" or "worth-judgments." In opposition to Hegelian intellectualism, which reduced religion to a rudimentary form of philosophy, Ritschl maintained that religious knowledge is different in kind from scientific and philosophical knowledge. The judgments of science or of philosophy, he said, are judgments of fact or existence, "existential judgments"; the judgments of religion are judgments of worth or value, "faith-judgments" or judgments of appreciation. That "the sun is so many million miles from the earth," that is a judgment of fact, of scientific fact. That "the sun's rays are life-giving and invigorating," that is indeed also a fact, but it is a judgment of value or appreciation, it expresses the value or worth of the sun for those who expose

themselves to it. Or, to take an illustration which applies the distinction more specifically in the religious sphere, to say that "Jesus was put to death by Pontius Pilate, procurator of Judaea, in the reign of Tiberius," that is a judgment of fact, a simple historical judgment or affirmation of fact, which might be assented to by a Buddhist or a Mohammedan as well as by a Christian. But to say that "Jesus died for our sins" and so is "our Saviour"—that is a value- or faith-judgment, a judgment of appreciation expressing personal appreciation such as can only be properly made by one who has committed himself in faith and trust to Jesus and His claims. In this sense religious knowledge is represented by Ritschlians as consisting in personal convictions, convictions based not on logical or scientific argument but on moral and spiritual experience, and as such consisting of "faith-judgments" rather than of "fact" or "existence-judgments." It is a somewhat unfortunate way of stating the contrast, as indeed some of Ritschl's followers have not been slow to recognize; unfortunate in particular as suggesting that religious knowledge is more subjective, more the product of individual preference or desire, and in this sense less assured and objective than natural scientific knowledge. As if, indeed, there were an antithesis or opposition between religious knowledge as consisting in value- or faith-judgments, and scientific or philosophical knowledge as consisting in judgments of fact or existence, and as if what is false as science or philosophy might be true as religion or theology and *vice versa*. Such a position would involve us in the philosophical heresy of "double truth," and would mean in particular the death of religion, for religion, if it is to exercise its proper influence in life, must be shown to be our reasonable service. Scientific truth and religious truth, so far as they are true, must be consistent one with the other. No; it is not that religious truth is less true or certain or objective, less objectively true and valid, than scientific truth. It is rather that the knowledge of its truth or certainty is attained in a different way, by a different avenue, conditioned by different conditions from the knowledge of historical or scientific truth. Once attained, religious truth, truth determined by moral faith or trust and thus expressed in personal convictions or judgments of personal appreciation, is as true, as objective, as scientific truth; and has to be related to it, united harmoniously with it, in one coherent system of truth, truth being ultimately one because God is one.

III

The *third* point I wish to make, which I now must do in the briefest possible manner, is that the facts of religious experience and knowledge once established and rationally justified are not only as true and objective as any other so-called objective scientific facts, but they are of all facts the most objective and objectively valid in the sense of providing a rational interpretation and explanation of the whole area of reality. In this way:

The fundamental question of religious knowledge is, What is God? What is the nature of the Power at the heart of the universe? The answer given to this question on the basis of religious experience, and in particular of that highest religious experience which we have through Christ and which we call Christian, is that the Power at the heart of the universe is a supreme, wise, moral, loving Personality properly called Father, "our Heavenly Father." It is a view, this, of the heart of the universe which is necessary not only to explain the facts of religious experience and in particular of Christian religious experience, that experience which we have of God through Christ, but also to render intelligible our total experience of the world and life, scientific, moral and aesthetic or artistic, as well as properly religious. First, "scientific." The scientist finds himself in the midst of a universe of law and order. His business as a scientist is to discover the laws which operate in the particular field or department of experience with which his science is concerned. But once the laws of operation have been discovered, the further back question remains: How explain the existence of these laws? How explain the fact of order or system in Nature? The fundamental principle of all rational thinking is what is called the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and this principle cannot be properly satisfied short of affirming back of the order or system of the universe an Intelligent Rational Power higher and greater than our own whom we call God. Second, "moral." The facts of human history and experience, of the rise and fall of nations and of men, bear witness in the long run and on the large scale to a moral order in the universe, an order "making for righteousness," to use Matthew Arnold's words. How explain or rationally account for this fact, to which history in the large bears testimony, short of positing a supreme Moral Orderer or Governor of history such as we think of when we say "God"? And Third, "aesthetic" or "artistic." The facts of beauty in the

world, as well as the facts of law and moral order, seem to demand for their proper explanation such a view of the heart of the universe as that which we predicate primarily on the basis of the facts of religious experience and in particular of Christian religious experience, the view of the universe, namely, as controlled by a loving, beneficent Heavenly Father who is concerned not only with His children's material good but also with their spiritual well-being.

Thus it is that the view of God and the universe to which we come first of all on the basis of the facts of religious experience and knowledge, further validates and objectifies itself by affording the needed rootage in reality to the great values of life—truth, goodness and beauty. It is the facts of religious experience and knowledge, especially the experience of direct communion with God in the person of Jesus Christ, that alone indeed give us certainty or assurance as to God's existence and character. Those philosophical arguments based on what seem to be the necessary implications of a sufficient explanation of the values of the world and life, truth, goodness and beauty—these, after all, give us only probability, even if a strong probability, as to the existence over all and through all of a Supreme, Intelligent Moral Power and Beauty. As F. W. Newman said of the old theistic arguments: "They do not warm the heart or take away the winter of my desolation." No: warm, assured knowledge of God is experiential or experimental in character, not inferential. But once assurance has been gained along the line of religious experience or communion with God, such assurance can be rationally reinforced and supported by arguments of a more philosophical and apologetic character after the manner indicated above.

Existential Thinking in American Theology

PAUL TILlich

WHEN I spoke the other day about the book¹ of Richard Niebuhr to a colleague—with great enthusiasm on both sides—he asked me to make two statements in my review: Firstly, he asked me to say that Niebuhr's book, although strictly scientific, shows an astonishing amount of almost poetic beauty; and secondly that the book, although almost popular in style and easy to read, has a tremendous profundity and ranks in the first line of advanced thinking. Since I fully agree with both assertions, especially with the second one, I make them herewith my own.

Niebuhr's book—in order to use a more difficult term than he himself does—is the successful attempt to interpret the idea of revelation in *existential* terms. Existential thinking is confronted in all sections of the book with theoretical thinking. Existential thinking, for instance, interprets history as "our history" while for theoretical thinking history is the "history of things." Revelation can only be understood from an existential point of view, as "revelation for us." Only he who has received revelation as a reality for himself understands what it means and knows its content.

In this way Niebuhr gives expression to a theological and philosophical development foreshadowed by Kant's separation of practical and theoretical reason. It has been carried further by Marx's protest against a theory not linked to social practice, by Kierkegaard's protest against a theory which is not linked to the ethical situation of the individual, by the attempts of the philosophers of life to understand truth as a function of life—a development which was reinforced in recent years by the theologies and philosophies of existence as represented by Barth and Heidegger.

Niebuhr starts his treatment of revelation by making historical relativism the necessary correlate of revelation. Historical relativism, while destroying the illusion that one's concept can be universal, does not necessarily create scepticism:—"one who understands how all his experience is historically mediated must not believe that nothing is mediated through history" (p. 18). Historical reason is not the negation of reason, but the

¹ *The Meaning of Revelation*. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.00.

only way in which reason can work. Historic truth is not the denial of truth, but the actuality of truth for man. In this sense revelation is "historic faith" and theology has its home in the Church as Schleiermacher and Ritschl have seen. "Theology of revelation" is existential theology, meaningful only for those who share the life of the Church.

Historical relativism is associated with religious relativism, the insight namely "that one can speak and think significantly about God only from the point of view of faith in him" (p. 23). But this does not mean, as religious liberalism has assumed, that faith can take the place of God. If *religion* becomes the "enhancer of life—the redeemer of man from evil, the builder of the beloved community" (p. 28), then God disappears, even if the idea of God is maintained. For he becomes a necessary (or even a not necessary) auxiliary and instrument. But this is not an unavoidable consequence of an existential doctrine of God. It is an aberration of religious relativism, as scepticism is an aberration of historical relativism.

The existential attitude towards history is clearly performed in the method of the Biblical writers, who have not merely formulated some general doctrines about God, man and the moral law but who speak of events they have seen and heard of. And they speak of them as participants in the same history out of which the records came. Therefore it is obvious "that we cannot know an historical Jesus save as we look through the history and with the history of the community that loved and worshipped him" (p. 51). In order to make this clearer Niebuhr introduces the difference between "history as lived" and "history as seen." Through a splendid example taken from a high point of the American history, the difference between the "history of things" (external history) and "our history" (internal history), becomes evident: In external history "past events are gone and future happenings are not yet. In internal history our time is our duration. What is past is not gone—what is future is not non-existent" (p. 69). In this way the realm is discovered in which revelation is to be found: "Internal history, the story of what happened to us, the living memory of the community" (p. 90). Niebuhr ably shows that this does not exclude, but strongly demands external history. Existential thinking does not deny but postulates theoretical thinking; it is not a second sphere of truth besides the theoretical truth. It is a qualification of it. Therefore existential and theoretical thinking cannot conflict when they rightly understand each other.

In the central chapter of his book, "Reasons of the Heart," Niebuhr develops first the relation between the (wrong) imaginations and the (right) reasons of the heart: "The heart must reason" (p. 108). The interpretation of religion in terms of irrational emotions is entirely mistaken. The contrary is true: "The revelatory moment is revelatory because it is rational, because it makes the understanding of order and meaning in personal life possible" (p. 109). "By revelation in our history, then, we mean that special occasion which provides us with an image by means of which all the occasions of personal and common life become intelligible" (p. 109). The description of the way in which revelation, understood in this way, interprets the past, the present and the future, destroying the wrong imaginations of the heart, is the most beautiful and one of the profoundest chapters of the book. What the author of this review has called the "center of history" is expressed by Niebuhr in the following words: "Through Christ we become immigrants into the empire of God which extends over all the world and learn to remember the history of that empire, that is of men in all times and places, as our history" (p. 116). Revelation in this sense is not the illustration of the "uniformities of divine and human behaviour—though it does that also—but it exhibits a unique, unreplicative pattern" (p. 127). Historical revelation is unique and universal at the same time.

The last part is called: "The Deity of God." It deals firstly with the nature of the knowledge of God. It is not a knowledge of things in which "the object is a passive and dead thing" (p. 144), (a "knowledge of control" as I would call it), but it is a knowledge of the knower, presupposing the knowledge of ourselves. "To know a knower is to begin with the activity of the other who knows us or reveals himself to us by his knowing activity. . . . Knowledge of other selves must be received and responded to" (p. 145). This is the model of the knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is possible only through the "self-disclosure of the infinite person" which we accept in an act of commitment, not as a belief about the nature of things (p. 154).

The question arises how revelation in this sense is related to the moral law and to the whole of human insights in nature and history. The answer in both cases is obvious: Revelation does not give a new law and a new knowledge. But it is "the beginning of a revolutionary understanding and application of the moral law" (p. 172). And it involves "the radical reconstruction of our beliefs, since these always reflect both human pro-

vincialism and concern for self with its idols as well as objective knowledge" (p. 172). Revelation neither augments nor removes the moral law and the objective knowledge, but purifies and transforms them from an ultimate point of view. It is illoyal to God, *not* to develop scientific knowledge.

A very important question remains: The relation of revelation to the religious life of mankind, including the philosophical idea of God. Niebuhr answers in the same way in which he has answered the question of the relation of revelation to the moral law and the objective knowledge. "Revelation is not the development and not the elimination of our natural religion; it is the revolution of the religious life"; (p. 190) and: "This conversion and permanent revolution of our human religion through Jesus Christ is what we mean by revelation" (p. 191). Although I fully agree with these formulations I cannot help saying that they must be developed in a system of theology in order to receive a real meaning. They are the expression of a program which must be carried through as the test of the method indicated in them. As they stand they must arouse the question: What happens in this revolution, if neither new laws nor a new knowledge, nor a new religion is created by them? What is the difference between a revolutionary transformation and the positing of something new? And beyond this a very special question must be asked. If revelation is the conversion of human religion, and if—as it is obviously the case—out of this conversion a new religious life grows—which again must be converted—is the pre-Christian religious life itself a result of earlier revelations or not? In the trend of Niebuhr's thought it seems to me an unavoidable consequence that it is. But he does not say so as far as I can see. On the contrary: By calling the religious life of mankind "Natural Religion" he prevents himself from drawing that consequence. Of course: Revelation is always revelation for us. But are we justified in excluding that there is revelation for others that is not revelation for us. We cannot! This does not mean that we can say affirmatively, as liberalism did, that the history of religion *is* history of revelation. But, on the other hand, we cannot deny that there might be revelation *in* it.

This is a book with which I find myself in an agreement, as it rarely happens between theologians of a very different background; a book which is *the* introduction into existential thinking in present American theology.

The Quarter's Fiction

JOHN C. SCHROEDER

THE war is at the center of our thinking. There is no escaping it. Fiction might seem to be the door through which we could escape, not to unreality, but to a revelation of life that is normal and regular, set in the peaceful milieu of civil pursuits. But the novelists too are concerned about the war and with their seeing eyes and penetrating insights, they are becoming absorbed by this fascinating and dreadful spectacle of man caught and enmeshed in the torturing social machine he has invented for his own destruction.

It might seem natural then to write an article about war novels, for there is a great deal of excellent fiction being written about our all-absorbing concern. Or it might be preferable to select such books as would make us forget the war to remember what normal life is about. Instead I have chosen from the many possible books that ought to be included in this column a selection each one of which is a distinguished piece of work, each of which differs widely in theme from the others but all of which together cover the widest possible range of interest. The reader may take his choice; or, if he has the leisure to read them all, he may be sure that he is not wasting his time.

Roger Martin du Gard is a winner of the Nobel Prize. The last volume of *The Thibaults* has been translated by Stuart Gilbert and is published under the title *Summer 1914*. One need not have read the previous volume to understand the situation as these two brothers and their friends and connections find themselves in a Europe on the brink of war. A few hours with this volume will persuade the reader that he must read the first too. Together they represent an important contribution to world literature.

Summer 1914 finds Jacques Thibault in Geneva at the very center of the revolutionary group whose headquarters are there. The son of an imperious, bourgeois, pious father, this sensitive boy frustrated as a novelist has joined the intellectuals who are seeking to foment world revolution. As the war becomes more and more imminent, Jacques' hopes for peace take him to revolutionary groups in Paris, Berlin and Brussels. He is too idealistic

and gentle to realize the ruthless and implacable character of Meynestrel, a sort of Lenin, who is the recognized leader of the radicals in Geneva who since they can find no way to earn a living try to support life with their endless talk. But these long conversations among them are extraordinary since through them du Gard is able to distill the whole of the revolutionary philosophy.

In contrast to Jacques is his brother Antoine, the physician who gives lip service to the moral code of the Catholicism he does not believe but whose fealty is given to a science in which he sentimentally believes. Like many a scientist, Antoine has no comprehension of the social forces which are about to shatter his world. In contrast to his brother who hopes that a general strike will stop the war, Antoine believes "My country, right or wrong," only because he has never thought about the possibility of war.

Against the brothers with their Roman Catholic background are painted the Fontanins with their Protestant allegiances. Here du Gard reveals with the delicacy of a Proust, all the emotions and sentiments which affect the fortunes of these contrasted people. As the story progresses it includes in its purview all the conceivable types who are caught up in the holocaust, their startled reactions to a catastrophe they could not believe possible and the turmoil of their lives as emotions are heightened by the acceleration of events.

Antoine's diary which records his thoughts as he faces death after having been gassed, is a confession of faith of the typical liberal man of science of the last century. In it is revealed the reason for the bankruptcy of the point of view of those who "accepted the conventional moral standards without being taken in by them." *Summer 1914* is a great novel of classic proportions. It surely will have an enduring place in the literature of our time.

Ellen Glasgow's *In This Our Life* is superb writing of an entirely different sort. It is the story of the Timberlake family in a small Virginia town. Asa Timberlake is a gentle, kind man, the ineffectual son of a line of successful business men. His wife Lavinia is a professional hypochondriac whose invalidism is her means of dominating her family's life. The two daughters, Roy and Stanley, while close together in age are eras apart in spirit. Roy is a modern woman with "a hard, fine core of integrity" who earns her own living and sacrifices the life she could live with her

doctor husband to the petulant demands of her mother's comfort. Stanley, the beauty of the two, is "the old siren in the new society." From the beginning of the story it is evident that Stanley, about to be married to a young lawyer, is bound to wreck her sister's futile quest for happiness as well as the flimsy economic stability of the family. The gentle Asa's meagre earnings are not adequate for his wife's demanding invalidism nor for Stanley's love of luxury to match her beauty and so they depend upon the largesse of old Uncle William whose ruthlessness makes him a spiritual contemporary of the girl who instinctively seized whatever made anyone else happy.

These are the people whose pathetically tragic life Miss Glasgow portrays with such deft skill. They are all modern in that their one desire is happiness and they are all frustrated in their futile quest. It is a bitter conclusion to which they are all driven and their ultimate defeat is relieved only by the delicate irony of the author's analysis. "The pity is, Asa thought, that he's futile. Like all the rest of us, like our world, our time, our code of living, he has no direction; he is incapable of any permanent motive. Ideas may matter to him but they do not matter enough. He has never known what he believed. Or is it that he has never really believed anything? Feeling has eaten him through and through, and there has been nothing strong and hard in him to resist it. They are all like that, and so am I, Asa told himself, only they have the freedom for destruction, and I was always kept in chains. I may have lost my beliefs, but the empty forms of my belief are still holding me." Perhaps Roy, who dares look at life, finally learns that the freedom she demands can never be had and though she never comes to discern any positive meaning out of the collapse of her hopes, she does discover how vain her demand for happiness was.

In contrast to this family and running a contrapuntal theme to its sad melody is the story of the servant Minerva, her husband Abel and her son Parry. Abel is content to accept the limitations which society has placed about his race but Parry rebels. His search for fulfillment is as futile as Stanley's even though they seek such different ends. *In This Our Life* is superb story telling and even more telling is its subtle analysis of human character.

Out of This Furnace is the story of the American steel industry as seen through the eyes of the men who work in the mills. Kracha is a

Slav who leaves his wife in Europe to come to America in 1881. The novel follows the fortunes of three generations of "hunkies" and their struggle for existence—their poverty, their work, the strikes and lockouts, their futile dreams of independence, the births and marriages and deaths of Kracha's family.

Mr. Bell knows not only the traditions and mores of these people but the techniques of the business and the history of the industry. It is the story of unionism among the workers. If Kracha accepted the axiom that he was fortunate to have a job whatever the conditions of his employment, his grandson Dobie knows his rights and understands how powerful the union can be. Three generations puts them poles apart in outlook and comprehension. Steel and modern industrialism have come out of the blood, sweat and tears of thousands of Krachas who escaped the feudalism of their agricultural Europe only to be caught by the feudalism of industrial plutocracy. They gave much to American life and Mr. Bell tells their story not only with accuracy but with sympathetic understanding.

There are two books about this war among many others that are worth reading. *This Above All* seems to rise above the war even though it was born in the midst of England's travail. Clive, born in poverty, but self-educated and thoughtful, has just escaped from Dunkirk. He has decided to desert since he cannot make himself believe that this war is his. He can see no reason for giving his life for an England which has so long been in the hands of a class unfit to govern it. He picks up Prue, a volunteer in a W.A.A.F. camp. She comes from the upper classes and believes in the war simply because she cannot help herself. She comes from the group that has always believed in England because it was always their England. As these two people fall in love after a casual affair, the torment and struggle in Clive's mind develops. She, realizing that he is thinking of deserting, presents the case for England against the Nazi menace—the lovely green England which has given her a heritage of good life—a far better life than anything that Hitler can offer. But Clive cannot believe in this England which for his class has never existed. He has known only a soul-deadening poverty and an imperialism from which he has never had any benefits. Having been through the horrors of Dunkirk he is not afraid of death but it is only when London is being bombed and he knows that Prue is to have a child that the

issue becomes clear for him and he knows why he is ready to die for an England which he believes will help his own class in the future.

Against this pair in the background is Prue's family with its old school tie tradition; a vivid picture of the war on the continent and England in its steady hail of bombs. Mr. Knight achieves a remarkable objectivity and the drama of the story overcomes the long conversations in which this ill-fated pair of lovers struggle for some meaning in the strife that engulfs them. So far this review would indicate that the book is merely an apology for the war. It is much more than this. The story telling is so good and the author is convincing because he succeeds in controlling his emotions. He obviously tries to be fair and in Clive he gives us a soldier who is a better soldier because he believes in what he is doing only because he has thought his way through the alternatives.

Spring 1940 seems more obviously propagandist. Yet such a bald statement seems hardly just since it is a successful attempt to portray what happened in Norway when the Nazis came. Ralph was born in Germany soon after the last war. His father having died, his mother marries a Norwegian and Ralph grew up there with his stepbrothers and stepsisters, happy in the security of the little democracy. His new father is a kind, religious man who believes in social democracy and who like the other people in the village pays little attention to the swiftly moving tide of events in Germany.

Ralph is sent there to study and becomes a Nazi convert. Mr. Engstrand here introduces only the perverts and sadists who rose to power in the party and who were responsible for the cruelty and terror of the regime. He does not include among Ralph's friends the many who, however deluded, must have made up the rank and file of the party's membership.

In preparation for the invasion of Norway, he is sent back to his family to be cured of "tuberculosis." He was only one of the many young "tourists" who had been sent to spy out the land. With his mother and his family and the friendly Lutheran minister surrounding him, he tries to maintain his belief in hate against their loving attempts to persuade him of the kindly life in which he had once believed. Bewildered he grimly clings to his belief in superior German culture. Tortured within, he betrays Norway as he plays the spy until he reveals information which leads to the death of his twin stepbrothers. When the invasion actually starts he joins the Nazi

legions to meet his death at the hands of his mother after the village had been destroyed and most of his family killed. The story is melodramatic. Yet undoubtedly there are many Ralphs in Germany who say to themselves "I must not think. The pale hands of pity cannot hold back the wave of the future."

There is so much good regional fiction being written that it is difficult to choose a typical volume. *Men of the Mountains* is a series of short stories, or rather characterizations, of life in the Kentucky mountains. The simple elementary ways of these people are revealed with chuckling good humor and fanciful honesty. Mr. Stuart's themes are earthy—work, young love, the pull of the soil, the coming of old age, death. He is not concerned with social causes and reform. The reader does not feel that he is exploring decadence however elemental the details of old Grandpa Grayhouse's dead body salted down in the attic for six months in accordance with the provisions of his will or the bleak tragedy of the farmers who try to eke out their living by working the dangerous coal mine. Mr. Stuart's style is often lyrical and while at times his prose is forced, the writing gives a sense of the people and their life. America's literary future may perhaps be found in this field of regional writing which is both indigenous and creative. Its development is worth watching.

Summer 1914. By Roger Martin du Gard. New York: The Viking Press. 1941. 1008 pp. \$3.50.

In This Our Life. By Ellen Glasgow. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1941. 467 pp. \$2.50.

Out of This Furnace. By Thomas Bell. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1941. 413 pp. \$2.50.

This Above All. By Eric Knight. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1941. 475 pp. \$2.50.

Spring 1940. By Stuart David Engstrand. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1941. 357 pp. \$2.50.

Men of the Mountains. By Jesse Stuart. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1941. 349 pp. \$2.50.

Book Reviews

The Nature and Destiny of Man.

(Vol. 1). By REINHOLD NIEBUHR.
New York: Scribner's. 1941. pp.
306. \$2.75.

Human Nature is the sub-title of this volume, which represents the first of the two series of lectures given by the author on the Gifford Foundation. Here are treated the doctrines of man and sin, a most timely theme for our day. The second volume, on *Human Destiny*, will be in effect a discussion of the Christian doctrine of salvation. Together these volumes consider the most vital matters in religious thought and those of great importance in their bearing on our social situation.

Dr. Niebuhr's position stands in interesting contrast to those of his American predecessors in this distinguished lectureship, to the idealism of Royce and Hocking as to the pragmatism of James and Dewey. It is definitely theological rather than philosophical. The true understanding of man is possible only as he is placed before God. Naturalistic schemes see only the biological creature. Philosophical idealism is one-sided in its stress on man as rational being. Romanticism is unrealistic in its optimism. Christianity alone can give the right idea of human nature. Its doctrine of the image of God in man emphasizes the height of man's self-transcendence, it stresses his creaturehood and dependence without holding that the finite and natural are evil, and its doctrine of sin brings the real appreciation of man's need.

This criticism of inadequate views is effective and is called for. The work

would gain by giving larger place to constructive statement and by showing somewhat less of a polemic tendency. There is little awareness evinced of the position of a liberal evangelicalism. Things are black or white, and white means Calvin and Augustine. A shallow Pelagianism is the only alternative to Calvinism. Like most of the neo-orthodox there is little understanding of what that liberalism in religion means which keeps the mind open, puts loyalty to the truth above tradition, and believes that the living God still guides man into the truth.

Yet Niebuhr's own debt to liberalism is apparent. The fall of man is not a historical event in which a given "Adam" figured. Total depravity in its strict Calvinistic sense is eliminated, as is "the historical-literalistic illusion, which places the original perfection of man in a period before an historical Fall." "Original righteousness" apparently is in essence that which makes man a morally responsible being. So far from having been lost, it "remains with sinful man as the knowledge of what he ought to be, as the law of his freedom." The discussion would gain if the author made more constructive use of the materials which biology and psychology furnish us as to the nature of man, a use that might be entirely consistent with the primacy of the Christian standpoint.

Niebuhr conceives sin as essentially pride, "man's rebellion against God, his effort to usurp the place of God." This is in the Augustine-Calvin-Barth succession. It is related to that concept of God which, in its emphasis, puts sovereignty before character. Where, on the con-

trary, as with Jesus, the stress is laid, not upon divine sovereignty and human submission, but upon the God of holy love in whose mercy we trust and by whose spirit of love we are to live, then sin becomes essentially selfishness refusing trust and obedience to God, refusing love and justice to men. Niebuhr does recognize love as "the end term of any system of morals," but he has not found the right relation of ethical and religious as this appears in the prophetic conception of God and religion, and so he misses the significance of this for the concept of sin. In these discussions the theologian's sin of abstraction and of remoteness from concrete reality is apparent. For example, we are told that the source of sin lies in the fact that man, capable of envisaging the whole, "commits the error of imagining himself the whole which he envisages."

Interesting is the suggestion that sin always presupposes already existing sin in order to its explanation, and hence that we are to believe in the devil as a fallen angel who brought sin into the world. Consistently, this speculation would involve the existence of sin in heaven as the source of the devil's temptation, with a regressus that would seem to lead back to God. If our modern "realistic" theology would consider more realistically what is necessarily involved in the existence of morally responsible beings developing in time, such speculation would not be called for.

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The Quaker Influence in American Literature. By Howard W. Hintz. Revell. \$1.00. A study of Quaker thought in American letters.

This Is the Victory. By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD. pp. 276. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury. \$2.00.

THIS is the seventeenth book by the able minister of the City Temple, London. While it was being written, says the comment on the front flap, "the house trembles with the vibration caused by the firing of guns, and the explosion of bombs." It was written, he says (p. 120) in "quest of a philosophy of life, a way of looking at life which strengthens the heart and mind to meet the problems of these days." Obviously the problems to be met are those which concern states of mind created by disillusion, loss of faith, fear and suffering.

Doctor Weatherhead provides (p. 17) the argument pursued through the book as a framework for such sequence as is discerned. In the preface he says he has prepared, less an argument, than a series of messages preached at the City Temple during the last few months and which are herein rewritten and enlarged.

There is continuity, to be sure, but hardly argument. Beginning with a series of chapters which sketch our mistaken faith in progress, and the reasons for our folly, he adduces certain aids to faith in God—not progress, which left God out. Beauty, humor, patience, and hope are the allies of a vital faith. Once faith is bulwarked and properly directed toward God, we need to see first the vision of the eternal Church, a Church which will be altered to meet the new day, and then the new age which our faith, through the new Church, will bring into being.

Since he acknowledges gratefully the help of his secretary who took the addresses in shorthand as they were delivered, we may properly assume that they are much the same as when originally

presented to people desperately anxious for such help as preaching is able to give—when competently done. The audience, as Hugh Black once said, is one of three essentials to good preaching, the other two being the truth and the personality of the preacher. In order, therefore, to get the full virtue of these sensitive and ardent messages, one must try to see before the preacher of the City Temple just such anguished, bewildered, searching hearts as must be filling the churches of England these days.

Doctor Weatherhead's central theme is "this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." In the face of the aggression that advertises world conquest as its aim, it takes courage to proclaim faith as the ultimate conqueror of the world. But with the probing insight of one who knows much of the working of the mind, the author undertakes to give immediate and practical validity to faith in God so that those who are threatened by physical death and moral defection may be held strong.

It is quite a chore he has undertaken. There is much that is repetitious, hortatory and commonplace in the book. He has written better in better times. But when a man faces a London audience these days in the effort to keep from hearts the poison of hatred and the evil of vengeance, and to build into the shattered foundations of hope new supports and larger visions, he can be excused if he repeats himself, or expresses his ideas in less fastidious language than peace times permit.

For the London people these sermons, put together to encourage, assuage and uplift, must have served their purpose grandly. They should be widely read by American preachers; for the time may not be far removed when they too will have to speak to ravaged hearts. If

they do it as well then as Weatherhead is doing it now, he will be an insensitive or impertinent fool who cavils at logic or style, so long as the needy folk to whom they speak are confirmed anew in the faith "that overcometh the world."

EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAT.

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A Christian Imperative. By ROSWELL P. BARNES. New York: Friendship Press. 1941. pp. xi+196. \$1.00.

THE members of our churches are today distraught and confused about the international scene. Indifference, isolationism, open-eyed pacifism, vigorous interventionism, cynicism and oversimplified activism jostle each other in the pews.

This book by an associate secretary of the Federal Council of Churches comes to fill a sore need; and it offers wise counsel, realistic analysis, encouragement and challenge to a perplexed church. The range of his thought in this brief compass is admirable. The sanity of his examination of the issues is reinforced by a personal, first-hand acquaintance with Europe at war, for he has recently traveled on both sides of the battle lines. The clarity of his presentation of the issues is both stimulating and encouraging, for it cuts through the fog of vague confusion in thought.

Of course it is not an exhaustive analysis of world peace. It was intended to be. Because of its sanity it will be attacked from both sides for ignoring critics' pet obsessions; and the cynical will brand its constructive note as too optimistic. But for a confused constituency in our churches it will give what is needed: a sense of the possibility of effective Christian action.

More adequate political organization, techniques of economic adjustment, a common sense of basic moral values, better people aware of their responsibility,—all these are needed for peace; and the churches can especially in the last two areas exercise power. The missionary enterprise here takes on new significance, while the ecumenical movement is making its force felt by keeping open the avenues of fellowship in a disrupted world. At home the churches must exert pressure, not for particular party platforms, but for standards consonant with decency, justice and goodwill; and maintain the spirit of fellowship in their own ranks.

All this has its price, and the author insists that we must face that cost if we are to match the morale of the forces of lawlessness that are abroad. By sacrificial relief to the suffering, by yielding national (which is ultimately personal) self-interest, by diluting national sovereignty in the name of mutual concessions, by sticking to important values in the routine activity of the churches, and by everlastingly maintaining respect for human personality even when it is embarrassing or costly, the churches *can* do something for peace.

Every church should have at least one group studying this book.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

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The Search for God. By MARCETTE CHUTE. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. pp. 320. \$2.75.

THIS book should come as a welcome discovery to all men who are interested in one of the most important subjects of religion and who have not previously known of the author's work. It is a stimulating, thoughtful and scholarly

work. It deals with an old subject in a new and original way. It is also a book that will make the reader re-think his own position in the interpretation of certain portions of Scripture. I would cordially recommend the book for that reason, if for no other, because I believe that to be a worth-while endeavor.

The book is divided into four parts: The Right to Search, The Object of the Search, The Search, The Finding. The author says in his foreword, "The difference between 'The Search for God' and all other interpretations of the Bible lies in the nature of this 'country' for which the men of Israel were looking." The conception of the Bible as a search for God is not new, but the author's treatment is fresh and original. In the first part we consider the story of the Book of Job. The experience of this ancient seer vindicates the right to search for God. In the treatment of the second part we find the object of the search to be the Creator, the God of the first chapter of Genesis. A distinction is drawn between the two accounts of the creation in the first three chapters of Genesis, with an ingenious explanation of the Adam and Eve story.

The third part, The Search, forms the body of the book. For two hundred pages the author, beginning with Abraham and continuing on through the whole of Old Testament history, lays bare the progressive self-revelation of God. The insight of Moses supersedes that of Abraham and Jacob; David makes a distinct advance in the apprehension of Reality; the prophets, especially Isaiah, come to a still better knowledge. "Isaiah believed that the one force that gave permanent life to a nation was the desire to find God, and that against this force not even the mightiest of armaments could prevail." Moreover,

it was Isaiah who introduced the famous sign of Immanuel, "God is with us."

The last part of the treatment is an attempt to understand the discovery that Jesus made about God. The fourth Gospel is used as the basis of interpretation. "Jesus was a teacher who had come to the world to make known 'the only true God,' . . . and Jesus said, and was prepared to prove it, that he was the son of God." The author draws a distinction, however, between the God of Jesus, and the God of Judaism. After reading this section one finds it easier to understand why the Jews rejected Jesus, and why Jesus went to the Cross.

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Springs of Creative Living. By ROLLO

MAY. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press. pp. 271. 1940. \$2.00.

THIS book breaks new ground in its analysis of the relation between psychotherapy and religion, in the making and remaking of personality. May takes his start from the thirst for meaning, without which human life breaks down. Religion, he holds, is the meaning, while psychotherapy "concerns itself with helping straighten out the structure of the meaning of an individual's life."

May weaves together in his treatment, the account of two processes which have developed concomitantly. One is the growth of modern psychotherapy, in which it became increasingly clear that depth analysis of personality was often only a half-way house on the road to recovery. It might help an individual to have faith in himself, but apart from philosophy and religion it was incompetent to help him arrive at a world view in which individual experience could have

ultimate meaning. But this "faith in oneself" of some psychotherapy, and the "faith in man" of humanism, are essentially the same. And the second process traced by May is the disintegration of humanism, with renewed sense of need for a God who is not man himself.

Against that background May develops a philosophy and the outlines of a technique of counselling which depends upon theology quite as frankly as it does upon psychology. In some respects it is a liberal theology, but it makes no bones about relying upon God, and upon the concepts of sin and grace.

The book is a highly useful contribution to the achievement of a working relationship between psychology and theology. And in such a synthesis, might it not be well to get rid of the hybrid idea of "counselor," but especially its outlandish correlate "counselee," if any better terms could be found?

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A Philosophy of Religion. By EDGAR
SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. New
York: Prentice-Hall. 1940. pp.
xvii-539. \$4.00.

DR. BRIGHTMAN's book is full of surprises, surprises of the kind which make the life of the reader worth living. The theme is necessarily an old one, about as old as the mind of man, but the approach and treatment are as fresh as today's news. Religion is accepted first of all as a fact and then is estimated for its value. It is from such a start in actual living that all Professor Brightman's theorizing takes its origin and follows its course through. Everywhere in the book is manifest this note and accent of life.

Another surprise is the range of the discussion, covering as it does all phases of intellectual and spiritual activity which have any significance for the main themes. Anyone who knows the author is aware of the thoroughness and completeness with which he works. He does not miss the significance of even the slightest contributions from any quarter. He is familiar with writer after writer who even in the most obscure corner of the theological world has thrown any light upon his problems. This does not mean that he merely cites books after the manner of a bibliographer. He does not pass judgment upon anyone's position unless he has thoroughly mastered those positions. It would be impossible for an attentive reader to go through these pages without arriving at the end with a fairly comprehensive acquaintance with just about everything that is being done in the field to which the book devotes itself.

Dr. Brightman is himself the advocate of some limitations in God which have seemed to many readers to place him among those who hold to the doctrine of a finite God. This particular book does not give a disproportionate amount of space to this conception of finitude in God, but does show the freshness and vigor which have come from the author's prolonged brooding over this part of his theme. Even if a student does not accept this particular interpretation of a limited God, he cannot fail to be benefited by the air of discovery and of courage with which the relevant theological territory is explored. Walter Bagehot, acute literary and theological English critic in the last century, once declared that while the more important theological discussions scatter some of the clouds of our thinking, they do so only

with the result of disclosing other clouds farther up. If any reader feels thus about any of Dr. Brightman's discussions, let him remind himself that the discussions do scatter some clouds, and if they reveal or suggest further clouds in the higher atmosphere, they make evident at the same time the increasing vastness of the problem and the higher mysteries which still quicken us and beckon us on to the farther flights. Fortunate we indeed are to have so intelligent and wise and skillful a pilot as Dr. Brightman in these daring journeys into the intellectual and moral stratosphere. Ignoring the problem of evil in the universe is not solving it—nor is that easy dismissal of the fact of physical and moral pain as due to the "freedom of man" a complete solution. Dr. Brightman has rendered an incalculable service by holding before religious thinkers that "Given" which must be part of the divine experience.

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Von Hegel bis Nietzsche. By KARL LÖWITZ. Zürich/New York: Europa Verlag. pp. 538. \$5.00.

It is unusual to review in these columns a book in the German language, but Löwitz's *From Hegel to Nietzsche* is an unusual book. A work published by the Europa Verlag simultaneously in Switzerland and New York in the year 1941 and written by an exile from Nazi Germany while he was teaching in the University of Sendai, Japan, with the friendly bibliographical aid of his colleagues, Professor K. Ishivara and Professor S. Takahashi, is a document of our times. Before the book was published, the encroachments of the Axis on the Far

East drove Dr. Löwith to America, where he is now lecturing at Union Theological Seminary.

From Hegel to Nietzsche is, however, not dependent for its interest and value on any extraneous dramatic circumstances attending its composition. It is a brilliant and scholarly interpretation of the development of nineteenth century thought in Germany, which everyone should read who wishes to see into the riddle of the German soul.

Dr. Löwith's book is a masterly survey of the spiritual struggles of the giants and epigones of the nineteenth century, bringing out the complexity of the problems with which Hegel and the post-Hegelians were wrestling. He avoids the superficial generalizations which led James to label Hegel's world a block universe, and which lead others to see in Hegel only the totalitarian state, or in Nietzsche only the ruthless blond beast. In contrast to these hasty and one-sided judgments, Löwith views Hegel as the great philosopher of spiritual history. For Hegel, the task of philosophy is to grasp the events of time in rational ideas. Löwith regards Hegel's philosophy, fundamentally, as a rational presentation of Protestant Christianity; for Hegel, the rise of Christianity was the decisive point in the history of the spirit. Hegel was the rational historian of the development of the Christian spirit.

After fruitful contrasts of Hegel with Goethe, Löwith goes on to trace the dissolution of Hegelianism. The left Hegelians, led by Feuerbach and Marx, reject Hegel's idealism and Christianity in favor of materialism, while the Christian Kierkegaard rejects Hegel's emphasis on reason in favor of an extreme individualism. Both Marx and Kierkegaard revolt against capitalism and secular Christianity as well as against Hegel.

Nietzsche is then interpreted as entering the stage at this point, finding that both Hegel and his critics had been too much preoccupied with the problems of history and of time, and proclaiming the need of conquering the petty problems of time by a new spiritual dimension—the dimension of Superman and of eternity.

This brief sketch falls far short of doing justice to the rich and many-sided thought of Löwith's work. Perhaps Löwith overemphasizes particular strands of thought in Hegel and Nietzsche; but his searching analyses are most illuminating and should go far to banish the bogeyman notion that many have of both Hegel and Nietzsche. Löwith's central thought, rich with meaning for today, is expressed in the closing sentences of his preface: "Man does not live by almighty Time alone. He outlasts the accidents of life by virtue of a single ray or spark of the being of eternity." This is the real ground of hope for Germany and for the world.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN.

Boston University,
Boston, Massachusetts.

The Creed of Christ. By GERALD HEARD. New York: Harper & Brothers. pp. 169. \$2.00.

The Code of Christ. By GERALD HEARD. New York: Harper & Brothers. pp. 168. \$1.50.

HERE are two books which deserve the attention of all earnest students of the Christian message. The first volume insists that the Lord's Prayer is the key to the teachings of Jesus. By means of this, we may reach the ultimate goal of life. "Christ was neither a dreamer building sky castles with poetic language nor a tyrant demanding bricks without straw."

The Code of Christ is contained in

the beatitudes. The author deals with life as it is, and as it ought to be.

The reader of both these volumes must divest his mind of many preconceived notions, if he appreciates their message. But the books shed radiant light, pointing in the direction of the highest kind of life. The author is a surgeon who performs a painful operation. It is one, however, that not merely the world, but which the Church itself greatly needs.

While one wishes that Heard had written many of his paragraphs with sentences that are less involved, so that the average layman would be more willing to read his message, there are certain cryptic statements which speak to all. We cannot forget some of them. "Even a little less egotism means a little more of heaven now." "Hell is a place composed of completely egoistic persons. There is no other hell and all ranges and degrees of misery can be exactly gauged and calibrated by noting the amount of ego that is present."

Again, the searching nature of the book is suggested when Heard insists that, to be perfectly frank, most of the virtues which we greatly admire are pagan, not Christian virtues. *The Code of Christ* seeks to go to the root of the original meaning of certain words of Jesus. Speaking of the meek, the author points out that the word, "praos," was used by the Greeks in describing wild animals "which had been tamed, trained, for wild horses which had been made able to work with men."

Referring to the present insanity of our war-mad world, Heard says: "This is not a return to disorder, anarchy, barbarism, savagery. This is ordered intelligence confounded by itself. There is no end to this but the destruction of all order and understanding, discipline and devotion—unless there can be found a

still higher training yielding a yet higher, apter power." The words pain us—because they are so true!

Mr. Heard rightly insists that the only proper attitude to assume, if one sincerely desires to understand the beatitudes, is to *act* upon them. We are not to "wonder if." We are to "go and try." This is the only fair test. If we understand Jesus, we must ever keep in mind that there is a third stage of development—spiritual in its nature—which goes beyond intellect, just as intellect is beyond muscle.

These are two volumes which will richly reward earnest-minded readers. The messages are vitally concerned with our contemporary order, and are definitely related to life, both as it is now and as it ought to be.

G. RAY JORDAN

Minister, First Methodist Church,
Charlotte, North Carolina.

Form and Freedom in Worship. By CLARENCE SEIDENSPINNER. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. pp. 186. \$2.00.

WHETHER he agrees with the writer or not, every minister who reads this book will be profited thereby. Inevitably it will cause him to consider most carefully, and perhaps to change quite radically, the order of service to which he has become accustomed. During recent years many Protestants have realized that in their churches the element of worship has not had its rightful place. Hence, there is now in progress a movement toward *form* which does not destroy *freedom* in worship.

The Rev. Clarence Seidenspinner, minister of the First Methodist Church, Racine, Wis., is one of the leaders in this movement. To readers of *Religion in*

Life, the *Christian Century*, the *Christian Century Pulpit*, and the *Epworth Herald*, he is not a stranger nor is his approach to the subject unknown.

The volume falls into three parts. First, The Present Situation; second, The Worship of Yesterday; third, Christian Worship for the New Day.

The author insists that at the present time "a new life form is emerging in America, perhaps in the world." Unfortunately a gulf exists between worship and this contemporary life. To bridge this gulf is one of the great tasks of the modern Church. Thus we are challenged.

If we are to move wisely into the future we must be acquainted with the past. Hence we consider the worship of yesterday, including the Church Year; the Holy Communion; and the Daily Office. The information in these pages is valuable. Church worship for the New Day is dealt with under the following divisions—Liturgical Form, Liturgical Material, the Sermon, the Liturgical Year, and the Building. To a considerable extent a manual of worship is here presented. Perhaps too great importance is given to the chancel with the central communion table. There is much that might be said in favor of the pulpit and the communion table as jointly the central objects in a Protestant church.

Rightful emphasis is placed by Mr. Seidenspinner upon the element of art that should be in our worship. Emphasis, perhaps too great, is placed upon the element of art in the sermon. Certain modern messages referred to as models almost always leave me with a feeling that something is lacking. Amos and Micah, John the Baptist and the Apostle Paul, pre-eminently Jesus, were far more than artists. If the modern preacher thinks too greatly of his artistry he may fail as

an evangel and as a prophet even though he please many hearers.

And yet a minister can be a prophet, an evangel, and an artist. Witness the late Dr. John H. Jowett. To attain this goal he should earnestly strive.

DUNBAR H. OGDEN.

Napoleon Avenue Presbyterian Church,
New Orleans, Louisiana.

The Unobstructed Universe. By STEWART EDWARD WHITE. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1940. pp. 320. \$2.50.

Stewart Edward White, author of tales of frontier life in North America and Central Africa, has for many years been a diligent student of occult phenomena. *The Betty Book* and *Across the Unknown* (with Harwood White) have preceded and prepared the way for the volume now being reviewed. None can question the sincerity of Mr. White. His conviction that conscious human life projects itself beyond the grave is expressed not only in his own literary output but in such a unique circumstance as the continuation of his late wife's name, Elizabeth Grant, alongside his own in the biographical sketch in *Who's Who in America*.

The Unobstructed Universe will take rank as one of the most plausible and philosophical books on spirit communication. Mr. White argues that the obstructed universe and the unobstructed universe are in reality two phases of one and the same underlying reality. Time, space and motion are at least partial barriers to the spirit of man so long as he inhabits this world. Set free from these obstacles by the adventure called death, personality thrives in a new environment and possesses powers which transcend the competencies and functions before

exercised. At bottom, however, the two worlds, the obstructed and the unobstructed, are separated only by a tenuous and translucent boundary. The fundamental reality in the comprehensive universe is consciousness.

The probability remains that the last word about communion of the living with the dead has not been spoken. It is well to bear in mind the distinction between the conclusion that immortality can be scientifically demonstrated and the Christian faith ably supported by reason that life is or can be made everlasting. The core of the Christian religion is not communication with the dead but commerce with God through Christ.

KARL R. STOLZ.

The Hartford School of
Religious Education,
Hartford, Connecticut.

Life's Intimate Relationships. By
TALMADGE C. JOHNSON. Abing-
don-Cokesbury, 1941. pp. 205.
\$1.50.

LIFE's most important problems are rooted in life's "intimate" relationship: sex, marriage, parenthood, family life. In fifteen helpful chapters the author surveys these various areas and indicates how religious faith will help solve the various problems which arise.

Would you know how to get along with and be a helpful "in-law"? What is the way to successful marriage? To achieve happiness in marriage? To be a successful parent? How may domestic crises be met and mastered? These and many other puzzling and perplexing questions are discussed with utter frankness, and most helpfully too.

The author's point of view is that only as one becomes an effective and efficient person can he meet and master life's in-

timate relationships. The secret is not so much in "finding the right person" as it is in "being the right person." It is Mr. Johnson's conviction that Christianity ceases to be vital unless it meets people where they have needs and that in a vital, personal relationship to God resources for effective living become available to those who earnestly seek to tap this great source of power. "Nothing," he says, "can help more in achieving happiness in marriage, success in parenthood, enjoyment in all life's relationships than can the Christian religion."

These practical chapters have all the vitality and virility of the spoken message coming directly from the heart and mind and lips of the author. As a matter of fact they are just that for they are sermons preached in a Sunday vesper series dealing with the intimate relationships of life. They lose nothing in being committed to writing. Any minister will find here rich suggestion as to how to deal frankly and openly with some of the problems which are often side-stepped by the preacher, but which need to be handled tactfully and positively. This is preaching, and counselling at its best.

EDWARD P. WESTPHAL.

Board of Christian Education of the
Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The Philosophy of Silence. By ALICE
BORCHARD GREENE. New York:
Richard R. Smith, 1940. pp. 254.
\$2.50.

DOCTOR GREENE has written on a most important theme. The value of silence to the life of devotion and contemplation has long been recognized but little understood. Centuries before Jesus withdrew "a great while before day"

into a place of solitude, the Pythagoreans found intellectual and spiritual discipline in cessation from speech. Today the Quaker practice of silent worship is making its way into more formal liturgical services; Gandhi observes regularly his day of silence; in the West we have taken to having ashrams and retreats. Yet the subject of silence has heretofore received little systematic analysis. The author says, probably rightly, that two conflicting and equally exaggerated reactions are usually accorded to it—credulity and skepticism. She attempts to mediate between these positions.

The book consists mainly of material assembled for a Doctor's thesis at Columbia. But it has none of the smell of midnight oil often associated with such dissertations. Perhaps the author's twelve years of experience as student and teacher in the School of Applied Philosophy in New York has removed it. In any case this is a readable (though somewhat moralistic) study, full of significant historical material and citations from the mystics of all ages.

There is a chapter which differentiates between the religious and reflective types of silence, while others deal with its group uses, silence as a self-discipline, as a source of healing, as a challenge to authority, and as a source of knowledge. The retreat movement is analyzed, as is the relation of silence to mystical experience. The book ends with "a few practical suggestions" for relaxation and psychotherapy which, though they sound rather obvious, are much needed by hosts of baffled and frustrated souls.

The religious implications of the book seem to me to lie too largely in the realm of individual salvation and personal peace to be fully satisfactory. But, then—there are other people to write a social

gospel. It is well that Dr. Greene has written on the subject she has chosen.

GEORGIA HARKNESS.

Garrett Biblical Institute,
Evanston, Illinois.

These Shared His Cross. By EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAT. New York: Harper and Brothers. pp. xvi-192. \$1.75.

THE author sets forth the purpose of this book and the explanation of its unusual framework in the following words: "If the Cross is a cosmic principle, it must be kept vital in human experience, kept as contemporary as the cosmos, indeed. Obviously, this is not easy. The Cross, being an historic fact, has for most of us little more than historic interest and value. How can an experience of the Cross be induced? By the telling of a series of imaginary episodes, this book seeks to get back behind the theologizing of the Cross to the experience of it in the lives of several witnesses. The Cross therefore is set over against the cruelty of the scourger, the property of Simon of Cyrene, the family of the lamenting women, the life philosophies of the malefactors, the liberalism of one who passed by in the mob, the orthodoxy of two who buried Him and the military system under whose legal code He was crucified."

Each chapter is divided into two parts. Part one is the imaginary episode so vividly and fascinatingly related that these hitherto insignificant participants in the story of the last week come to life. The reader of this book never again will hear mentioned or will read of Nicodemus, or Simon of Cyrene, or the malefactors, or the son of the Widow of Nain, without feeling that he knows them now more intimately.

The processes of thought and the practices of conduct with which the Cross eternally deals are thus skillfully portrayed in the frame of real life (albeit imaginary) happenings. So reverently does the imagination of the author deal with the known facts and so intelligently does he make use of the knowledge his scholarly research has made available that the reader is never offended by obvious incongruity. One's own imaginative powers are stimulated rather than deadened by the very simplicity of his treatment.

Part two of each chapter is an interpretation of the cosmic principle of the Cross forever engaged in redemptive conflict with that one of the forces that crucified Jesus which has just been made real in part one.

The acute insight of the author lays bare in contemporary life and thought the poignant pain involved in "Sharing His Sufferings." Yet he leaves one with the feeling that life gains significance and value only in so far as one shares in this creative process and a renewed determination not to flinch today nor tomorrow. What more could a book do?

PAUL QUILLIAN.

First Methodist Church,
Houston, Texas.

Come, Let Us Worship. By ALBERT W. PALMER. pp. xx-136. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$1.50.

THE four words of the title of this book express a need which is being increasingly recognized in Protestantism today. It always has been the glory of Protestantism that the pulpit and preaching have been exalted in influence, and this emphasis never should be lost since it reflects the prophetic earnestness of all vital religion;

but to this emphasis on preaching there needs to be added also a leading of the whole congregation to worshipful communion with God. In this the independent and sometimes casually ordered services in Protestant churches frequently have failed. That failure and the desire to correct it are shown by such facts as the wide activity of the Commission on Worship of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, and by the spontaneous efforts of many ministers to enrich and beautify the worship in their own churches.

President Palmer's book begins with a sympathetic and discerning preface in which he sketches the difficulties under which many of the Protestant churches, and especially the small churches, in America, labor today. Yet there is within them, he writes, both among their ministers, their choirs and congregations, "a blind, inarticulate longing to come close to God in worship, although not knowing quite how to do it." Then he goes on to say, "To throw light on the problem of the small church, whether urban or rural, to bring encouragement and practical suggestions to those who are responsible for the leadership of worship services, to share experiences on methods of overcoming practical difficulties, to give ministers new power to analyze their problems and fresh courage to move toward a solution and, finally, to inspire choirs and congregations with an informed interest in the cooperative task of serving the community through better services of public worship: such are the objectives of this book."

Suffice it for the reviewer to say that these objectives are admirably attained. Dr. Palmer is direct yet always tactful, conscious of the great difficulties under which many churches labor, yet moved by a warm and generous appreciation of their latent possibilities. He does not give general exhortations but practical and specific

counsel. No minister anywhere can read this book without being helped, and the great number of ministers who tend to be discouraged because they are in churches where their resources are meager will find it an inspiration to their hearts and a light upon an open way. How adequately Dr. Palmer deals with the realities with which ministers have to do, may be seen by listing the names of some of the chapters—Preaching and Worship, The Bible and Worship, Literary Materials for Worship Programs, Organizing the Church Service, The Building Problems of Small Churches, Educating the Congregation about Worship.

Get this book to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest.

WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE

Union Theological Seminary,
New York, New York.

The Great Century (1800-1914 A. D.). By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York and London: Harper & Brothers. pp. 516. \$3.50.

DR. LATOURETTE continues his monumental history of the expansion of Christianity by bringing out Volume IV in his projected series. This time it is *The Great Century*. Covering, as it does, the organized life and work of the churches of Europe and the United States—more especially of the United States—from 1800 to 1914, one would naturally expect such a volume to be encyclopaedic in sweep and content—and indeed it is. Dr. Latourette spreads a tremendous canvas as may be inferred from the fact that his bibliography printed in the back of *The Great Century* takes 33 pages, 8 point, 3 lines or so to the *biblios*. But the author is attempting to list, evaluate and cover every feature of importance

that appeared in world Christianity between the time that Napoleon crossed the Alps, and the first World War.

The Great Century is factual rather than philosophic. If the book has any fault, it lies in the certain detachment—an objective setting forth of fact in a passionless manner which, while impeccable technique for the historian, in the field of religion always starts a cool wind blowing. But no objections can stand before the actual accomplishment of the architectonic task which the author has undertaken and has to this date finished in such an able way.

The church world should appreciate the value of Dr. Latourette's volumes, finished and unfinished, more than possibly it will. The older type of church history very often became so enthusiastic in portraying the woods that it failed to show the trees. Dr. Latourette certainly cannot be charged with this fault. His study at times becomes almost vague in the enormous mass of detail he feels bound to show. Nevertheless through all the kaleidoscopic movements of a most colorful as well as a "great" century, the ebb and flow of Christianity's tidal movements are clearly seen and distinctly felt. Furthermore, unlike the dictionary, there is a "hang" to the story. In spite of the time and attention given to such unrelated subjects as Swedenborgianism, Premonstratensians, Wellesley College, Speaking with Tongues, Pallotti Fathers, The New York Peace Society and Flathead Indians, the book has unity and coherence.

We predict the volume will maintain its place in years to come and certainly whoever would understand present-day Christianity should have ready access to a copy. Significantly enough, Dr. Latourette closes this great volume by promising three more. Let us hope that this

truly *magnum opus* will be brought to conclusion in the author's own time and way. He is accomplishing a magnificent service.

NOLAN B. HARMON, JR.

Book Editor of the Methodist Church,
New York, New York.

Quit You Like Men. By JOHN MCNAUGHER, F. H. Revell, New York, 1940. pp. 191. \$1.50.

VIGOROUS in style, virile in piety, these thirteen chapters are distilled from baccalaureate addresses to seminary graduates over a period of fifty-two years. The author, President of the Pittsburgh-Xenia Seminary, is a prominent figure in the United Presbyterian Church, a staunch Calvinist, and yet his advice will be welcome as stimulating for ministers of all shades of Christian faith, old or young. The writer's Calvinism is of an earlier type, both social-minded and optimistic in the long view. The great emphasis in these chapters is on preaching, and the personality of the preacher, the writer believing that the "one great and imperative dependence" of the church for her teaching is the pulpit. The church's task is viewed as a quadrilateral: "unlimited evangelism, the edification of its members, a ministry of consolation, and a ringing witness for righteousness within the round of civil society." By this last Dr. McNaugher does not mean merely a polishing of the existing order. Although he does not believe the church ought to preach particular programs or that the world is to be saved by any such, still he affirms that "old-time capitalism has been smitten on its shoddy feet" and that the Gospel is "at bottom both individualistic and socialistic." Firmly evangelical, the author nevertheless warns against "censorious

parochialism" and reminds young ordinands that they are to be ministers of the Church at large. He urged that entering the ministry is not saying goodbye to intellectual freedom, which can be enjoyed "without becoming crooked or even diagonal in theology." And always Christ is to be at the center of life and preaching "like a watermark in stationery." Altogether this is a book which will throw out many a kindling spark.

K. J. FOREMAN.

Davidson College,
Davidson, North Carolina.

The Bible. By WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE. New York: Association Press. pp. 67. 50 cents.

Reality and Religion. By HENRY P. VAN DUSEN. New York: Association Press. pp. 88. 50 cents.

What We Mean by Religion. By WILLARD L. SPERRY. New York: Harper and Brothers. pp. 177. \$1.75.

HERE are three tracts for the times. In brief compass these books lift the problems that intelligent persons face concerning religion and its validity.

The growth of the idea of God in the soul of man is exceedingly slow. Man will persist—he can hardly help himself—in flinging the shadows of his own limitations across his vision of God. It is a necessarily component part of the great and sublime truth that God made man in His own image, and man cannot help constructing God in his own image. That is not a cynical thing to say, except for those who are utterly devoid of insight.

Religious men have projected their own personality to the very throne of God. Nothing can be more fatal to un-

derstanding the Bible than to suppose that it gives us one flat level of moral and spiritual knowledge. Far from being a flat level, it is a continuous ascent, and often a steep and hard one. It is an ascent through failures and mistakes, as well as through successes and victories. It is the glory of the Bible that, beginning with but a very primitive idea of the Divine, it conducts us up and on and out, during the more than 1500 years in which it records the discoveries of the character of God up to the disclosure that we see in Jesus Christ.

Dr. Bowie puts it this way: "The greatness of the Bible, even in its earliest and most primitive elements, lies in its conception of a divine reality ruling the universe, creating man, and inspiring man's slow and confused but onward-moving history."

The Bible affirms the victory of the God of righteousness. "No temporary fanaticism, no matter how passionately it may be believed in and served, can escape the ultimate judgment of unshakable moral facts that are stronger than any nation and longer than any age. Whatever sets itself up against the everlasting standards of truth and honor and justice and mercy, writes its own doom. In the great words of the Bible, God is not mocked. Dreadful moral contradictions arise, and for long periods evil may seem to triumph. But sooner or later, the moral absolutes triumph."

We are hearing much these days about taking what is called "a realistic view of life." We cannot judge the real world by some small bit of it, which tomorrow may be replaced by something better. Its deeper meaning does not stand revealed in some preliminary stage of it but by the outcome toward which it marches. Fix your eyes upon some fag end of human experience, some terrible tragedy, some

primitive custom, some sorry lump of misery, and one may question the worth of religion. You may then ask: "Where is God? Does God really care? Back of all this weltering mass is there a loving and intelligent Personality?"

Van Dusen puts it this way: "Why Religion?" and answers: "Religion is organic to the warp and woof of life—*real* life—its whole course through. Religion may not be especially involved with *all* the issues of life. It is involved in life's *central* issues. This is attested by the origins of religion in mankind's history and in each man's experience; by the persistence of religion among all peoples and through all the ages: but, especially, by the fact that in life's moments of most vivid and vibrant reality—whether joyous or confounding—men *must* seek religion."

In a bit longer book, Dr. Sperry discusses "What We Mean by Religion." Five words that are central to the Christian view of life are examined: religion, faith, prayer, morals, God. The experience of the Christian purpose calls for faith, prayer and moral steadfastness.

"What we need is not the immediate assurance that the mighty scourge of war may pass speedily away, earnestly as we may pray for that happy issue; what we need is the long-range faith that in casting our lot with the Beatitudes and the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians we are on what must be in the end the winning, not the losing, side. Remote as the realization of that hope may be at any given time, this is the Christian faith, and those of us who profess and call ourselves Christians have no alternative but to hold it in good conscience. Meanwhile if there are times when the whole problem of the true nature of morality seems an open question, and when making a moral choice means taking a personal risk, there

is sufficient warrant for taking a Christian risk."

It is good to have minds like those of Bowie, Van Dusen, and Sperry bring a clear witness to the unchangeable God and our own inescapable need. We believe in God because we can neither live nor understand the world in which we live without a sense of a personality "nearer to us than breathing, closer than hands or feet," who becomes our strength and our light.

OSCAR THOMAS OLSON.

Epworth-Euclid Church,
Cleveland, Ohio.

Nurseries of Christians. By JOHN W. SKINNER. London: The Epworth Press. pp. 31. 1 shilling.

A Boy's Right to Religion. By CONRAD SKINNER. London: The Epworth Press. pp. 38. 1 shilling.

The Christian and Education. By W. G. HUMPHREY. London: The Epworth Press. pp. 33. 1 shilling.

THAT England needs a Christian culture, and that the total educational system must provide it, is the thesis underlying these essays by distinguished "public school" educators. Dr. John W. Skinner pleads eloquently for new zeal for the Christian religion in the school system, blasting at complacency, sectarian rivalry, barren religious exercises, anemic homilies for children, and the ignoring of the really Christian training of the young. *Sample*: "Let the ministers and lay preachers have some freedom from their staid, replete, phlegmatic sheep, so that they can feed their hungry, frisking, eager, wayward lambs."

Mr. Conrad Skinner urges the parents of young children to "condition" their boys and girls in matters of the spirit

while they are young, indicating the comparative ineffectiveness of religion taught later in school and church. He emphasizes the obvious need of parents who are positively Christian. On the matter of teaching religion in the school, he suggests the necessity of eliminating all artificiality in worship and Bible instruction. *Sample*: "Experience drives me to the belief in the introduction of the roving element in study of the Bible, the frequent use of seven-league boots."

That the new culture which is to follow the present conflict must be Christian if it is to be worth survival, and that, therefore, its inculcation is the concern of all, is the chief point Dr. Humphrey makes. He emphasizes the necessity of continuing education, and of helping the young to achieve a Christian philosophy of life. *Sample*: "At the moment, one has the impression that the younger laymen who have been brought up in a Christian home and a Christian school are not on the whole pulling their weight in the Christian community."

PHILIP COWELL JONES.

The Madison Avenue
Presbyterian Church,
New York, New York.

Christian Realism. By JOHN C. BENNETT. Scribner's Sons, New York: 1941. pp. xi-184. \$2.00.

ANYONE who has read *Social Salvation* by Dr. Bennett would pick up a new book by the same author expectantly. Such a one would not be disappointed by *Christian Realism*.

Dr. Bennett is always thoughtful, sane and socially creative in what he writes. In this book he naturally begins by asking for a realistic Christian position in the midst of the whirling chaos of today. As in his previous book, he demands a

blend of the personal and social in any attempt at realism.

We are asked to note that we will have to face the world ahead without the backing of the previously generally accepted moral sanctions. "We used to live in a world in which people generally realized that Christian standards had a claim upon them . . . in which those who exercised power were at least inhibited by the scruples of their own or other people's Christian conscience. . . . It is the unity of that world that has been shattered . . . the modern tyrant has no fear of God or hell. . . . God is not only denied in practice. . . . He is also denied in theory." (pp. 2, 5, 6.)

These and other causes which, when worked out into contemporary tyrannies, not only prevent the Church outside America from having freedom to speak on social situations, but "may lead to a wave of other worldly Christian thinking" (p. 75). He asks us in this country to realize that American Christians "must keep alive Christian social teaching, not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of the world Church" (p. 75). His appeal that we specially apply our social thinking to economic realms is based on the fact that "for the first time in history it is possible to produce enough economic goods to abolish poverty" and he quotes from the Oxford report as follows: "The direction of Christian effort . . . should be hereafter turned from charitable paternalism to the realization of more equal justice in the distribution of wealth."

Society tends to control its life for the benefit of the top fraction. Our churches have followed this same middle class tendency and now they are called upon by the author to aid those who are exploited and insecure, these should be given the benefit of the doubt. He writes, "I submit that unless we cultivate the habit

of mind that sees the world from the point of view of these who have least privileges, we can have no part in the mind of Christ" (p. 114).

In discussing various phases of the theological message for tomorrow, Dr. Bennett deplores the tendency to lessen the place given to Jesus in the liberal Christianity of today. He says "Men are more likely to be humbled in their pretensions in a significant way as they face the embodiment of divine goodness in Christ, than when as in the case of Job they face the power and majesty of God in the cosmos" (p. 29). He further argues against the belittling of the importance of the "Jesus of History" in contrast to "The Christ of Faith."

Dr. Bennett in his treatment of pacifism pays high tribute to those who hold the absolute pacifist position but insists that "pacifism is not a self-sufficient social strategy available at all times to the nation and to those who are responsible for public policy, and that since Christians have responsibility for public policy, pacifism is not the only decision open to the Christian who seeks to be sensitive and obedient" (p. 101).

In the closing chapter the author gives a list of the bases for the redemptive factors at work today. These, while realistic, are substantial and worthy of careful thought in formulating our conclusions.

It is a good, sane and clarifying book and one whose whole impact will be "on the side of the angels."

ALBERT W. BEAVEN.

Colgate-Rochester Divinity School,
Rochester, New York.

The Greatest of These. By Frederick Pinch. Revell. \$1.50. Love, the Key, as applied to every phase of modern life.

Religion and the Modern World. University of Pennsylvania Press. \$2.00. Fifteen proofs given at the University's Bicentennial Conference—proofs that our modern world is athirst for religion at every point.

What Does Jesus Expect of His Church? By Sam Higginbottom. Revell. \$1.25. "To bring about a better understanding between God and man and between man and man."

The Man Christ Jesus. By John Knox. Willett, Clark. \$1.00. A picture—not a portrait—of the "Man."

Our Prodigal Son Culture. By Hugh Stevenson Tigner. Willett, Clark. \$1.50. Is culture ready to return home now, since science, big business and law of progress no longer support it? Or can the dictators help?

The Religions of Democracy. By Finkelstein, Ross, and Brown. National Conference of Christians and Jews. \$2.00. An exposition of the principal beliefs, creeds and practices of Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism.

Asking Why. By R. S. Wright and A. W. Loos. Oxford. \$1.50. A padre and his boys discuss the Christian faith.

He Opened the Book. By Teunis E. Gouwens. Revell. \$1.50. A plea for the lost art of Bible study.

Wisdom and Folly in Religion. By Joseph Haroutunian. Scribners. \$2.00. An interpretation of religion according to the modern mind; and a restatement of the Reformation—not so modern.

Manifest Victory. By J. R. Moseley. Harper. \$1.50. The tale of a victorious life gained through complete faith in the all sufficiency of God's love.

Christian Symbols in a World Community. By Daniel J. Fleming. Friendship. \$2.00. A pictorial proof of the use of the indigenous arts of Africa and Asia on Christian churches in those lands.

Author of Liberty. By Robert W. Searle. Friendship. \$1.00. A call for Christlike Christians to preserve democracy.

Christ in War Time. By John S. Bunting. Revell. \$1.50. Inspirational aids for spiritual comfort in time of need.

Not Alone. By Joseph R. Sizoo. Macmillan. \$1.25. Practical evidence of God as our "ever present help."

Candles in the Wind. By Allan Knight Chalmers. Scribners. \$2.00. A pertinent presentation of the "true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

—And the Other Mary. By P. G. S. Hopwood. Revell. \$1.25. Life after death as a continuance of life before death.

The Practice of His Presence. By Thomas A. Stafford. Revell. \$1.50. Helps for daily meditation.

N. Y. Botanical Garden Journal— March, 1941. 15c. A comprehensive discussion and list of Biblical plants—viewed in the light of "modern knowledge."

Bold To Say. By Austin Pardue. Scribners. \$1.75. Man's basic need and attitude as reflected in the "Lord's Prayer."

The Prayer Perfect. By Harry Rimmer. Revell. \$1.25. The background and origin of the epitome of all prayers.

Bookish Brevities

It was just another item on the Booklist, but it translated a local professor of Frankfurt and Berlin into an acknowledged leader in the international sphere of thought. The author was no longer simply a leader of the young Christian Socialists of a single country. He was the property of the world. He was to be compared to Spengler. With convincing confidence he could interpret contemporary movements of history and culture in terms of Christian Philosophy.

Today the Union Theological Seminary and America—in fact, the entire thinking world—is richer because Paul Tillich is an exile from Germany. The book—*The Religious Situation*. And it is interesting to note that it was translated by H. Richard Niebuhr, whose *Meaning of Revelation* Dr. Tillich himself reviews in this issue.

Seldom, if ever, has an author burned out his publishers, although doubtless there have been authors who would have found the idea attractive. But something like that happened when Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., in London went up in smoke when Paternoster Row was bombed a few weeks ago. They had published *Mein Kampf*.

The Baptist Times of London evidently is keeping its eye on Dr. James Moffatt's American translation of the Bible. Recently it said: "The English translation for which he is responsible

has not entirely commended itself to American readers. They are said to object to a number of English colloquialisms. Dr. Moffatt, therefore, is going to turn them into Americanisms!"

Three hundred sheepskins were needed to make one perfect copy of the Gutenberg Bible. One of the three existing copies is owned by the Congressional Library. Another has been purchased by the Huntington Library in California.

Edward Shillito is responsible for the word that despite war conditions, there were 16,944 books published last year in the United Kingdom, more than in any previous year. Of these there were 913 books on religion—an increase of 67.

The Library of the University of Southern California, which emphasizes the collection of American literature since 1850, has recently been presented with most of the books and private papers of the late Hamlin Garland. Among the many interesting and valuable items, comprising early editions, manuscripts, and voluminous correspondence throwing light upon literary trends through several generations, is a presentation copy of one of Emerson's books, on the flyleaf of which John Burroughs summarized his personal and ideological connection with the philosopher.

An additional highly-prized gift to the Library is that of thirty-five rare volumes by, and about, Madame de Staël.